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ABSTRACT 
As the title suggests, the primary concern of this study is with problems 
arising from a very widely used notion in the recent literature of linguistics and 
philosophy, the notion of implicature. As this concept was introduced and 
developed by the philosopher H. P. Grice, the main part of the study will under- 
standably be centred around his work. Grice distinguished between two main 
types of implicature, the conventional and the conversational. 
In the first part we will be concerned with, what Grice called, conventional 
implicature, and in particular with the linguistic items generating it, as described in 
his work. Thus the aim of this part of the study will be to investigate the nature of 
conventional implicata, and to ask whether they can be justifiably claimed to be non- 
consequential for truth-evaluation and invariable, as Grice argues. Grice's 
account in this respect will be found to be partly implausible, as regards his treatment 
of 'therefore', and partly inadequate, as it fails to take into account the wide ranging 
function of 'but' - his paradigm of conventional implicature - but treats its 
variable meaning aspects as invariable, conventional implicature. In view of the 
intriguing linguistic behaviour of 'but', the main contributions to this topic in the 
literature will be reviewed. 
In the second part of the study our primary aim will be to consider in detail 
linguistic phenomena that come under the rubric of conversational implicature in the 
literature - with an emphasis on Grice's examples - with a view to detecting 
common characteristics that can be taken as the parameters along which these phenomena 
can be defined as a homogeneous class. It will be concluded that they cannot. More 
stringent criteria will be proposed for membership in a narrowly defined class of con- 
versational implicature. Two classes of background knowledge and assumptions will be 
described and shown to bear significantly on language production and understanding and, 
in particular, on the production and understanding of linguistic facts that have been 
called conversational implicatures. It will be concluded that the term 'conversational 
implicature' has been misused and abused. The view taken here will be that backgroun 
knowledge schemes must be taken into account and represented in a language theory, 
though the difficulties facing such an enterprise are well understood and acknowledged. 
However, the overall conclusion will be that Grice's proposal effects a cut 
and dried demarcation between a neat but narrowly defined truth-functional semantics, 
on the one hand, and an unexplicated pragmatics, on the other, that would, however, 
include the most intriguing aspects of language use. , This view of language is not 
very revealing and, hence, uninteresting and unappealing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years some philosophers have called attention to the concept of 
contextual implication in their attempt to solve philosophical problems by analysing 
the meanings of words and by analysing the relations between linguistic forms and 
the world. In particular, the notion of contextual implication figures prominently 
in Nowell-Smith, 1957, who was the first to flesh it out. He defines contextual 
implication as follows: 
I shall say that a statement p contextually implies a statement 
q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language 
would be entitled to infer q from p in the context in which 
they occur. 
(p. 72) 
A detailed exposition of contextual implication is offered by Hungerland, 1960, who 
rejects the inductive interpretation of the paradigm of contextual implication (to say 
p is to imply that one believes that p), and, instead, proposes an explicatory model 
according to which "a speaker in making a statement contextually implies whatever 
one is entitled to infer on the basis of the presumption that his act of stating is 
normal" (pp. 255,224). 
However, Grice was the first, and, until now, the only philosopher to develop 
a fully-fledged theory of contextual implication considered from the point of view of 
the philosopher of language, although, originally, in his earlier writings, his immediate 
concern lay with the problem of formulating a theory of Perception, rather than with 
advancing a theory of implication, per se. Later on, however, in a series of lectures, 
Grice developed a very influential theory of discourse, in which the notion of 
implication has a prominent role. 
As our primary concern in this study is with the concept of implication, or 
implicature as it was later baptized by Grice, we think it will prove useful to give a 
brief sketch of Grice's theory of Conversation. We may, therefore, first turn to his 
account of 'what is said'. 
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1. Grice's account of 'what is said' 
Grice distinguishes between two identifications of 'what is said'. A 
full identification, for which one would need to know "(a) the identity of x, 
(b) the time of utterance, (c) the meaning on the particular occasion of utterance" 
(Grice, 1975, p. 44) the words, or sentence uttered; and a partial one, for which 
none of the above factors are needed. 
Although Grice's definition of a partial identification of 'what is said' is 
closely related to the conventional meaning of words (or sentences), yet it is not 
identified with it. He writes: 
In the sense in which I am using the word 'say', I intend 
what someone has said to be closely related to the con- 
ventional meaning of the words (the sentence) which he 
has uttered. 
(ibid., p. 44) 
However, the partial identification of what is said seems to be indistinguishable from 
the conventional meaning of words or sentences. The reason for his distinction, 
apparently, lies in the fact that he wants to leave room within the bounds of con- 
ventional meanings for his concept of conventional implicatures. Conventional 
implicatures have to be part of the conventional meaning of words. Therefore, a 
partial identification of what is said is identifiable with only a part of the conventional 
meaning and bears a part - whole relationship to it. 
The question that arises is what is the utility of a distinction between two 
identifications of what is said. Wouldn't the definition of a full identification of 
what-is said still leave room within the bounds of the conventional meaning for 
accommodating conventional implicatures deriving from it? ' Grice does not seem 
to give any justification for this distinction. A graphic representation of his 
concept of 'what is said' would be as in figure 1. 
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Figure 1 
Total signification of utterance (what is conveyed) 
meaning 
conventional 
what is said (partially) what is conventionally 
implicated 
what is said (fully) 
The only grounds for singling out a partial identification of what is said 
seems to be the fact that we have a rough understanding of what is said, as well as 
of what is conventionally implicated, without having any knowledge of the factors 
determining the full identification of what is said. For if I overhear someone 
saying (1) 
(1)' Robin is very fond of seals, therefore he ordered one, 
I have a rough understanding of what is said and what is implicated (conventionally), 
though I do not know who is the referent of 'Robin', nor whether what is meant by the 
word 'seal' is the sea mammal, or the engraved stamps, or the sealing wax. I still 
understand, though, that the person referred to as Robin ordered either a sea mammal, 
or an engraved stamp, or a sealing wax, as a result of his being fond of it. This 
relation of consequentiality is what Grice calls the conventional implicature attaching 
to the word 'therefore'. 
Another hitch in his account seems to be the following: In order to deter- 
mine factor (c), the meaning, on the particular occasion of utterance, of the phrase 
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used, you need to know more than what is specified in factors (a) and (b), i. e. 
the identity of references in the sentence uttered, and the time of utterance. For 
imagine a situation in which I say to my friend (2) at a specific time t, 
(2) Queen Elizabeth II is very fond of seals; 
given that the identity of the reference is quite clear and the time is also specified, 
my friend couldn't, on the grounds of the identification of these two parameters 
alone, decide between the two interpretations (2a) and (2b) of (2): 
(2a) Queen Elizabeth If is very fond of sea mammals 
(2b) Queen Elizabeth 11 is very fond of engraved stamps. 
(similar examples are pointed out in Lehnert, 1980) 
More circumstances of the utterance need to be known for identifying precisely the 
conventional meaning of the words used, i. e. for a full identification of 'what is 
said', as Grice conceptualises it. 
However, enough has been said about Grice's account of 'what is said. 
His main contribution to a theory of discourse has been his proposal that talking be 
seen as a co-operative enterprise, with an accepted purpose and direction, a case of 
"purposive, indeed rational, behaviour" (Grice, op. cit., p. 47), governed by the 
Cooperative Principle and its maxims, to a sketch of which we will now turn. 
2. The Cooperative Principle and its maxims 
The Cooperative Principle (henceforth CP) specifies that our conversational 
contributions are governed by a rationale that would run as follows: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, 
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk-exchange in which you are engaged. 
(ibid., p. 45) 
Four categories are distinguished within the CP, which he calls Quantity, 
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Quality, Relation and Manner. 
gories: 
Further subsidiary maxims fall under these cate- 
Quantity ('M. Quant'): (1) Make your contribution as informative as is 
required (for the current purpose of the exchange) 
(2) Doanot make your contribution more informative 
than is required. 
Quality ('M. Qual'): Supermaxima Try to make your contribution one 
that is true. 
(1) Do not say what you believe to be false. 
(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate 
evidence. 
Relation ('MR'): Be relevant. 
Manner ('MM'): Supermaxim: Be perspicuous. 
(1) Avoid obscurity of expression. 
(2) Avoid ambiguity. 
(3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
(4) Be orderly. 
I 
We will now turn to Grice's account of conversational implicatures and their 
connection with the CP and its maxims. We will draw attention to certain problems 
that can be raised with his account of the CP in section 6.5, though. 
3. Conversational implications 
Grice's, 1915, notion of conversational implicature is intimately connected 
with the CP. He characterizes it as follows: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) 
that p has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally 
implicated that q, provided that: (1) he is to be presumed to be 
observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative 
principle, (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks, that, 
q, is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p 
(or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and 
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(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think 
that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of 
the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (2) is required. 
(ibid., pp. 49-50) 
A conversational implicature, therefore, is worked out on the assumption 
that the CP is observed. However, it is mostly generated via an apparent violation 
of it. A participant in a talk-exchange may fail to fulfil a maxim in a variety of 
ways. He may "quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim", or he may "opt out 
from the operation both of the maxim and of the CP" (ibid., p. 49). He may be 
faced with a clash of two maxims, when, for instance, he cannot give the requisite 
information on a matter ('M. Quant. ') or if he lacks adequate evidential grounds for it 
('M. Qual. '). Furthermore, he may "flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly 
fail to fulfil it". In this latter case, when it is clear that the speaker. is neither 
trying to mislead, nor is he faced with a clash of maxims, and, on the assumption that 
he is in a position to fulfil the maxim, then the hearer is faced with a problem: he 
wants to reconcile the speaker's saying what he did with the supposition that the CP 
is observed. It is this situation, Grice says, that characteristically gives rise to the 
generation of a conversational implicature; "and when a conversational implicature 
is generated in this way", Grice writes, "I shall say that a maxim is exploited" (ibid. , 
p, 49). 
Grice distinguishes between two classes of non-convent ional, 
2 
conversational 
implicatures: generalized conversational implicatures and particularized conversational 
implicatures. In cases of particularized, conversational implicature, "an implicature", 
Grice says, "is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion, in virtue of special 
features of the, context". " In these cases, he adds, "there is no room for the idea that 
an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying. that p"'(ibid., p. 56). 
On the other hand, the absence of these characteristics seems to define the 
class of general conversational implicatures. For example, the generalized, 
conversational implicature attaching to conditional and disjunctive statements is that 
7 
there are non-truth-functional grounds for making them. So in the case of 'if p 
then q' expressions, there is an implicature that the speaker is not in a position to 
make a stronger statement, if the assumption is that he is observing the CP. For 
if he were in a position to say that p, then, according to the maxim of Quantity he 
would say so. But to choose this form of expression, he conversationally implicates 
that he lacks sufficient evidential grounds for saying p, or for saying Band he, thus, 
avoids a clash with the maxim of Quality. Likewise, in cases of use of 'if p then9' 
forms, the generalized conversational implicature thereby generated is that there are 
non-truth-functional grounds, i. e. that q is inferrible from p, or that 2 is a good reason 
for q. Grice, therefore, is in a position to maintain that, accepting this explanation 
for the, non-truth-functional aspects of meaning of such locutions enables us to handle 
disjunctive, conditional and conjunctive statements in terms of their logical counter- 
parts, 'pvq', 'p-)q', 'p&q'. 
However, Grice admits that non-controversial examples of generalized, 
conversational implicatures are hard to find, "since it is all too easy to treat a 
generalized, conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature" (ibid., 
p. 56). Moreover, although a conversational implicature is a condition that is not 
specified within the boundaries of the conventional force of an utterance, Grice admits 
that "it may not be impossible for what starts life ... as a conversational implicature to 
become conventionalized" (ibid., p. 58). It is quite obvious that Grice here refers 
to generalized, conversational implicature, since in most cases of particularized 
conversational implicature, -the implicature is carried through in virtue of contextual 
features which are not germane to the utterance, per se, of the sentence. Whereas, 
in cases of generalized implicature, the implicature is carried in virtue of the use of a 
certain form of words in an utterance. It is immediately evident that there is 
tension in the distinction between, and specification of, these two types of implicature, 
the conventional and the non-conventional conversational generalized implicature. 
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Furthermore, it will be shown in a later section of this study, that the vehicles 
carrying the implicature -a test Grice proposes for identifying the vehicles of 
implicature - in cases of conventional implicature are identical to the ones in cases 
8 
of generalized, conversational implicature. Although general ized. impl icatures 
can be cancelled, 
4 
they exhibit a high degree of non-detachability. trice 
actually considers the viability of treating non-truth-functional aspects, of the 5 
meaning of 'or' in terms of conventional implicatures.. But then he adds: 
... if a model case for a word which carries a conventional , implicature is 'but', then the negative form 'It is not the case 
that A or B', if to be thought as involving 'or' in the strong 
sense Con-truthfunctiona7, should be an uncomfortable thing 
to say, since 'It is not the case that A but B' is uncomfortable. 
(Grice, 1978, p. 117)5 
However, in a lengthy discussion of, the linguistic behaviour of 'but' in later sections 
of this study, it becomes clear that 'but' cannot be cited as an indisputable "model 
case of a word which. carries a conventional implicature", as Grice would have it. 
There are grounds, therefore, for viewing non-conventional generalized 
conversational implicature, attaching to such locutions as 'if p then'a', 'Evg' and 
'p & q', as belonging on'anýequal footing with conventional implicature. - On the 
assumption that they both carry distinct aspects of meaning from the logical meaning 
of the words, it,; could be proposed that they both be accounted for within a unitary 
framework (cf. Karttunen and Peters, 1979, p. 48). This would result in a more 
economical and elegant account. 
In this study, therefore, as far as' conventional`implicatures are-concerned, 
we will be primarily 'concerned, not with generalized, conversational implicatures, 
but with the more intriguing class of particularized conversational implicatures. 
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As for another type of generalized, conversational implicature' that, according to 
Grice, attaches to the use of the definite and indefinite article; it will be dealt 
with in chapter 9. Grice's account of conversational implicature raises a number 
of issues, some of which, however, will be taken up in the second part of this thesis. 
Before turning to a detailed consideration of conventional implicature, it would be 
worth mentioning two kinds of tests, which, Grice proposed for the identification of 
impl icatures. 
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4. Detachability and cancellability tests 
Two features that could characterize conversational implicatures are 
detachability and -cancellability. Grice is not very explicit as to what the 
doctrine should be, neither does he claim that any of these two tests is decisive 
for determining the presence of implicata. He writes that all conversational 
implicatures are cancellable, and, apparently, he is inclined to claim that they should 
be non-detachable, too. It looks as though, ideally, the doctrine should prescribe 
that: (a) all conversational implicatures must be cancellable; and, (b) all con- 
versational implicatures must be non-detachable. 
An impl i cature is not detachable in so far. as one cannot find another form of pi 
words to make exactly the same assertion that would not carry the some implicature. 
It is cancellable inasmuch as one can withhold commitment from the implicature 
carried by what he has said, without thereby annulling what was said. An implicature 
can be cancelled, either explicitly, by the addition of a clause of the form 'but not 
or 'I do not mean to imply that a', or contextually, when the context is such that no 
implicature is carried by the same locution. 
Unfortunately, however, neither of the two tests is considered to be a 
necessary, or a sufficient condition for the presence of an implicature. For example, 
non-detachability cannot be a necessary condition because an implicature may be 
carried in virtue of the manner of expression, and, in that case, it is detachable. 
Taking into consideration that entailments are also non-detachable, it is clear that 
detachability cannot be a sufficient condition for conversational implicature, either. 
The cancellability test can fail, too, because of our loose use of language. For 
example, we may use locutions, such as 'It is green now', when all we actually mean 
is that it looks green. 
Grice argues, however, that the implicature is not detachable in so for as it 
is not possible to say the same thing in another way which would not carry the 
implicature. He cites the verb 'try' as an example of this instance. He writes: 
10 
One would normally implicate that there was a failure, or 
some chance of failure, or that someone thinks/thought there 
to be some chance of failure, if one said 'A tried to do x'; 
this implicature would also be carried if one said 'A attempted 
to do x', 'A endeavoured to do x', 'A set himself to do x'. 
(Grice, 1978, p. 115) 
However, the question that is raised in this connection is why such meaning aspects 
should be treated as conversational implicatures rather than be regarded as part of the 
meaning proper of the word, or at most as conventional implicatures (cf. Karttunen 
and Peters, 1975,1977) if the existence of such a class of implicatures is to be 
conceded. In the some vein then, one could say that the verb 'chase' implicates 
that the entity identified as its direct object is moving fast, or when we say 'She 
bought a cardigan', we thereby imply that there was somebody to sell the cardigan, 
or, further, when we say 'She sold five beakers today', the implicature attaching to 
the word 'sold' is that there was at least one person to whom she sold the beakers, and 
so on (cf. Fillmore,. 1971. a). One, then, wonders what the conventional meaning of 
these words is. Besides, such a proliferation of implicata would be intolerable on 
the assumption that implicatures are to be treated as informal inferences, as indeed 
they are by Grice, and, hence, not to be handled within a formal framework. 
Another class of implicatures are what Grice calls conventional implicatures, 
hinted at in section 1. As has been seen, conventional implicatures derive from the 
conventional meaning of the words, and, yet, they are not part of what is said. 
Therefore, they are not truth -fun ctional: aspects of mean ing, "-neither will. an account of 
them be included in a semantics proper in Grice's view. In Part One our concern is 
with this poorly described class of implicatures, the conventional implicatures, and, 
in particular, with the implicatures attaching to 'but' and 'therefore' - these two 
words being the main examples of conventional implicatures in Grice's account - to 
a consideration of which we may now turn. 
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.: r PART Iý 
CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES 
". 
' 
,a fp'. 
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1. 'THEREFORE': A CASE STUDY 
1.1 'Therefore', 'but', and truth-functionality 
It is well known that not all the connectives of natural language have 
their analogues in a formal logical system. Moreover the ones that do are 
not considered to be adequately represented. 
As we will be concerned here with the conjunctions 'but' and 'therefore', 
the question that immediately arises is why they are not represented in formal 
systems; 
' 
- 'and', however, is represented in-logic, apparently, because its 
formal counterpart '&' affords truth-functionality and precision. The following 
passage explains why 'and', but not 'but', or 'because', has a logical counterpart: 
'&' is truth-functional; and truth-functions are especially 
readily amenable to formal treatment - notably, they allow 
the possibility of a mechanical decision procedure. This is 
no doubt why the formal logician has an analogue of 'and' but 
none of 'because' or 'but'; 'and', in at least a large class of 
uses, is truth-functional, whereas the truth-value of 'A because 
B' depends not only on the truth-values of 'A' and 'B', but also 
on whether B is a reason for A, and the trut1-value of 'A but B' 
also upon w1 ether the combination of A and Bis surprising. 
(S. Haack, 1978, p. 34) 
Strawson, 1952, finds "the logician's neglect of these conjunctions, in spite 
of their distinctive meaning .., intelligible". He points out that the reason the 
logician has selected, for example, 'and' to be represented in a formal system and 
not other conjunctions, is not a fear of reduplication: 
The words 'but', 'although', 'nevertheless', for example, are 
not mere stylistic variants on 'and'. Their use implies at 
least that there is some element of contrast between the 
conjoined statements or attributes; and, sometimes, that 
the conjunction is unusual or surprising. But this kind of 
implication, though it must not be neglected when we are 
discussing the meanings of words, is not readily expressible 
in an entailment - or inconsistency - rule. 
(ibid., Chapter 2, part II, section 12) 
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While, however, it is quite clear that truth-functionality is desirable, 
it has yet to be proved that the logical constants are capable of covering most, 
if not all, of the uses of their natural language counterparts. 
2 
To do so, 
they must admit of readings that will correctly represent other connectives of 
natural language that have no formal analogues, like 'but' and 'therefore'. 
However, if a formal system is to afford greater generality and precision, 
conjunction in natural language must be viewed as truth-functional, i. e. the 
truth-value of the compound sentence must depend on the truth-values of the 
conjuncts and not as intensional, i. e. as depending on the meaning of the 
conjuncts. But it is well known that the connectives in natural language 
are not merely truth-functional and that, as a consequence, there are 
discrepancies. 
1.2 Grice's proposal of conventional implicatures: 'therefore' 
In part of his work Grice is concerned with these discrepancies in meaning 
between the logical connectives and their counterparts in natural language. He 
holds that such divergences in meaning are apparent and no more than the conse- 
quence of lack of due attention to the conditions attaching to conversation: 
I wish ... to maintain that the common assumption of the 
contestants that the divergences do in fact exist is (broadly 
speaking) a common mistake, and that the mistake arises 
from an inadequate attention to the nature and importance 
of the conditions governing conversation. 
(Grite, 1975, p. 43) 
In an attempt to remedy this state of affairs he proposes that part of what 
is understood in many utterances is no more than what is 'implicated'. These 
'implicatures' carry what can be characterized as the non-truth-functional 
meaning of the connectives of natural language. 
In what follows we will concern ourselves with a poorly described class 
of implicatures, which Grice calls conventional implicatures. Grice does 
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not give a full account of what this class of implicatures is, how they can be 
defined, what their main characteristics are or how they differ from his other 
class of implicatures, the conversational, or how they are distinguished from 
what is said, as he acknowledges in his William James Lectures: 
The nature of conventional implicature needs to be examined 
before any free use of it, for explanatory purposes, can be 
indulged in. 
(Grice, 1978, p. 117) 
The notion of conventional implicature needs attention; the 
relation between what is conventionally implicated and what 
is said needs characterization. 
(Grice, Lecture V, p. 19) 
According to his account, while conventional implicatures derive from 
the conventional meaning of the lexical items used, they are not part of what 
is 'said', i. e. the logical content that determines the truth conditions of the 
sentence. They comprise those aspects of the meaning of words that are non- 
truth-conditional: 
In some cases the conventional meaning of the words used 
will determine what is implicated, besides helping to 
determine what is said. 
(Gri ce, 1975, p. 44) - 
However, it should be remarked in passing that what is claimed in this 
quotation does not seem to be in line with Grice's account of conventional 
implicatures elsewhere. (See Grice, 1978, p. 113). This could be 
represented in a tree diagram as follows: 
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Figure 2 
The total signification of an utterance 
(what is conveyed) 
what is said what is implicated 
conventionally non-conventionally 
If we want to bring in a reference to the conventional meaning of an utterance, 
then the tree diagram would be as in figure 3: 
Figure 3 
The total signification of an utterance 
(what is conveyed) 
conventional meaning `,. what is implicated 
what is said ? conventionally non-conventionally 
In both diagrams, however, it is not clear if there is any interrelation, let 
alone a close one, between the conventional meaning of the utterance and what is 
conventionally implicated or, assuming that there is such an interrelation, how it 
is to be represented. By contrast, what the diagram shows is that the conventional 
meanings of the words of the utterance do not have a direct bearing, as the system 
assumes, on what is conventionally implicated. The claim, however, is that the 
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conventional meaning of the words determines what is conventionally 
implicated, and this connection must be represented in a tree diagram by way 
of a dominating relation. 
R. Harnish; '1977, offers a similar diagram in which, again, 'what is 
meant' and 'what"is said' do not seem to bear any'determining relation to what 
is conventionally implicated, though he notes that his schematization, figure 4, 
is meant to be only suggestive. 
Figure 4 
Total content (signification) of an utterance (remark) 
what was meant what was said what is implicated 
what was 
presupposed 
what is conventionally what is non-conventionally 
implicated imp7icated 
what is conversationally 
implicated 
contextual 
particularized generalized 
conversational implicatures conversational implicatures 
(ibid. , p. 331) 
Moreover, in his diagram, what is said does not seem to be part of what is meant 
as is the case in Grice's theory. Neither is what is conventionally implicated 
represented as being dominated by what is meant. 
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Sadock, 1978, on the other hand, rejects a tree diagram along these 
lines, and prefers an altered version, as in figure 5, "because of the close 
similarity between what is said and what is conventionally implicated, and 
because of the similarity between conversational and nonconversational, 
nonconventional implicature". 
Figure 5 
Conveyed 
conventionally non-conventionally 
semantically non-semantically generally particularly 
(ibid., p. 284) 
In this schematization the crucial relationship between the conventional 
meaning of the words and what is conventionally implicated is brought out. 
Although Sadock does not make any further comments, it is quite clear that 
the conventional implicatures would belong to what is conventionally non- 
semantically conveyed in an utterance. 
Another diagram along lines suggested in Grice's account again (1978, 
p. 113) would look I ike the one offered in Sadock, 1978. 
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Figure 6 
Total signification of utterance (what is conveyed) 
meaning 
conventional non-conventional meaning 
what is said conventional non-conventional implicatures 
implicatures 
,-:, I 
conversational implicatures 
particular - general 
In this schematization conversational implicatures are seen as dominated by the 
parent node of non-conventional meaning. However this diagram is inconsistent 
with figure 2, which again is derived from Grice, 1978, as is clear below: 
I wish to make ýra distinctio]within the total signification 
of a remark: a distinction between what the speaker has 
said ... and what he has 'implicated' (e. g. implied, indicated, 
suggested, etc. ), taking into account the fact that what he has 
implicated maybe either conventionally implicated (implicated 
by virtue of the meaning of some word or phrase which he has 
used) or non-conventional) implicated (in which case the 
specification of the imp icature falls outside the specification 
of the conventional meaning of the words used). 
(P"54) 
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In so for as 'but' and 'therefore' are concerned, Grice suggests that they 
are formalisable by means of the logical constant '&' on the assumption that the 
non-truth-functional aspects of their meanings are accounted for in terms of 
implicatures.. As regards 'therefore', Grice, 1975, gives the following 
account: -, 
If'I say (smugly) "He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, 
brave", I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of 
the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his 
being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being 
an Englishman. But while I have said that he is an 
Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to 
say that I have said (in the favored sense) that it follows 
from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though I 
have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is 
so. 
(pp. 44-45) 
He goes onto say that implicatures of this kind are conventional, apparently, 
because they are closely related to what is said. They are a regular feature 
of what is said in the sense that what is conventionally implicated cannot be 
intelligibly contradicted. Were one, for example, to utter: "He is an 
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave though I do nöt think there is any causal 
connection between the two", he would, no doubt, leave his audience mystified. 
However, Grice wants to claim, although they cannot be intelligibly contradicted, 
such an explicit cancellation would fall short of rendering the utterance false were 
it the case that, indeed, he was English and brave. 
He therefore regards the utterance of (3), 
(3) He is an Englishman; he is therefore brave, 
as the utterance of two sentences conjunctively connected with the"connective 
11 1ý1 &I ;i 
(4) p&g. _ 
Thus the utterance of (3)'cän be written as (5): 
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(5) He is English & He is brave. 3 
In other words Grice claims that (3) should be regarded as a conjunction, 
i. e. a truth-functional compound statement in which '&' is a truth-functional, 
connective. Therefore, the truth-conditions of (3) should be equivalent to 
the, truth-conditions of (5), which are represented in the following truth-table: 
p9. 
ttt 
t-, ff 
fft 
f f- f 
As for the meaning of consequentiality that is conveyed by 'therefore', Grice 
wants to claim that it is a matter of conventional implicatures, i. e. that it does 
not play any role in the determination of the truth-value of the utterance. 
1.3 
- 
The enthymematic form of Grice's example of 'therefore' 
However for such a claim to be validly made, it must not be the case that 
the truth or falsity of one conjunct will affect the truth-value of the other; 
that is, the truth-values of the two connects must be independently determined, 
if Grice's system of conventional implicatures is` to be salvaged. As Quine, 
1952, put it, "the logical connectives by which components are joined in 
compounds must be thought of as insulating each component from whatever 
influences its neighbors might have upon its meaning" (p. 49). Moreover, the 
contents of one of the two connects must not be inferrable on the basis of the 
contents of the other (see below). Our grounds for asserting one conjunct 
must not be our belief in the truth of the other; i. e. the reason for asserting 
q must not lie in our belief that a is true. 
We will now proceed to examine Grice's example (3) of conventional 
implicature, which is repeated here for convenience: - 
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(3) He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave. 
Grice holds that the semantics of (3) are accountable for within the framework 
of formal logic with the proviso that what is taken to have been asserted are 
the propositions that he is an Englishman and that he is brave. To be able to 
do that, however, any logical connection between the two conjuncts should be 
dispensed with in a formal semantics. What this requirement entails is that 
the proposition 'he is brave' should not be assertible in virtue of the assertibility 
of the proposition 'he is an Englishman'. 
The first thing that comes to notice in (3) is that it has the form of an 
informal argument which is elliptically formulated; (3) is a 'hidden' 
syllogistic argument whose form is that of an enthymeme, i. e. an argument with 
one of its two premises suppressed. Although we often use categorical 
syllogisms in everyday discourse, it is useful to remember that they are very 
rarely explicitly stated in their complete form. More often, what can be 
'understood' without being explicitly expressed can be left out. It is then 
left to the hearer to supply the assumed premise that was left by the speaker 
unexpressed, and on the basis of which the argument will be comprehended. 
The Enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often 
than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any 
of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even 
to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show 
that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize 
is a crown, it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the 
Olympic games", without adding "And in the Olympic games 
the prize is a crown", a fact which everybody knows. 
... we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length 
of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all 
the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words 
in saying what is manifest., ' 
(Aristotle's Rhetoric, 1357al6,1395625, 
quoted in C. L. Hamblin Fallacies, 1970, p. 71) 
Aliwood et al., 1977, note that, in everyday speech, premises from which 
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conclusions are drawn in reasonings may be left unexpressed. They add-that 
such hidden premises can be viewed as background knowledge shared by speaker 
and listener. It is not evident, though, that this is indisputably the case. 
It is arguable whether what is left unexpressed is viewed as background knowledge 
shared by both or all participants in a conversation, or whether it is not more 
accurate to say that it is so regarded by the'speaker alone. 
5 
In fairness to 
Allwood et al., however, it should be noted that what seems to be the case is 
that the premises that are not commonly stated, but assumed, are statements of 
great generality'or laws or quasi-law statements. In so far as such general 
statements are concerned, it can be justifiably claimed that they can be regarded 
as background knowledge shared by both speaker and listener. It should be 
remarked, though, that the degree of the probability of 'sharedness' is inversely 
proportional to the degree of the probabilistic nature of the statement that 
constitutes the assumed premise. In any case it, is quite clear in the-example 
at, issue that the premise that is left unexpressed, but on the assumption of which 
the utterance of (3) is intelligible,, is (6): 
(6) All Englishmen are brave. 6 
1.4 Two interpretations of the example 
1.4.1 ExplandtorY interpretations 
It is essential here to make clear wliat the utterance of (3) may constitute. 
It may be uttered as an argument, but it may equally well be uttered as an 
explanation. In the latter case, the proposition 'he is brave', is viewed as a 
well known and established fact, whose truth is taken for granted. ' He is 
brave' comprises the explanandum for which an explanation is sought. What 
the speaker does in this case is to propose a causal connection between two 
factual (true) states of affairs. The speaker asserts that he is an Englishman 
and that he is brave and he, in addition, suggests that there is a causal connection 
between the. truth. of the two propositions. e The truth of both propositions is 
regarded as well established, and what is suggested is that p, 'he is an Englishman', 
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can be seen as the grounds explaining q, 'he is brave': 'p, `therefore q' is 
very similar to 'q because p'. 
The intelligibility of this utterance as an explanation,, again, depends 
on the assumption of the general statement (6) as in the case of arguments. 
Ayer, 1972, notes that every causal statement, to be acceptable, should be 
backed by some true generalization. Quine and Ullian, 1970, point out 
that in explanations, as in arguments, we do not render explicit what we think 
is well-known to our audience: 
We leave the obvious unstated. But an obvious premise, 
even if unstated, may still be part of an argument; and 
so may an unstated belief constitute part of an explanation. 
(Ch. VIII)7 
Proposition (6) which is assumed to be 'in the mind' of the speaker, and 
the proposition 'he is an Englishman' are not put forward as evidence or grounds 
for inferring the proposition 'he is brave'. Rather these two propositions are 
offered as the proposed explanation of a factual state of affairs, or of what is 
presumed to be an unproblematic truth. 
Now, if we are to look on the second clause of (3) as the explanandum, 
then (3) can be viewed as an implication.. In seeking to establish the 
explanatory significance of the antecedent for the latter clause, we cannot 
invoke a universal law to the effect that all Englishmen are invariably brave. 
What we can appeal to is, at best, a generalisation whose content is roughly 
that of (6). 
Seen in this light (6) may be a general statement 
8 
or even be attributed 
the lofty status of a 'probabilistic-statistical' law9 which renders the explanation 
probabilistic in character. Hempel, 1968, notes that psychological 
generalizations maybe understood as expressing "not strict uniformities, but 
strong tendencies, which might be formulated by means of rough probability 
statements" (p. 66). Granted, then, that the deducibility requirement is not 
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a sine qua non for all explanations, that is, is not a necessary condition, it 
follows that we can offer explanations whose truth or , 
falsity will not depend 
on their deducibility from true premises. The premises can be true and yet 
the explanation may be false. Hospers, 1956, notes that "the deductive 
requirement will let good and bad explanations alike slip through like water 
through a sieve". It may be the case, then, that while all propositions in 
an explanation, both premises and conclusion, can be true, there may be no 
causal connection between the corresponding states of affairs. Ayer, 1972, 
notes that "every causal statement could be represented as offering an 
explanation of the truth of one proposition in terms of the truth of another" 
(p. 134). 
The construal of (3) along these lines lends support to Grice's account of 
conventional implicatures. 
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In uttering (3), Grice holds, a speaker 
implicates that there is a causal connection1 
1 between the two states of affairs; 
should it, however, turn out that this causal connection did not hold, and yet 
the two propositions were true then, so the argument goes, it can be justifiably 
claimed that the whole utterance could still be true; "e & g" may be true, 
in spite of the falsity of 'g because p". 
However there still seems to be a problem facing this account. In a 
context in which (3) is uttered as an explanation of the true proposition 'He is 
brave', and in which it is a well known fact, both to the utterer of (3), and to 
the hearer, that 'he' is an Englishman, the sole purpose of uttering (3) then is 
to assert a connection that holds between them; i. e. the intention of the 
speaker is not merely to reiterate two propositions whose truth is presumed to be 
well attested, and known to be so, to the hearer; but, rather, to give an 
account of a connection that is presumed to obtain between them. Yet, an 
account of such an utterance within Grice's framework is stripped of such 
aspects of meaning. Any intentionality on the speaker's part that constitutes 
the very purpose of the utterance is liable to be relegated to the feeble status of 
fortuitous conventional implicatures which have no real import in a semantic 
theory. 
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1.4.2 Inferential interpretation 
------ -- --- - --- 
As we have seen, 'p, therefore 9' can express either an explanation or 
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an argument; (3) is meant and construed as an argument, if there is no 
independent evidence to the effect that he is brave, but the premises of the 
argument provide evidence for the truth of its conclusion. As Copi, 1968, 
notes, explanation and inference are closely related in so far as they are "the 
some process regarded from opposite points of view" (p. 376). Given the 
expressed premise, 'He is, an Englishman' and the assumed major premise 'All 
Englishmen are brave', the conclusion 'He is brave' can be logically inferred. 
This conclusion, in turn, can be regarded as adequately, explained by the 
premises of the argument provided that they are true. However, in 
explanations the point of departure is a statement whose truth is established, 
a problematic or puzzling truth, if you will, or a given fact to be explained. 
This is a crucial difference. It can be justifiably claimed that this truth has 
been explained, if a set of premises has been found from which the true statement 
can be logically inferred. 
In an argument, on the other hand, we assert a set of propositions to be 
true, and then these propositions are presented as grounds for accepting the truth 
of a further proposition. The truth of the premises provides the reason for 
believing the conclusion to be true in the sense of 'g, . 
*., I infer that q'. It 
follows, therefore, that the proposition 'He is brave' is assertible in virtue of the 
truth of the propositions 'He is an Englishman' and 'All Englishmen are brave'. 
The proposition 'He is brave' is inferred from'the other two propositions, one 
stated and the other assumed. 
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Put rather schematically, as an argument, (3), 
(3) He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave, 
can be represented as 'because p, i. e. as (7), 
(7) Because he is an Englishman, he is brave, 
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as against 'q because p', - i. e. (8), 
(8) He is brave because he is an Englishman, 
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whenever it (3) expresses an explanation. 
Evidently, what we have in mind here is Halliday's, 1967, character- 
ization of 'theme', which is that part of the clause, which has initial position 
(but see Firbas, 1962,1964) and may coincide, as in (7) and (8), with the 
'given'. The 'theme' is selected by the speaker as a meaningful option. 
Therefore, whether the speaker utters (7) or (8), is not considered to be a 
random event, but, rather, the result of a purposeful selection, which is in 
most cases conditioned by what is given in the situation (for example, his 
Englishness, or his bravery, in this case), and what the speaker wants to say 
about it ('theme'). 
It may be noticed that (7) sounds rather odd. This may be due to the 
fact that the 'because' clause in (7) states the basis for the inference, and, as 
Davison, 1970, noted, "'because' is distinctly odd in the premise reading, in 
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which intention or volition is absent" (p. 108). In contrast, the 'because' 
clause in (8), states the motivation for the assertion, and constitutes an 
explanatory account in this case. The distinction between the inferential 
and the explanatory reading is brought out clearly, if 'since' is substituted for 
'because' in the inferential case, as in (9): 
(9) Since he is an Englishman, he is brave. 
To return to our argument, after this digression, the question of the truth 
or falsity of this proposition, 'He is, therefore brave', does not arise, except as 
a direct consequence of the assertibility of the premises. 
Therefore the assignment of the truth-value of 'E, therefore q' by means 
of the logical constant '&', i. e. in the form of the conjunction, 'p & q', does 
not seem to be'plausible. in the case of arguments, since the truth-value of 'p, 
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therefore q' in this case, depends not only on the truth-values of the two 
propositions, p and q, but also upon whether p constitutes adequate grounds 
for asserting q. 
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Taking into account, however, that valid deductions are non-ampliative, 
i. e. that their conclusions are implied by their premises, and that nothing new 
is given in the conclusion, it could be argued in support of Grice's thesis that 
the fact that the conclusion is inferred from the premises is of no significance. 
If the conclusion follows logically from the premises used or assumed, and the 
premises are true, then so is the conclusion. In this case, therefore, we can 
see no warrant for rejecting the claim that true premises invariably provide 
adequate grounds for asserting the conclusion to be also true. The conclusion 
then is a truth validly deduced and as such it is always true given that the 
premises are true, i. e. it is entailed by the premises. It therefore is of no 
importance, in determining the truth-value of 'p, therefore g', whether p 
constitutes adequate grounds for q since every time p is true, in conjunction with 
the truth of the major premise, so is g. 
1.5 Problems for a truth-functional account of 'therefore' 
However attractive this argument may sound, it is nevertheless obvious 
that it is ill-founded. It is immediately recognized that (6), in spite of its 
form, is neither an analytic statement, nor a law. It is a general statement, 
but not so obviously 'factual', that its truth or falsity could be readily determined 
by appeal to, observation or experiment. 
- Even so, the statement 'All Englishmen are brave', taken to refer to every 
single Englishman, is surely not true. Therefore, although our argument is 
valid, it can never be sound in this formulation (S. Haack, 1978). 
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what is assumed is not the universal proposition 'All Englishmen are brave', but 
the generalization 'Englishmen are brave' or 'Most Englishmen are brave'. As 
Gray, 1977, would put it, "a generalization can absorb exceptions; an 
unequivocal, all-inclusive assertion cannot" (p. 136). 
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Dijk, 1977, noticing that general connected statements do not necessarily 
hold universally, introduces a new quantifier, '(Mx = for most x (---)', or a 
system of relative probabilities 'Pr (p/q)', giving the probability of R, given-9, 
in order to restrict the domain of the general statement; he writes, 
We may preserve the general statements but restrict their 
validity to most possible worlds/situations. Thus in case 
two facts are causally related, the sentence (both connects) 
must be true in the actual world, and in 'most physically 
possible alternatives to #'. 
(p. 49) 
Moreover, Ayer, 1972, holds that most of the generalisations on which 
our reasoning about human conduct depends are statements of a weaker type, 
stating tendencies rather than universal propositions. He goes on to add: 
Generalisations of this weaker type raise a special problem. 
If p and q are directly connected by a universal proposition 
r, Eandjr will jointly entail q. There will therefore be 
no question but that if we are justified in accepting p and 
r,, we are justified in accepting q. But if r is only a state- 
ment of tendency, the entailment does not hold. 
(Ch. 3, p. 61) 
Indeed, it is argued here, with regard to (3) uttered as an argument, that, 
given that we know that p, and given that q has not been observed, our ground 
for asserting (our belief) that g consists in the assumption of the truth of p and 
r. But if r is a statement of tendency or a generalisation of restricted 
validity, then it is quite clear that we are not in a position to claim that q is 
true. In any case, since gis inferred from P we do not have a2 and g, 
whose truth values are independently known, from which we could compile the 
truth value of 'p & q'. 
1.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, (3) should be 'construed as being predictive or explanatory 
on the one hand and summative, on the other, by implication. The proposition 
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that a man is brave can be construed as an explanatory statement, i. e. as 
stating the cause of some action of his; 
19 
or as explaining some actions by 
their subsumption under a broad property of his or as manifestations of it. 
In this case you explain an action by appeal to a trait of character. 
However 'He is brave' can be regarded as a, predictive statement, in 
that it can be seen not as a categorical statement, but as a hypothetical one. 
'Brave' is a dispositional predicate that attributes a certain tendency to its 
subject to act in a certain way. Indeed Ryle would characterise it as 
'determinable dispositional'. To say that somebody is brave, in this case, 
is to make a hypothetical statement, or a prediction. Just as if you were 
to say that were there a call for it, or should the need arise, he would be prone 
to conduct himself bravely. Harthack, 1965, reiterating Ryle's thesis, 
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notes that most statements describing personal traits, tendencies, dispositions, 
etc., are hypothetical statements. 
In trying to determine the truth-value of (3) seen in this light, we shift 
the problem to the assumed general statement. If the assumed statement is 
(6), and it is true, and the first clause of (3) is as well, then so is the second 
clause. But (6) is not what is assumed; rather, it is the generalisation 
'Englishmen tend to be brave'. Therefore, we are saddled - as we would 
be on either account - with the problem of specifying the truth-value of 
the proposition 'He is brave' independently. If there are no independent 
grounds, however, for determining its truth-value other than our reliance on 
the truth-value of the preceding propositions, expressed or assumed, and if, 
granted that they are true, the preceding propositions can, at best, only 
"probabilify"21 the truth of the further proposition 'He is brave', then we 
come upon a difficulty which Grice's account is not well equipped to handle. 
The difficulty that an inferential use of 'p, therefore9' incurs for Grice's 
account, is brought out clearly in the following quotation from Brown, 1955, 
who argues that it is misleading to express an inference in the formulation 
therefore q'; 
22 
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Staring at this form of words jp, therefore q! 7 one might 
think it obvious that p and q stood for propositions or 
statements and that-'tTierefore' was the mark of the 
transition from one proposition to another in which the 
inference consisted. The p and9 appear to be on an 
equal footing, but we know that an inference cannot be 
either a proposition or two propositions, so there is nowhere 
for the inference to make its home except half-way between, 
as the passage from one to the other. But the q must stand 
not for a proposition but for the inference that q. 
(p. 358) 
(3) is summative by. implication in as far as it hints at an inductive .. 
inference which is presumed to have been arrived at by appeal to our past 
experience. From one point of view, 'therefore' is employed to assert, or 
infer, that the proposition 'He is brave' is assertible, or inferrable (cf. Ryle, 
1971) by virtue of some other proposition, p, i. e. 'He is an Englishman', or a 
set of propositions, r, s, for instance, which constitute our evidential grounds 
for 9. What is taken for granted on this view is that our evidential grounds 
are true or are believed to be true. -, 
Indeed, it might be argued, it is more apt to claim that what is implicated 
here is the general statement that is left out and on the assumption of which the 
utterance of (3) is intelligible. The utterance of (3) forces the hearer to a 
backward reasoning, an "inverted deduction" process, 
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which will take him 
back to a premise that will necessarily imply the conclusion. Alternatively, 
it may be argued, the utterance of (3) forces the hearer to make a hypothesis 
which will constitute an inductive guess. It might be controversial, however, 
whether what is left unexpressed can be held to be implied, implicated, pre- 
supposed or implicitly asserted. 
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2. 'BUT' AND 'THEREFORE' CONSIDERED 
.,.. -t 
2.1 Dissimilarities of conventional implicata 
We would now like to take issue with Grice on yet another score. His 
two paradigm cases of conventional implicature, 'but' and 'therefore', do not 
receive uniform treatment, as would be required of instances of the same phenom- 
enon. To be more specific, with regard to 'but' he says that there is a conventional 
impl icature of a contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and 
her honesty; (cf. p. 40, e. g. (27)). 
First it should be noticed that if it is maintained that the contrast is made 
between her poverty and her honesty, (i. e. 'p but g', a contrasts with g, or, there 
is a contrast between p and g) then the lexical item 'but' is seen as capable of 
generating conventional implicatures operating within the confines of the uttered 
sentence, that is, what is said. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the 
contrast implicated is between poverty and honesty in general then the conventional 
implicature is generated by appeal to a general statement, and is therefore seen as 
operating outside the, boundaries of what is actually uttered. This is a significant 
difference that should not go unnoticed as it does both by Grice and Harnish. 
Harnish, 1977, says that we have the conventional implicature of: 
p but q: p contrasts with q, 
but he , then goes on to generalize the implicature beyond the confines of what is, 
said: 
If one says that Jackie is wealthy, but a brunet, one implies 
a contrast between wealth and hair color. 
(p. 339) 
On the other hand, in his example of 'therefore', 'He is an Englishman; he 
is therefore brave', Grice views the conventional implicature as operating within 
the confines of what is said. He does not seem to give credit to the fact that to 
be able to intelligibly claim that there is a conventional implicature, such that the 
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content of the second clause follows from the content of the first, you are implicitly 
relying on the felicitous invocation of a suppressed statement. 
1 
Moreover, whereas 
in the 'but' example this suppressed general statement is brought out in the shape of 
conventional implicatures, i. e. this general statement constitutes what is convent- 
ionally implicated, this does not seem to be-the case with 'therefore'. The 
conventional implicature, in this case, as explicated by Grice, does not bring out 
any assumed general statement. Yet it must be acknowledged that it is because 
of the accepted validity of this premise that the alleged conventional implicature 
is operative in this case. The fact remains that what are characterized as 
implicated meanings in each case seem to be different linguistic facts. 
2.2 Dissimilarities: conventional implicatures and negation 
Another point of divergence between the behaviour of 'but' and 'therefore' is 
noticed when they are within the scope of negation. It is reasonable to assume 
that the negative operator will not negate the conventional implicatures, but rather 
the semantic (truth-functional) content of the sentence that falls within its scope. 
Now consider what is negated in -(Ebut q), i. e. in (10): 
(10) It is not true that she is poor but she is honest. 
To be in a position to say that thenon-truth-functional meaning of 'but' is implicated 
and not asserted, it must be the case that what is negated in -(p but y. ) be the con- 
junction (p and q); that is, any of the two conjuncts or both. It cannot be the 
case that what is negated here be just the contrastive relation between the two 
conjuncts, p and q, if the claim is that this contrastive relation is implicated and 
not asserted. 
Indeed this condition seems to be met in connection with 'but'. (10) cannot 
be uttered with the purpose of just denying the implication. Dascal and Katriel, 
1977, say that, although it is not at all clear what is denied in -(p but a), the most 
natural interpretation in most cases of such an overall negation is that what is denied 
is one of the two conjuncts; that is, -(p but q) is treated as the negation of the 
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conjunction (p and q). This is brought out clearly in the following exchange: 
A: She is poor but honest. 
B: That's not true. 
B has thereby committed himself to the falsity of 'p and q', and not to the falsity 
of the conventional implicature purportedly conveyed by A's utterance. B may 
decide to continue by uttering any of the following: 
B: That's not true. She is not at aI I poor. 
She is not honest. 
She is neither poor nor honest. 
However, he cannot continue as in (11): -ý 
(11) That's not true. There's no contrast between poverty and 
honesty, 
and convey thereby that he otherwise accepts the statement. Moreover, by 
accepting A's utterance as true, B is not thereby committing himself to the truth or 
falsity of the implicature. 
In our view -(E but q), i. e. (10), sounds odd2 just because the contrastive 
meaning of 'but' cannot be denied by it. It is therefore pointless to expend the 
extra effort required by uttering -(a but g), if what you want to deny is just a or g. 
On the other hand, if you intend to deny both conjuncts of 'p but q', again in 
conformity with the principle of economy or 'least effort'3 you deny them in the 
conjunctive form -(p and q), and not by uttering -(p but g), unless such a denial 
is a reflex utterance given a semi-quotation interpretation: "It is not true that 
'She is poor but honest. "' 
This is indirect confirmation of the fact that the contrastive meaning of 'but' 
cannot be denied in formulations like -(p but g), i. e. inexplicitly, or without being 
spelt out. As regards the principle of economy or 'least effort', it can be operative 
not only linguistically, but also conceptually, as in the case in point. That is, if 
the use of 'but' in a specific case does not, or cannot, result in a full utilization of 
all its meaning aspects - i. e. if significant meaning aspects are rendered redundant, 
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and only its conjunctive meaning is operative - then use another lexical item, 
if such an item exists, whose meaning specification is such, that it will convey 
just those meaning aspects, and no more than those, that the use of 'but' would 
convey in this case.. In the case in question 'but' can only convey the con- 
junctive aspects of its meaning, and not its contrastive ones. Therefore it is 
more economical and, less wasteful to use 'and', whose meaning is specified as 
conjunctive in, at least, the majority of the cases of its use. 
However, consider a point made by Kempson, 1975, that may suggest that a 
non-truth-functional änalysisäof the implicature generated by 'but' is problematic. 
The point concerns the contrast effected by 'but', between positive and negative 
conjuncts. Her example is the following: 
(12) It's not true that John hit Bill but Bill didn't hit John - 
Bill did hit John. 
On, the grounds that the element of contrast between the two conjuncts (positive- 
negative) is denied, she poses the question whether, even this implicature is not 
after all truth-conditional, since it is included within the scope of negation. 
, 
She 
writes: 
Can we say in this case, on'the ground that the element of 
contrast between the conjuncts (positive-negative) is denied, 
that the implication of contrast is. included within the scope 
of negation? If we can, then this suggests that even this 
implication is after all truth-conditional. If not, then it 
is not. 
(ibid. , p. 218) 
However, - it is arguable whether this observation holds only for cases in which 
the contrast is made between-a positive and a negative "conjunct. ' lt may have 
more general validity. Indeed it seems to depend on`whether the contrast is 
effected by reference to a general statement that is felicitously invoked to prop up 
the contrast made within the utterance; in this case the uttered sentence is only 
an instantiation of the general statement, as seems to be the case with 'She is poor 
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but honest'. Kempsorr's observation seems to hold for cases in which no such 
general statements are involved, but in which the contrast is made on the basis 
of lexical items that can be contrasted, or on 'local' inferences drawn from one 
of the two conjuncts and germane to the discourse in hand. Consider two 
examples: 
(13) Bill is short but Robin is tall. 
(13a) It's not true that Bill is short but Robin is tall. Robin 
is not taller than Bill. 
(14) He went to see Aruna but her brother was there. 
(14a) It's not. true that he went to see Aruna but her brother 
was there. Her brother wasn't there. He was in 
London. 
Notice that in both (13a) and (14a), by denying the second conjunct, you are 
thereby eliminating an element on which the contrast depends. This is 
illustrated by (15) and (16) below: 
(15) ? Bill is short but Robin is short. 
4 
(16) ? He went to see Aruna but her brother wasn't there. 
Is all this then conducive to the supposition made by Kempson that the negative 
operator affects the contrastive meaning as well as the truth-functional meaning 
of 'but'? But if this is so, how can it be claimed that the contrastiveness of 
'but' is not part of the truth-functional meaning of 'but'? 
However, in both (13a) and (14a) the selection of a specific intonation 
contour seems to play a significant role. Indeed, if the elements 'Robin' in 
(13a) and 'brother' in (14a) are not heavily stressed it does not seem to be at all 
natural to deny (13) and (14) by uttering (13a) and (14a) respectively. Rather, 
it is more acceptable to negate them by denying the corresponding conjunction of 
the form 'p&q' - and this seems to follow from our discussion above - than by 
denying the conjunction of the form 'p but g'. IF this is so, it seems that this 
will constitute counter-evidence to the above supposition made by Kempson. 
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Further, by stressing the items 'Robin' and 'brother' it is clear that you 
'reiterate' a contrast that has already been made. That is, the denial of 'p but 
q' in the formulation of -(p but g) has a semi -quotationa I reading, or is a reflex 
reading of the hearer's attitude (cf. Wilson, 1975, p. 119). 
Whatever the case may be, it is evident that what is negated in -(Q but c. ) 
is not - at least - just what Grice wants to call the conventional implicatures 
generated by 'but'; and this should suffice for the purposes of our argument. 
Let us now consider 'therefore' when this is included in the scope of negation. 
Consider (17): 
(17) -(p & therefore q). 
(18) It is not true that he is an Englishman and therefore brave. 
To be in a position to maintain that the meaning of consequentiality is only implicated, 
and not asserted, there must be a condition that when 'therefore' lies within the 
negative operator this meaning be not denied. If this is so it must necessarily be 
the case that the negative operator negates the conjunction, i. e. at least one of the 
two conjuncts. It is a requirement that what is negated in -(sand therefore q) be 
the conjunction 'p&q'. 
However, it is evident that this need not be the case. One may negate just 
this meaning of consequentiality that is allegedly conventionally implicated by the 
use of 'therefore', and nothing else. Consider (20) as a rejoinder to (19): 
(19) He is an Englishman; . 
he is therefore brave. 
(20) That's not true. . 
Why should you think that he is brave 
because he happens to be an Englishman? He is brave 
because he is a philosopher. 5 
What is in effect rejected in (20), by negating the relation of consequentiality between 
the two conjuncts, is the general statement that is appealed to, to buttress this relation 
of consequentiality. This is done via the negation of (19). But as Harnish, 
1977,6 rightly says with regard to a similar example (21), 
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(21) He is a philosopher, he is, therefore, brave, 
7 
. 
'.. Z 97 reject the statement above as false, 
8 
... it would have to be the case that what was said comprises the notion 
of his being a philosopher providing grounds for thinking 
him to be brave, because the other two clauses are true. 
(ibid., p. 339) 
In actuality, however, when Harnish says that, 
the reason we are willing to say he is brave has nothing at 
all to )-76 with his being a philosopher, but rather with his 
work in the Resistance, 
(p. 339) 
he hints at the assumed general proposition that relates the state of being a 
philosopher with the personal trait of bravery. What is denied by calling the 
statement false, when we accept as true both the propositions that he is a 
philosopher, and that he is brave, is the relation of consequentiality that is 
asserted to hold between the two propositions, and hence the truth of this general 
proposition. What is denied by (22), 
(22) It's false, he's not brave because he's English but 
because of his work in the Resistance, 
is this relation of consequentiality, and by this means a law-like proposition of the 
form (x) (Fx 4 Gx). In its stead it is proposed that his work in the Resistance 
is a sufficient evidential reason for warranting the assertion that he is brave. 
Instead of accepting the above general proposition, which explains a trait of 
character as causally sustained by another property of his, i. e. that he is brave 
because he is English, what is proposed is (23): 
(23) He worked in the Resistance and his work there 
satisfies the proposition that whenever the situation 
calls for brave conduct he responds positively. 
(23) makes a characterological attribution to an individual, which explains certain 
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actions. As Quine and Ullian, 1970, put it: 
It is a sad fact about our views of others ... that we are inclined to adopt in such a case just the explanation that 
fits our prejudices. 
(Ch. viii) 
In denying that 'He is a philosopher, he is therefore brave' is true, we 
are actually denying - if it is well known that both clauses are true - that 
a 
either his being a philosopher is a sufficient condition for his being brave, or 
that his being brave is a necessary condition for his being a philosopher. In 
asserting the proposition 'He worked in the Resistance; he is therefore brave', 
what we are asserting is that his being brave is a necessary condition for his work 
in the Resistance, or that his work in the Resistance is a sufficient reason for the 
ascription of the quality of bravery. 
The purpose of this discussion has been to illustrate the point that it is 
possible to deny just the alleged conventional implicature arising from the use of 
'therefore' in (18). Besides, more is involved in the use of 'therefore' than just 
the generation of the alleged conventional implicature that the second conjunct 
follows from the first. It must be noted that indeed the two utterances, 
He is a philosopher, he is therefore brave, 
He worked in the Resistance, he is therefore brave, 
are not really mutually exclusive - identity of referents assumed - as is clear 
in the following exchange: 
A: Why, did he work in the Resistance? 
B: Well, he's a philosopher, he is therefore brave. 
If indeed what we understand by 'therefore' in (24), 
(24) He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave, 
is only conventionally implicated and not part of the semantic meaning of the 
sentence, then it should be possible to evaluate it, i. e. for example, accept the 
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two propositions as true and then reject the implications in a separate evaluation. 
In other words, it should be possible to reply to (24) by uttering' (25): 
(25) That's true. But I don't agree that he is brave 
because he is an Englishman. 
Besides, it should be possible to reply to (24) by (26): 
(26) 
, 
That's true, 
without thereby committing yourself to accepting the conventional implicature as 
well. However, we have seen that the putative implicature of 'therefore' is so 
central to the sum total of what is conveyed by (24), that we tend to reject it as 
false, as Harnish rightly noticed, on the grounds that we do not happen to agree 
with this impl icature. The upshot of all this is that a truth-value assignment 
to (24), irrespective of what is putatively conventionally implicated by 'therefore', 
does not seem plausible. 
2.2.1 Conclusion 
It has been shown, therefore, that, in negating sentences conjoined with 'but', 
it is the conjunction that is negated, and not the conventional implicature, i. e. the 
contrastive meaning of 'but'. There have been found no grounds for accepting 
(A) with regard to negating-'but' sentences. 
(A)(i) The 'contrastive' meaning of 'p but g' is denied; and 
(ii) neither anor gis denied. 
Moreover, in 'denying' the contrastive meaning, a conjunct is denied, thereby 
undermining the basis of the contrast. By contrast, in the case of negating 
'therefore' sentences, there have been found grounds for accepting (B), the equiv- 
alent of, (A) in the case of 'therefore'. 
(B)(i) The 'consequential' relation of therefore q' is 
denied; and 
(ii) neither p nor gis denied. 
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In conclusion, it seems rather implausible to claim that the non-truth- 
functional meanings of 'but' and 'therefore', what Grice dubbed conventional 
implicatures, can be regarded as manifestations of the same linguistic phenomenon. 
2.3 Cancellability, detachability and conventional iMiplicatures 
Grice employs two tests on his examples of implicatures, those of the detach- 
ability and cancel lability of the implicature. With regard to his paradigm example 
of conventional implicature, 
(27) She is poor but she is honest, 
he says that whilst the implicature is detachable, "the question whether ... the 
implication is cancellable is slightly more complex" (1967, p. 92). Yet, he argues, 
the resultant utterance is not unintelligible. The main thrust of his argument that 
what is conveyed by 'but' is implicated is, however, that it leaves the truth-value of 
what is said conveniently unaffected. It is reasonable to expect, however, the 
some results to be obtained from an application of the same criteria to all instances of 
the some phenomenon. With this in mind, therefore, we will apply these two tests 
to both examples of conventional implicata in what follows. 
2.3.1 Cancellability 
We will now turn to the employment of the canceliability test first, and then 
to that of the detachability test, in connection with Grice's example, i. e. (24), 
which is repeated below for convenience: 
(24) He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave. 
Applying the cancel lability test first to (24) we get (28): 
(28) He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave; though, 
of course, I do not mean to imply that there is any 
causal (or other) connection between the two. 
We may not wish to "go "so far as to say that his utterance was uninteIIigible",, but 
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nevertheless it is not for from being pointless or absurd since an essential part 
of the purpose of the utterance is frustrated. One is inclined to say that 
part of 'what was given', as Strawson puts it, 'is taken back again'; indeed, 
it can be argued that some sort of inconsistency is involved in the utterance of 
(28). For is it not contradicting oneself, if one conveys in a standard9 way 
that one proposition follows from another, and then proceeds to deny it in the 
same breath as it were? But if some sort of (partial) contradiction is involved 
here, don't we have to say that what is contradicted, or is inconsistent, must 
comprise part of what is said rather than part of what is implicated? 
It would seem that (28) involves a contradiction of some sort. The contra- 
diction in (28) lies between the assertion that the speaker does not mean to imply 
that there is any causal connection between the propositions made, that he is an 
Englishman and that he is brave, and the meaning of 'therefore'. This- contra- 
diction does not follow from our knowledge of the world or of any such pragmatical 
factors - in that case we would not be talking about a contradiction - but is a 
direct consequence of our knowledge of the meaning of the word 'therefore'. 
Evidently the issue depends on the nature of the contradiction. If the 
contradiction is semantic, then what is contradicted must comprise part of what is 
said rather than what is implicated. In other words, if p semantically entails 
q then 'p & not -a' is a contradiction in the sense that there is no possible world in 
which it is true. 
If, on the other hand, the contradiction is pragmatic then it need not be 
part of what is said. If 2 pragmatically implies g, then 'E but not -q' is a contra- 
diction only in the sense that asserting 'not -J' conflicts with an aim or purpose the 
speaker is supposed to have in asserting p. But 'E and not -g' could be true in 
some possible world. 
What should be examined, therefore, is the nature of the contradiction 
involved. Let us consider (28a), instead of (28), as the cancellation of the 
0 
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im plicature in (24), 
(28a) He is an Englishman and, he is therefore brave, but 
there is no connection between the two. 
(28a) seems to be close to a semantic contradiction. What then about (28)? 
According to Grice, 1967, the vehicle of implication with regard to the parallel 
case of (27), 
(27) She is poor but she is honest, 
can be said to be either 'the speaker', or 'the words the speaker used'.. Clearly, 
it does not make sense to ask whether Grice would like to claim that what is 
implicated in (24), is, 
(a) that there is a connection between being English and being 
brave, 
or (b) that the speaker implicates that there is such a connection,. 
since the expression 'implicated' cannot be reiterated as in (b). By necessity, 
therefore, we conclude that what is implicated in (24) is (a). If, however, this 
is so, what form should the cancellation of the implication in (24) take? According 
to the conclusion reached, this cancellation would be as in (28a). , 
This reasoning 
indicates that the contradiction involved in (28a) seems to be close to a semantic 
contradiction. If 'There is a connection between his Englishness and his bravery' 
is only an implicature of (24), then (28a) seems to be the correct form of words to 
use to deny one's commitment to the implicature. But (28) only has a use if (28a) 
is not a logical contradiction. So if (28a) is a logical contradiction (28) has not a 
use. 
In this connection Kempson, 1975, says that conventional implicatures are 
not contradictable: 
Conventional implicatures are ... those 
elements'of 
meaning which are not truth-functional but which are 
not contradictable. 
(p. 145) 
43 
However, it is not evident what she means by that, because clearly they are 
contradictable. Presumably she means that they are not cancellable. With 
regard to 'but', for instance, Grice claims that "there is a sense in which we may 
say that ithe conventional implicature7 is non-cancellable" (1967, p. 92). 
It is argued here, however, that cancellability of an implicature should not 
result in contradiction. If it does then the implicature is spurious, if the test 
is to be taken seriously. 
Dascal and Katriel, 1977, on the other hand, argue that "it is clear that 
conventional implicatures are just as cancellable as conversational implicatures" 
(p. 151) but this remark is not only incorrect but uncritical. They base the 
'obviousness' of their claim on the wrong assumption that 'and' generates conventional 
implicatures, and as those are cancellable,, so. are the conventional implicatures 
generated by 'but'. However, Grice considers 'and' to be an example of a 
generalized conversational implicature, and Dascal and Katriel should be referred 
to his Urbana lectures, SV. 
Moreover (28) cannot be 'construed as an argument (see. 1.4.2): 4 For if you 
intend to assert that q follows from p, then this should be stated rather than annulled. 
But in the event that this connection is annulled, it is very doubtful whether it can 
still be argued that what is said is left unaffected, as might be the case with 'but'. 
The main issue is that there is a causal (or other) connection between land q in the 
case of 'therefore', and it seems clear that this connection is a much stronger relation, 
binding up p and q together, and making the one dependent on the other, than is the 
contrastive relation in the case of 'but', which indeed does not seem to affect the 
truth-value of the whole utterance. 
Neither can (28) constitute an explanatory statement, since any causal (or 
other) connection is first stated or implicated only to be contradicted or cancelled 
within the bounds of the same utterance by the some speaker. 
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Indeed, one is left wondering why one who wants to assert just that 'p and 
g', i. e. the propositions that he is an Englishman and that he is brave, should go 
to such lengths to say what, it is claimed, is said in (28). Further, it can be 
argued that granting the acceptability of (28) is not in accordance with Grice's 
conversational principles as it necessarily clashes with his co-operative principle. 
Indeed, such an utterance violates almost every single maxim, and for no good 
reason. 
It can be argued, however, in defence of Grice's thesis, that in spite of 
all its flaws, (28) is a true and intelligible utterance - in a' given situation - 
and that it is of little significance for a truth-functional semantics, as envisaged 
by Grice, whether (28) is pointless or unacceptable or 'ill-informed' as defined by 
G. Lakoff, 1971a, or what have you, as long as it is true. But it can be counter- 
argued that the cleavage between a truth-functional semantics, as envisaged by 
Grice, and an account of the acceptability of utterances, can be so sharp and 
often unbridgable that the former account seems to lose its point. Further, if 
an utterance like (28), which is in breach of the co-operative principle, could be 
included in the semantics, it would have to be conceded that such a semantics 
could contain sentences that are virtually 'unemployable', so to speak, as they 
cannot be filtered in real conversation by the co-operative principle. - The 
worrying point is that since truth-values are assigned to utterances in Grice's 
system, i. e. to a full identification of what is said, it follows that truth-valuation 
takes place not at an abstract level, but in real conversation where the co-operative 
principle is - latently or actively - in operation. This fact necessarily brings 
into conflict utterances like (28) with the co-operative principle, since the latter 
cannot 'take over' from the realm of truth-functional semantics and 'put right', i. e. 
give an interpretation to, what is presumably only seemingly wrong with such 
utterances. The co-operative principle will be called into action in our effort 
to understand what was said. 
10 
The contradiction is obvious. The point at 
issue is that (28) cannot be filtered by the co-operative principle, that is, is 
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'unusable' in any conversational situation, and this is a direct consequence of 
the contradiction involved. 
11 
The speaker's act in uttering (28) is self-defeating 
and certainly not in accordance with any Rationality principle. For the speaker 
at the same time undoes, 'unstates, part of what he does, states, in his utterance 
(see Hungerland, 1960, pp. 254-55). Yet, (28) claims a place in a truth- 
functional semantics. 
2.3.2 Conclusion 
. We 
have seen that the conventional implicatures generated by 'but' and 
'therefore' are not cancellable. That is, the employment of the cancellability 
test is not in order since it engenders some sort of contradiction and the relevant 
utterance has no employment. There are two routes to be taken: We can 
either retain a class of conventional implicatures and argue that they need not be 
cancellable, or concede that, since these implicatures are not cancellable, they 
are bogus cases of implicatures. 
In the former case the onus that will fall on us will be to give strong justi- 
fications 
12 
for excluding these aspects of meaning, that have been dubbed con- 
ventional implicatures, from what is the standard meaning (semantic or logical) of 
the lexical items bearing the implicatures; 
13 
to say, however, that such aspects 
of meaning constitute a stumbling block in a truth-functional account, within the 
framework of a traditional logical system, is evidently not a plausible reason for 
jettisoning them from a semantics proper. 
2.3.3 Detachability and reported conventiona-l iTp icata ---------------- --------------- - 
Let us now apply the detachability test to 'therefore'. If the implicature 
in the case of 'therefore' is detachable then it should be possible to restate (24) as 
(29): 
(29) He is an Englishman and he is brave, 
and, further, (24) would invariably have the some truth-value as (29). But is this 
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so? If 'He is brave' in (24) were to be inferred from 'He is an Englishman', 
rather than be asserted on independent grounds, we would be inclined to say 
that what is asserted in (24) cannot be assigned the same truth-value as (29). 
This must be clear by now. 
Furthermore, we could consider what results (29) would yield, were, it to 
be reported. Consider (30): 
(30) She said that he was an Englishman and that he was 
brave. 
Would one who had uttered (24) intending it as an argument consent to this form 
of report on his utterance? Indeed, were it to be proved that the referent of 
'he' was not an Englishman, wouldn't one be prone to retract his utterance on the 
grounds that if the first conjunct was false so was the second? This utterance, 
then, would resemble the conditional rather than have the form of a conjunction. 
In any case, (30) does not seem to report the utterance of (24) truly, though it does 
that of (29). But isn't arguing so tantamount to saying that part of what was said 
in (24) was not reported in (30)? For if what was not reported was only what had 
been conventionally implicated in (24), one would neither balk at (30), nor rule it 
out as a false report. 
It must be made clear, however, that we are here concerned with the report 
of (24), when this is meant as an argument. It may be recalled that a true or 
satisfactory report need not report all the assertions made in a speech. However, 
it should report those parts of the speech that are crucial for conveying any further 
assertions in the spirit in which they were made. Moreover, as argued by Zwicky, 
1971, 
a satisfactory report conveys the meanings 
14 
of a speech 
and not its presuppositions or its possible messages or possible 
inferences from it. This is a property of the verb 'say' ... 
(pp. 7475) 
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If conventional implicatures do not constitute part of what is said, then we are 
entitled to conclude that they have no place in a report of a speech with 'say' 
as the reporting verb. If however Zwicky's condition is deemed to be too strong 
then,. relaxing it, it can be expected that the inclusion or not of a conventional 
implicature should not affect the meaning and the truth-value of what is reported. 
Yet, we have seen that it does. Moreover, the inclusion of the alleged 
conventional implicature renders the report more satisfactory and complete in any 
case. This fact yields additional evidence against the construction of an account 
of those aspects of meanings in terms of conventional implicatures. 
If (24), on the other hand, was meant as an explanation then, though (30) 
might not be looked on as false, it would nevertheless frustrate the very purpose 
of the utterance. Note that in this case (31), 
(31) She said that he was brave because he was an Englishman, 
is a more satisfactory report of (24) than (30) is. 
To see the whole issue from the other side of the coin, (32), 
(32) She said that he was an Englishman and that he was 
therefore brave, 
should constitute a true report of (29) if (24) is equivalent to (29). Yet , it is' 
doubtful whether one who had uttered (29) would, quite happily, consent to (32) 
as a true report of what he had said, especially if (29) was intended as the assertion 
of two independent propositions, unconnected, apart from the obvious connection 
that they were both predicated of the same individual. Wouldn't we be inclined 
to say that the report (32) was false on the grounds that part of what was reported as 
having been asserted, i. e. that he was brave, was reported as if it followed from the 
other part, i. e. that he was an Englishman? Yet, the inclusion in the report of a 
conventional implicature should not be capable of falsifying it; but this seems to be 
the case with (32). 
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One is inclined to conclude that indeed what is conveyed by 'therefore' 
cannot be conventionally implicated, since a prerequisite for the assignment of 
the status of implicatures to any aspects of what is conveyed in an utterance is 
that they do not affect the truth-values of the utterances which include them. 
On the other hand, 'but' does not seem to behave in quite the same way. 
Consider (33), 
(33) He said that she was poor and (she was), honest 
which can be the report of (27): 
(27) She is poor but she is honest. 
Indeed, (33) is not only a true and satisfactory report of (27), but it also seems 
to share the some truth-value with (34): 
(34) He said that she was poor but (she was) honest. 
Moreover; in (34) the source of what is conveyed by 'but' need not be the 
speaker of the 'oratio recta'. This source can be sought either in the original 
speaker, or in the reporter, or indeed in someone else connected with the discussion; 
'but' can be understood either as having been uttered by the original speaker of the 
utterance, or as having been added by the reporter. Understood in a loose sense 
it can function transparently. To' clarify this point consider (34a): 
(34a) He said that she was poor but hey (also) said that 
she was honest (too), 
in which the elements 'he (also) said' reinforce the status of the second clause, 
which is that of a report. 'But' falls outside the scope of the reporting verb, 
which is repeated, and serves' to conjoin the two clauses as two separate reports. 
In contrast, 'therefore' can function only opaquely, so to speak; that is, 
it can be understood only as within the scope of the reporting verb: 
(35) She said that he was an Englishman and (she said) 
(that) (he was) therefore brave. 15 
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I 
'Therefore' cannot be added by the reporter as 'but' can be. 
In this connection it can be noted that the reported clause in (36), 
(36) He said that she was poor but (that she was) honest, 
though I wouldn't agree there was a contrast between 
the two, 
must be recognised as the quotational form of someone else's words if we are to 
understand the reference of the second clause; i. e. (36) must be understood as 
(37): 
(37) He said (that) 'she was poor but she was honest'. 
But even if (36) is given a (semi-)quotation reading it is not obvious that what is 
conveyed in it is absolutely clear. Indeed, if the utterer of (36) wishes to 
express his difference of opinion on the matter, he had better be explicit, as in 
(38) or (39): 
(38) He said that she was poor but that she was honest, 
though I do not see why she should have to be 
dishonest just because she was poor, 
or (39) He said: 'She is poor but she is honest', but 
... 
(as in (38)). 
(40), on the other hand, does not pose such problems: 
(40) She said that he was an Englishman and (that) (he 
was) therefore brave, but/though I can't see the 
connection . 
These facts are brought out clearly. in the following examples: 
(41) He said that she was poor but (that she was) honest 
though he (himself) didn't imply a contrast between 
the two. 
(42) She said that he was an Englishman and that he 
, was therefore. brave, though 
she-. (herself) didn't 
imply (a connection between the two. 
(that the one followed from the other. 
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In (41) the pending attribution of the implicature generated by 'but' to the 
original speaker of 'oratio recta' is averted. But this does not hold for (42). 
(42) involves a contradiction. 
The diverse linguistic behaviours of 'but' and 'therefore' in 'oratio obliqua' 
seem to be determined by the fact that they each have a distinct structural status. 
According to Fries, 1967, 'but', but not 'therefore', belongs to a group in which 
all words are "signals of 'levelling', of connecting two units with the 'same' 
structural function", as "all the words of this group stand only between words of 
the some part-of-speech class or subgroup" (p. 95). 'But', therefore, is capable 
of bringing the reported clause 'that she is honest' down to the same structural 
level as, either that of the clause 'that she is poor', or that of 'he said that she is 
poor'. 
16. 
In other words, this versatility is due to the fact that 'but' like 'and', 'or', 
'not', and 'rather than' (Fries, op. cit. ) can stand, on the one hand, either only 
between words of the same part-of-speech class, as in 'she is poor but honest', 
or, on the other, before single free utterance units. Therefore, in our example 
of 'oratio obliqua', 'but' can be interpreted as standing either before '(that she was) 
honest', in which case it will have to be understood as the 'but' connecting words 
of the some part-of-speech class - i. e. in the case in hand as connecting '(that 
she was) honest' with 'that she was poor'; or it can be interpreted as standing 
before, what can be characterized as, a single free utterance unit, namely, 'he 
said that she was honest', connecting it with the preceding part of our example, 
i. e. 'He said that she was poor'. 
17 
The ambiguity is resolved in (34a), in which 
the structure of the second clause becomes explicit. The tree-diagrams on pp. 51 
and 51a represent the_disrtinct structures in-each case. 
On the other hand the structural description of 'therefore' specifies that it 
belongs to those words that can all stand before groups of words "having the 
characteristic arrangements of parts of speech that occur in single free utterance 
units" (Fries). 
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It follows, therefore, that 'but' can operate to invoke a general, proposition 
or belief in this case which can be imputed either to the original speaker, or to 
the reporter, or to a related person in the same discourse. By contrast, 'therefore' 
invokes the assumption of a general belief which can be imputed only to the utterer 
of the sentence and not to the reporter. This is indicative of the presence of 
closer ties between p and q in 'p therefore g' than there are in 'p but g'. It also 
seems possible to claim that the general statement assumed in 'p, therefore q' -is 
invoked via the stated connection between its two propositions so that what is said, 
including those aspects of meaning that have been claimed to be conventional 
implicatures by Grice, can be confined within the bounds of what is actually 
uttered. In this respect, too, 'but' and 'therefore' seem to be distinct as regards 
their conventional implicata. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to report (24) as in (43): 
(43) She said that he was an Englishman and that 
he was brave and that he was brave because 
he was an Englishman. 
or the one followed from the other. 
or there was a causal connection 
between the two, 
or as in (44) She said that he was brave because he was an 
Englishman. (Katz, 1972, p. 446) 
On the other hand, if we apply the same methods to'but', we end up with odd 
reports of what was initially said. 
We believe we have shown that 'but' and 'therefore', both claimed to be 
paradigm cases of the some linguistic phenomenon in Grice's theory, do not behave 
uniformly as should have been expected. Moreover, not only does 'therefore' 
seem to be more easily amenable to a semantic treatment but it also poses, as we 
have seen, greater problems for an account of its meaning in terms of conventional 
implicatures as these have been explicated by Grice. 
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2.4 Summary 
Grice offers as paradigm cases of conventional implicatures the impiicatures 
generated by the lexical items 'but' and 'therefore'. Conventional implicata 
in both cases are characterized as the non-truth-functional aspects of their 
meanings. That is, in the case of 'but', the truth-functional meaning is its 
conjunctive meaning, while the contrast that is conveyed by 'but' is claimed to 
be conventionally implicated. Therefore 'but' can be accounted for in terms of 
the truth-functional conjunctive 'and'. 
As for as 'therefore' is concerned, however, Grice is not explicit as to how 
it should be represented in a formal system, but it has been assumed in this study 
that this, too, will be treated in terms of the truth-functional conjunction. This 
assumption is based on the existence of sentences like: 'He is an Englishman and 
he is therefore brave' and also on the necessity of the presence of the conjunctive 
'and' in negation: 'It is not the case that he is an Englishman and that he is 
therefore brave. '. Grice has claimed that the meaning of consequentiality 
conveyed by 'therefore' is not truth-functional, but is conventionally implicated 
and, therefore, truth-valuation of what is said can take place irrespective of any 
such aspects of its meaning. 
However, it has been shown in this study that this is not always the case. 
There are cases of the use of 'therefore' in which such a claim is groundless because 
the truth or falsity of the second sentence depends on the truth-value of the first by 
way of this relation of consequentiality conveyed by 'therefore'. No such inter- 
relation has been found in cases of use of 'but'. Moreover, it has been pointed 
out that in the case of 'but' Grice is not consistent in his claim concerning what 
constitutes the conventional implicatum, while in the case of 'therefore' the 
conventional implicature, as explicated by Grice, does not extend beyond the 
limits of the uttered sentence. 
Employing the negation test, it has been found that in -(a but9) the 
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conjunction is negated while in cases of -(p'and therefore g) it is possible-'to 
negate just this relation of consequentiality between p and g conveyed by 
'therefore' and characterized by Grice as the conventional implicature generated 
by 'therefore'. This latter result, however, is not consistent with the assumption 
that what is negated is conventionally implicated, and not asserted. 
Applying the two tests proposed by Grice to conventional implicatures, it 
has been shown that both the implicata of 'but' and 'therefore' are not cancellable. 
Grice never suggested that cancellability is a sufficient or necessary condition for 
the presence of conventional implicatures. However, under the assumption that 
aspects of what is conveyed in an utterance that do not form part of its truth- 
functional meaning should be cancellable, without engendering contradiction, the 
cancellability test is of some utility: the expectation being that cancellation of 
conventional implicata should not occasion contradiction. Yet, we have shown 
that it does. If q is merely an implicature of p, then it should be possible to 
cancel the implicature. Hence, 'p but I don't mean to imply that g' should 
have a use, and 'p but not -q' should not be self-contradictory. In our discussion 
we have focused our attention on 'therefore', and not on 'but', as the cancellability 
of the latter is discussed in Grice, 1967a,. Therefore, our conclusions concern 
mainly 'therefore'. 
It is argued that the postulation of a separate class of conventional 
implicatures needs strong justification based on independent criteria that will 
differentiate them from meaning proper (see Wilson, 1975, p. 120). This strong 
justification is lacking at the moment, and the postulation of a class of conventional 
implicatures is therefore based on flimsy grounds, the sole motivation being that 
such aspects of meaning would constitute a stumbling block to a truth-functional 
account of meaning. 
Further, the test of detachability (see 2.3.3) revealed that indeed the 
implicature of 'therefore' is detachable as claimed by Grice. However, the 
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question that is raised is whether in all such cases, in which 'therefore' is detached, 
it can be justifiably claimed that the truth-functional meaning of the utterance 
remains the same as in cases of its use. This takes us back to problems posed by 
- the inferential use of 'therefore' discussed in section 1.4.2. 
On the other hand, the conventional implicature generated by 'but' is not 
only detachable, without thereby affecting the truth-value of what is said, but it 
has also been shown that in indirect speech the conventional implicatures of 'but' 
play no role in the truth-valuation of the utterance. Besides they can be attributed 
either to the speaker of the 'oratio recta', or to the reporter, or to someone connected 
with the conversation, without affecting truth-values. This constitutes additional 
evidence of the absence of any truth-functional interrelation between the two 
conjuncts in cases of 'but'. 
'Therefore', however, creates a lot of problems for an account of non-truth- 
functional conventional implicatures. To be sure, reported conventional implicata 
of 'therefore' cannot 'move across' from the speaker of 'oratio recta' to the reporter. 
They behave opaquely, so to speak, confirming an inextricable connection between 
the two propositions it conjoins. Besides, conventional implicata of 'therefore' 
are not cancellable in reported utterances, in spite of the fact that such implicata 
need not be conveyed in reported forms of the utterances containing them in the first 
place. This yields additional evidence that the meaning of consequentiality 
conveyed by 'therefore' is asserted and not implicated. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We believe that the following points have been convincingly argued in this 
chapter: 
(1) Conventional implicata of 'therefore' are operative within the limits 
of what is actually uttered. This has not been shown to be, the case 
with respect to 'but'. 
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(2) Conventional implicatures of 'therefore' can be negated. This 
has not been shown to hold for conventional implicatures generated 
by 'but'. 
(3) Conventional implicatures, in general, are not cancellable. In 
particular, with regard to 'therefore', it has been shown that can- 
cellation of the implicature results in contradiction, a feature 
characteristic of truth-functional aspects'of meaning. 
(4) Conventional implicata of 'but' are detachable without any consequences 
for the truth-value of the conjunction. This is not true of the con- 
ventional implicata of 'therefore'. Conventional implicata of 'but' 
in reported utterances can be 'lost' or cancelled in a sense. Con- 
ventional implicata of 'therefore' remain attached to the conjuncts it 
conjoins. They cannot be cancelled or 'transferred'. 
On the assumption that these points are correct, it is evident that 'but' and 
'therefore' differ on more than one count as regards their conventional implicatures. 
In view of this fact they cannot be characterized as instances of the same linguistic 
phenomenon. Besides, while it is clear that part of the meaning of 'but' is 
conjunctive - and therefore 'but' has this aspect of its meaning in common with 
'and' - this is not true of 'therefore'. 
18 
Therefore the question that one may 
posit is what the justification is for accounting for 'therefore' in terms of the truth- 
functional conjunction. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the conventional implicatures of 'therefore' 
cannot be justifiably excluded from its truth-functional meaning, as it has been 
shown that they affect the truth-valuation of what is said. 
In view of these facts it is claimed in this study that what is allegedly con- 
ventionally implicated in the case of 'therefore' is part of its semantic meaning, 
and it is, therefore, suggested that it be accounted for within the framework of 
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semantics proper. This will not pose as many problems as a semantic account 
of 'but' would probably do, since the alleged conventional implicatures of 
'therefore' are constant and operative within the bounds of the utterance. This 
has not been proved to be the case with regard to 'but'. 
In the next chapter therefore we will concern ourselves with the intricate 
linguistic behaviour of 'but', and examine the nature of the implicatures it generates 
as we have not found any grounds, as yet - as in the case of 'therefore' - for 
assuming that these aspects of meaning can be justifiably claimed to be part of its 
meaning proper. 
.. ý ,ý 
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3. CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES: VARIABLE OR INVARIABLE 
Grice says that in some cases the conventional meaning of the words 
used determine "what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said" 
(1975, p: 44). These implicatures were dubbed conventional. Clearly 
conventional implicatures, as described by Grice, are not connected with general 
features of discourse since they do not seem to be affected by the maxims of con- 
versation or by violations of them. On the other hand, they do not constitute 
part of what is said since they are not amenable to a truth-functional treatment. 
Yet they are characterized as being determined by the conventional meaning of 
the words that generate them. Grice does not argue for the presence of any 
other factors that might determine them. One is therefore led to conclude that 
part of the conventional meaning of some words is not explicable within a truth- 
functional framework. 
Besides, according to Grice, what is said does not in any way determine, 
or help to determine, what is implicated; that is, an interrelation between what 
is said and what is implicated, as seen in the following diagram, is not in Grice's 
spirit: 
conventional meaning 
what is said what is conventionally implicated 
On the contrary, what is said does not seem to affect what is implicated; rather, 
it is the conventional meaning that does. One of course may identify the con- 
ventional meaning with a partial specification of what is said; but we are here 
concerned with the full specification of what is said, which is truth-functional. 
I 
This leads us to the assumption that conventional implicatures, unconnected as they 
are with features of discourse, and unaffected by the full specification of what is 
said, must be invariable; But are they? 
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Regarding 'therefore', as we have seen, we can confidently say that it 
invariably conveys a relation of consequentiality between the two propositions 
that it connects. This enabled us to argue that this aspect of meaning should 
not be regarded as conventionally implicated, but as part of what is said. 
2 
As 
far as 'but' is concerned, however, it is difficult to see how this could be the 
case in view of the versatility of its linguistic behaviour. In what follows, 
therefore,. we will consider more closely the behaviour of this conjunction; but 
first we will try to establish, what has already been claimed, that the conventional 
implicatures generated by 'but' are not invariable. 
3.1 On the implicatum of 'but' 
Grice claims that the speaker's word, i. e. 'but' in the case at issue, implies 
a contrast between the two parts that it conjoins. But even in this respect there 
is an inconsistency in his claim because he explicates the contrastive meaning of 
'but' as operating either between the two conjuncts that are actually uttered, or as 
invoking a general statement, of which the uttered sentence is only an instantiation, 
i. e. a statement of the form (x)(Fx- Gx). 
However, if the non-truth-functional meaning of 'but' is invariable, it must 
be the case that its contrastive meaning is always operative in a standard way. One 
must always be in a position to delineate the function of 'but' - apart from its truth- 
functional conjunctive meaning - by saying for example that, besides conjoining two 
sentences, 'but' serves to contrast them. 
However it is clear that this is not so. " This is amply'. illustrated by such 
examples as (45): 
(45) 1 went to see him but he wasn't there. 
Clearly there is nothing that 'but' contrasts in (45), at least at first sight. 'I went 
to see him' and 'he wasn't there' cannot be contrasted in any meaningful way. But 
granted that there must be some contrast, it is not at all evident what this contrast 
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is or what it holds between. 
3 
T. van Dijk, 1977, argues that similar sentences are equivalent to the 
schema 'p but q, because r' which will make (45) equivalent to (46): 
(46) I went to see him but I didn't see him because he wasn't 
there. 
The example he gives is the following: 
(47) 1 called him but he was drunk and didn't hear me. 
He maintains that (47) is equivalent to (48): 
(48) 1 called him, but he didn't hear me because he was drunk. 
He goes on to say: - 
From a sentence 'a calls b' we may infer in most contexts 
'b hears a' (otherwise a's calling would be pointless, i. e. 
it is a necessary condition of any speech act that the speaker 
believes that the hearer can hear and will listen to him). 
In the example this is not the case. Hence the contrastive 
'but' in (48). 
iP"58) 
In a similar fashion it could be argued that when we say 'a went to see b' what we 
infer, unless otherwise stated, is that 'a saw b'; hence (46) (cf. Bendix, 1966, 
1971). 
However, it must be noted that if there is a contrast here, this contrast must 
be seen as operating, not within the bounds of what is uttered in (45), but rather, 
between part of what is uttered and inferences drawn from it. Seen in this light 
it is a cooperative act, in Grice's sense, to proceed to annul these inferences that 
are legitimately drawn and yet are false. 
In his explication Dijk sees the contrast as operating between what is said 
preceding 'but' and the inferences that are expected to be drawn from it, rather than 
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between the two conjuncts. In his example however these inferences are 
stated, or rather denied, in an immediately following clause introduced by 'and', 
thus providing the grounds on which the contrast operates. He maintains: 
The rule is, thus, that directly after 'but' we may have 
sentences describing the situation in which facts may 
occur which are in contrast with the set of sentences 
preceding 'but'. 
(Dijk, 1977, p. 58) 
He argues that (47) is equivalent with the schema 'p, but q, because r'; but 
this argument does not hold for (45) as the inferences drawn from the sentence 
preceding 'but' are not stated - or denied - in any explicit formulation. 
3.1.1 On-Dijk's definition of contrastives 
----------------------------- 
Dijk's definition of contrastives, (49), 
(49) CONTR(A, B) def (A+B). (A ,, wB), 
(ibid., p. 51) 
does not seem to be capable of analysing cases like (47) or (45). In any case 
(49) seems to be inadequate-to represent examples of 'but' in which the use of the 
conjunction is determined, not by any expectations, but by semantic (lexical) 
dissimilarity, 
4 
as in (50): 
(50) John is a bachelor but David is married. 
There is no reason to assume that if John is a bachelor David must be a bachelor, 
too. Therefore Dijk's condition (A 4B) of (49) is not satisfied in (50), and there 
are many similar cases of 'but'. 
However it may be hoped that (49) is a plausible definition of the use of 'but' 
in cases in which expectations or presuppositions`are involved. Dijk does not 
talk in terms of expectations with regard to 'but'; but in terms of general statements 
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with varying 'strength' that are involved in conjunctions. He holds that: 
The definition of contrastives must thus incorporate a 
negation, because the negated postcedents yield 
regular implications. The intuitive idea is thus 
that a regular implication p3q is presupposed but that 
p. m q is actually true. 
(Dijk, p. 51) 
Arguably, (49) can embrace most cases of the use of 'but' in which a general 
statement is involved on the assumption, however, that in most cases (A411) of 
(49) is not a representation of this general statement, but of an, instantiation of 
it. This leaves us with a deficient definition since this presupposition on the 
basis of which the conjunction is used is not captured in it. For example (51), 
(51) John is a Republ ican, ' but he is honest, 
5 
will be represented by (49) as in (52): 
(52) If John is a Republican then he is dishonest and John is 
is a Republican and he is not dishonest, 
where A= John is a Republican 
B= He is dishonest. 
(52) leaves out the general statement, which Dijk presumably wants to include in 
his definition, namely, in the case in question, that Republicans are not generally 
highly esteemed. 
Moreover there are cases of the use of 'but' in which a general presupposition 
is involved which has little lexicogrammatical affinity with the second conjunct, B, 
and therefore in these cases Dijk's condition, (A 4B), is rendered vacuous. 
Consider an example from R. Lakoff, 1971; 
(53) John hates ice-cream., but so do I, 
in which the general presupposition is thatice cream is generally liked. By 
6 
63 
contrast, what (49) can yield by substitution is (54): 
(54) If John hates ice cream then I Iike it and John hates 
ice cream and I'hate it too. ,.. . 
It is not clear though how the hypothetical in (54) can be justified in the event 
that the general presupposition involved in this use of 'but' is either that people 
generally like ice cream,, or that I am expected to Iike ice -cream. 
In addition 
7 
the hypothetical here imparts something that (53) does not necessarily convey. 
Further (49) is incapable of capturing the function of 'but' when this operates 
across the discourse, i. e. when its point of reference lies not within the conjunct 
preceding it, but reaches out into the preceding utterance made by another speaker; 
that is, when its point of reference lies in the preceding turn8 and not in the one in 
which it occurs; this is a very general use of 'but' even if it does not occur 
initially. 
9 
However (49) seems to be satisfactory for those cases, of 'but' which contain 
a direct contrast, i. e. a contrast operating within the bounds of the conjunction 
and which is understood without any reliance on the invocation of any general 
proposition; (55) is an example: 
(55) It's January but it's not cold. 
Admittedly it is not clear whether what is involved in (55) is some sort of contrast 
or presuppositions and therefore expectations. In any case (55) seems to be 
satisfactorily explicated by (49). 
10 
3.1.2 G. Lakoff's deductive system and 'but' 
--------------------------------- 
In this connection G. Lakoff's, 1971b, work seems to be relevant. He 
characterizes cases of 'but' which involve statements of greater generality as more 
complex and as being instantiations deduced from a general presupposition; in 
other words he argues, like Dijk, that a general implication 2-ýg is presupposed, but 
he also maintains that there is a series of deductions involved via which we get to 
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the uttered structure. For example, he says that (56), 
(56) John is a Republican, but he is honest (too), 
is grammatical only relative to the general presupposition that one would expect 
Republicans not to be honest. He therefore argues for the following form for 
it: 
-, '(56i) Assertion: f(a) and g(a) 
Presupposition: (x)Exp(f(x)>Ng(x)) 
where: f= is a Republican 
g= is honest 
a=John 
f(a) = S1 
g(a) = S2 
By means of a deductive process' 
1 
we get to (56ii): 
(56ii) a. (x)Exp(f(x): )nvg(x)) (presupposition of (56)) 
b. Exp(f(a)->+, g(a)) (instantiation) 
Since f(a)S1 and g(a)=S2 we arrive at the form Exp(SP'-'S2). 
Lakoff, therefore offers a more complex general implication that claims to 
represent more accurately the thought processes that seem to be involved in some 
cases of 'but'. But even this complex system of deductions is not capable of 
accounting for the difficulties that confront us in types of sentences conjoined by 
'but' in which the contrast - if indeed it is a contrast - is made between-the 
conclusion of inferences that are not stated and part of what is said in an utterance. 
And this despite the fact that Lakoff brings contextual features into his analysis. 
In such intractable cases the second conjunct must be replaced by the conclusion of 
inferences drawn from the first. 
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But what are the criteria that can be independ- 
ently13 employed to differentiate between these cases? 
Notice that if I say 'I went to see him' you invariably infer, in the absence of 
any further remark, that I saw him. But if I say 'She is poor' or 'She is a woman' 
f 
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you do not infer that she is dishonest or, in the latter case - hopefully - 
that she is unintelligent. Hence in utterances like (27) and (57), 
(27) She is poor but she is honest, 
(57) . She is a woman 
but she is intelligent, 
more can be conveyed by the use of 'but' than can in (45). 
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Besides, in (45) 'but' does not conjoin the sentence 'I went to see him' and 
the negation of the conclusion of the inferences that are legitimately drawn from 
it in the absence of a further utterance denying them, 'I didn't see him'; that is 
(45) is preferred to (58) by speakers, 
(58) 1 went to see him but I didn't see him, 
because it is more economical and informative since the inferences drawn are 
automatically, though inexplicitly, annulled by giving the explanation superceding 
the explicit cancellation: 'He wasn't there'. 
3.2 Conclusion 
To conclude, it is clear that-there is not a constant standardized conventional 
implicature of a contrastive relation between the two parts conjoined by 'but' as 
argued by Grice. In Wilson's, 1975, words: 
There are, unfortunately, myriad other interpretations, and 
not alI of them involve either an objective contrast between 
the facts described in the two conjuncts, or a contrast of 
any sort in the speaker's attitude to them. 
(p. 118) 
Indeed, Woods's, 1967, remark on 'and' could be aptly extended to 'but', as well: 
By contrast with 'implies' there just is no common non-truth- 
functional relational ingredient associated with the various 
non-truth-functional uses of 'and' ... 
(p. 363), 
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Moreover, if the implicature generated by 'but' is conventional but not 
truth-functional, and hence not dependent on features of conversation or on what 
is said, but only on the conventional meaning of 'but, it follows that the meanings 
of the two conjuncts must not be involved in the determination of the non-truth- 
functional meaning of 'but'. However, we have seen that there is no independent 
procedure available that will help us determine what the non-truth-functional 
meaning of 'but' is, without recourse to the meanings of the conjuncts it connects. 
Besides, we cannot say that 'but' invariably implicates a , contrast between its 
conjuncts. It must be noted that there are more difficulties involved in deter- 
mining the meaning or implicatures of 'but' than just having to take into consideration 
the meanings of two conjuncts. 'But' can function across the discourse at hand, and 
in that case it is meaningless to talk of any contrast implicated or not, between the 
two conjuncts. 
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In any case, we cannot appeal to any general principles that 
will provide the guidelines in the determination of the nature of the conventional 
implicature independently of the meanings of the conjuncts, or in some cases, of 
longer stretches of discourse. 
. 
Kempson, 1975, says that conventional implicatures are counterexamples, 
not only to a truth-functional semantics, but alsoto. ä Gricean pragmatics, as they 
are not explicable by reference to discourse features, and concludes that, "the 
evidence in these cases is far from unambiguous - either in favour of a truth- 
conditional analysis or against it" (p. 218). Analysts of language generally 
tend to disregard conventional implicatures either because they are left unexplicated, 
and therefore are not well-understood, or because it is not clear in precisely what 
way they differ from the meaning of the words that generate them. 
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' For example, 
Katz, 1972, says: 
I shall ignore the former subcategory what is conventionally 
implicated because I am unable to see why the kinds of cases 
that are included in it are really anything more than part of 
the meaning of the sentence type in question. 
(p. 445) 
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The attractiveness of Grice's thesis from some points of view, however, 
is obvious. But if we opt for his position then our choice would be dictated by 
a desire to retain, on the one hand, a truth-functional semantics at all costs and, 
on the other hand, to dismiss significant aspects of meaning with the claim that 
they are adequately explicated in terms of conventional implicatures of a 
contrastive relation between two conjuncts. However, even on the assumption 
that these aspects of meaning are conventionally implicated, we have seen that it 
cannot be justifiably claimed that conventional implicatures arise invariably from 
relations between two conjuncts. This evidently poses the question of what 
conventional implicatures are. 
The facts discussed here seem to militate against a truth-conditional approach 
to 'but' that would not exclude the non-conjunctive aspects of its meaning. However, 
assuming that what has been called the non-truth-functional meaning of 'but' is 
invariant, the question that arises is whether these aspects of meaning can be justifiably 
accounted for non-semantically. Wiggins, 1971, for example, in considering the 
difficulties posed by 'and' and 'but', in relation to the lexicon entries, writes: 
Consider 'and' and 'but', .,. If we try to account for the 
differences. in each pair by making different 'analyses' or 
'citations'(17) do the explanatory work, then we reach some 
absurd positions. But and and differ in meaning. Suppose 
we account for this by a difference in citation. Then the 
sentence 'His speech was long but impressive' will account as 
false even if the speech was both long and impressive if there 
exists no such contrast as the one which the different citations 
for and and but require. Finding this absurd, we may feel 
obliged to accept one and the same simple truth-functional 
citation for both words. And we may wrongly reject the idea 
that but and and have any difference at all in strict meaning. 
Note, Fowever, that we shall be doing this purely and simp y 
because their lexical citations are identical. Frege boldly 
took this course but it is equally counterintuitive ... 
The 
generalization of the distinction between a directive (18) and 
a citation makes it possible for us to see how and and but have 
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different lexicon entries and differ in meaning without differing 
in citation. The standard ... difference between them comes in their respective directives. But this leaves the difference 
within the realm of semantics ... 
(p. 27) 
I 
It is not inconceivable that a comprehensive account of the meaning of 
'but' - both truth-functional and non-truth-functional - can be given. What 
is objected to in this study is an unprincipled exclusion of these non-conjunctive 
aspects of meaning from semantics, which is motivated solely by the fact that they 
constitute a hurdle to a truth-functional account. 
3.3 Robin Lakoff: two types of 'but' 
In the previous section we established that the non-truth-functional meaning 
of 'but', namely, what Grice calls the conventional implicature occasioned by 'but', 
is not invariant. Grice argues that 'but' generates a conventional implicature of 
some sort of contrast between the two conjuncts. However as we have seen, not 
only is his notion of contrast vague and unexplicated, but it is not always made 
between the two parts of conjunction. Besides it is disputable whether indeed 
what is involved in all uses of 'but' is some sort of contrast as Grice argues. We 
will therefore turn to a widely accepted account of conjunction in the hope that it 
will throw some light on the behaviour of 'but'. 
In her insightful analysis of conjunction, R. Lakoff, 1971, differentiates 
between two uses of 'but': the 'semantic opposition but' and the 'denial of 
expectation but'. It is not clear whether she wants to attribute two distinct 
senses to 'but, or whether she is only interested in the various uses of 'but' and in 
giving an analysis of the various factors that determine them. 
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However she 
formulates some rules which in her view seem to condition the use of either of the 
two types of 'but'. 
3.3.1 'Semantic opposition but' and 'denial of expectation but' 
In conjunctions in which the 'semantic opposition but' is used, she says, there 
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is no-relationship between the two conjuncts except that their subjects are directly 
opposed with respect to a specific property. She goes on to say: 
There is no reason to assume that, since the first part of the 
sentence is true, the second should be false; no conclusion 
about the second member of the conjunct is derivable from 
the first, insofar as we know from the sentence itself. 
(R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 133) 
Therefore the use of 'but' in (59) and (60) is that of the 'semantic opposition but' 
since the contrast is made between lexical items contained in the two conjuncts 
which form pairs of antonyms: 
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(59) John is tall but Bill is short, 
(60) John hates ice cream but I like it. 
On the other hand the denial of expectation use of 'but', it is argued, is 
conditioned by the speaker's presuppositions and knowledge of the world which give 
rise to general tendencies or"expectations. 
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In a sentence like (61), 
(61), John is tall but he's no good at basketball, 
the presupposition involved is that if someone is tall he is then expected to be good 
at basketball. These presuppositions are not claimed to be germane to the speaker 
alone. They are held either by the speaker, or the world in general. 
In what follows we will endeavour to show that her distinction between the two 
types of 'but' is not justifiable; though it might look so at first sight. In addition, 
it will be argued that most cases of the denial of expectation use of 'but', given the 
appropriate context, can be seen as uses of the 'semantic opposition but' or rather - 
since a distinction between the two types of 'but' is considered unfounded in this 
study - as a use of 'but' that does not involve the assumption of any general 
presuppositions regarding the speaker's or hearer's general knowledge and hence 
expectations. 
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3.3.2 On. Lakoff's conception of antonymy 
------------------------------ 
First it will be argued that her notion of antonymy is not only confusing 
but confused. Yet this notion should be defined in clearcut terms as her thesis, 
is based on it. The 'semantic opposition but', Lakoff holds, is determined not 
by presuppositions "residing in the speaker's knowledge of the world, and therefore 
his expectations" (R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 134) but by 'presuppositions of antonymy'; 
that is, the presupposition involved in the case of the semantic opposition use of 
'but' is a part of the lexical item that is contrasted. The reference to pre- 
suppositions with regard to lexical meanings is rather uncomfortable, but it need 
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not concern us here as our argument does not hinge on this point. 
However, clearly, Lakoff wants to draw a distinction between the meanings 
of lexical items in abstraction from the speaker's presuppositions regarding his 
knowledge of the world, on the one hand, and these presuppositions and hence 
the speaker's attitude and expectations on the other. That she refers to features 
of the meanings of particular words in her definition of antonymy is beyond doubt 
as she talks of their representations in the lexicon. For example, she says, 
that 'hot' and 'cold' will differ in their representations in the lexicon in that the 
former will be assigned a feature L+temperaturJ or some such notion and the latter 
Z=-temperatur]. Therefore the contrast between the words 'hot' and 'cold' 
provides the ground for the use of the semantic opposition 'but'. If I say 'My 
drink is hot' there is no expectation derivable therefrom of a second member of a 
conjunction, for instance, 'My drink is hot but yours is cold. ' 
However, as is acknowledged, her distinction between the two types of 'but' 
is hardly tenable if her notion of antonymy is not considerably extended. A use 
of 'but' like that in (62), 
(62) John is rich but dumb, 
she claims, can be either that of the 'semantic opposition but' or that of the 'denial 
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of expectation but'. Evidently, (62) must find a place in the 'semantic 
opposition but' cases as the first conjunct does not give rise to any assumptions 
as to the truth or falsity of the second conjunct or, as Lakoff puts it, "no, conclusion 
about the second member of the conjunct is derivable from the first, in so for as we 
know from the sentence itself" (p. 133). 
In order to account for the semantic opposition use of 'but' in (62) along the 
lines of the notion of antonymy, she concludes that "the only reason that 'but' may 
be used in the sentence is the fact that rich and dumb share one semantic character- 
istic, and share it in that one is '+' for it, the other '- "'(p. 135). She goes on 
to say, firstly, that richness and dumbness are contrasted in that they can be the 
objects of approbation or disapproval, and secondly, that they differ with respect 
to one feature, i. e. one is /Tgood thin J, the other L=good thing7. But one 
should note how the relation between 'good' and 'approve' is summed up in Ziff, 
1960, pp. 223-27: 
The relation between 'good' and 'approve' appears to be as 
follows: if someone says that something is good in a 
situation having a relatively formal character owing to the 
fact that it has something to do with putting that which is 
in question to a test, and of that which is in question is 
envisaged as subject to alteration, and if there are no 
indications tote contrary, the person who utters the 
utterance can be taken to approve of whatever is in question. 
(emphasis added, p. 227) 
He goes on to add: 
But how one could seriously maintain that to say 'This is good' 
is to say, and means the some as saying, 'I approve of this', I 
find difficult to understand. 
Incidentally, only a cursory look, not into the endless philosophical disputes over 
the meaning of 'good', but into the last chapter of Ziff, 1960, will dissuade any 
linguist from using the term 'good' as a semantic feature. 
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However, whilst rich and poor contrast semantically, 
23 
there is no warrant 
for holding that this is the case with respect to rich and dumb. The pre- 
suppositions involved here, ggood thiniland -good thin27, as Lakoff sees 
them, are features of a pragmatical appraisal of certain qualities rather than 
"part of the lexical items" rich and dumb. Such features are outside the realm 
of semantics. Indeed the respective ascription of these features to the lexical 
items in hand is conditioned by our cultural beliefs. Even within our society 
not all people will agree that richness must be assigned the feature 
[ good thin q, 
whilst we will all be scalded if hot water were to be spilt on us. It is remarkable, 
though, that although Lakoff bends the notion of 'semantic features' to make the 
concept of antonymy suit her analysis, she still claims to explicate 'antonymy' in 
semantic terms. 
It follows therefore that according to Lakoff our lexicon will be fraught with 
our value-judgments and, evidently, if value-judgments, start finding their way in- 
to the lexicon, it will not be a lexicon any more; it will be a thesaurus of our 
cultural beliefs. It can be argued, however, that 'evaluative features'24 can 
have a place in the lexicon. Fillmore, 1971 a, for example, considers both 
cases in which evaluative adjectives like 'good' can have a fixed meaning derivable 
from the semantic definition of the words they qualify, and cases in which evaluative 
adjectives characterize words, not in terms of their semantic definition, but in terms 
of features that have to be stated independently of the definition of the word (cf. 
also Wiggins, 1971, p. 29). He concludes, 
The question a lexicographer must face is whether these 
matters have to do with what one knows, as a speaker of 
a language, about the words in that language, or what 
one knows, as a member of a culture, about the objects, 
beliefs and practices of that culture. 
(p. 383) 
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However, assuming that 'evaluation features' can have a linguistic validity. 
that would reflect an aspect of linguistics competence, (cf. Fillmore, op. cit. ), 
the lexical items 'dumb' and 'rich' are not related, in any systematic way, in 
terms of any evaluative semantic markers. Besides, in the same paragraph 
Lakoff seems to obliterate her distinction between lexical meanings and the speaker's 
knowledge of the world, and hence his attitudes and expectations. Indeed what 
else are our judgments of approbation or disapproval than our expression of our 
attitudes towards the existing state of affairs? And what determines our attitudes 
other than our knowledge of the world and our beliefs and expectations thereof? 
Furthermore, by the same token, the use of 'but' in (61) could be claimed to 
be the semantic opposition one as both the expressions tall and no good at basketball 
can be said to "share one semantic characteristic and share it in that one is '+' for 
it, the other'-' "'(R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 135). That is, tallness and being no good 
at basketball are alike in that one is L+good thing7, and the other is /=good thinq7. 
Indeed Lakoff's notion of antonymy is so blurred and infiltrated with pragmatical 
notions that one is tempted to think that the reason she does not claim that 'but' in 
(61) is a 'semantic opposition but' is the fact that the two predicates that are somehow 
contrasted in (61) are of a completely different composition. 
We belief that we have shown that Lakoff's definition of antonymy is circular 
since it involves the speaker's beliefs. 
it has been made almost contentless. 
In any case, it is so broadly defined that 
By necessity, therefore, her argument for a 
distinction between some broad, but yet semantically defined, conception of 
antonymy and the speaker's knowledge of the world, i. e. a pragmatical feature, is 
vitiated by her own definition of this extended notion of antonymy, and hence 
untenable. 
25 If such a distinction, however, is a condition for her distinction 
between the two types of 'but', as is the case, then her thesis is invalidated. But 
let us for the moment accept her distinctions and see whether her thesis can be 
formulated in more rigorous terms. 
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3.3.3 An attempt to reformulate Lakoff's analysis: 
__ 
some criteriaproEosed - -- - ---------------------- -- -------- --- - 
There appear to be two factors that seem to condition the use of 'but', in 
Lakoff's view, although they remain unacknowledged and presumably unidentified. 
Firstly, it is noticed that the subjects in conjunctions with the 'semantic opposition 
but' are not identical in most cases. This is only implicitly acknowledged by 
Lakoff in the following quotation: 
There is no relationship, implicit or otherwise, between the 
two parts of the sentences except that the subjects of the two 
sentences are directly opposed to each of er in a particular 
property. 
(emphasis added, R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 133) 
Secondly, in the cases of the 'semantics opposition but, there must be lexical items 
that are antonyms or near-antonyms. It must be also noted that expressions that 
are contrasted usually belong to the some lexical class. 
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On the other hand in cases in which the contrasted expressions are either of 
a different structural composition, as in (61), or cannot be claimed in any reasonable 
sense to be antonyms, as in (63), 
(63) John hates ice cream, but so do I, 
then the type of 'but' used is argued to be the denial of expectation one. However, 
it is not an accident that in the cases of the 'denial of expectation but' the subjects 
of the two sentences of the conjunction usually have the same referent. This seems 
to be a direct consequence of the concept of antonymy involved in the semantic 
opposition use of 'but'. Indeed antonymy can only be present in an attenuated 
form if the subjects of the two conjuncts are identical. As Lakoff notices in 
cases of true antonymy the subjects of the two conjuncts cannot refer to the same 
individual. For example, (64), 
(64) John is rich but poor, 
is contradictory. 
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In cases of the denial of expectation use of 'but', therefore, the tendency 
is to have identical subjects in both conjuncts and items that are not antonyms or 
near-antonyms. Additional evidence for this supposition is provided by examples 
which have identical subjects, on the one hand, like (62), 
(62) John is rich but dumb, 
but which, in Lakoff's view, contain near-antonyms that belong to the same class, 
on the other. Lakoff claims that (62) has two readings depending on the circum- 
stances in which it is uttered. It must be noticed that in (62) the subjects are 
identical, hence the structural ellipsis of the noun phrase. However, since near- 
antonyms, at least in Lakoff's view, are also present in (62), it can be grouped 
together with cases of the semantic opposition type of 'but'. But nevertheless it 
has also the reading of the denial of expectation 'but', just because - it is 
argued here - the subjects of the two sentences in the conjunction refer to the 
same individual. 
A graphic representation of what the case seems to be in Lakoff's account is 
given in figure 9 below: 
Figure 9 
BUT 
Category A Category B 
5_ semdntic,. opposition denial of expectation 
but but 
(i) non-identical subjects (i) identical subjects (i) (usually) 
identical subjects 
(ii) contrastable lexical 
items (sem. antonymy) 
(ii) contrastable lexical 
items (sem. antonymy) 
(ii) non-contrastable 
lexical items 
Group N Group D'% Group IJ 
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However even if we put aside our objections to Lakoff's definition of 
antonymy which, as has been claimed, invalidates her distinction between the 
two types of the conjunction at issue, there is such a plethora of uses of 'but' which 
like (62) can be identified, depending on the circumstances, with either the 
'semantic opposition but' cases or the denial of expectation ones that a distinction 
between these two uses of 'but' is rendered vacuous, especially as no formal 
procedure is provided "that will distinguish between them. For instance, the 'but' 
in our familiar example, 
(27) She is poor but she is honest, 
which belongs to group /'31, in figure 9, can be identified as either the 'semantic 
opposition but' or as the 'denial of expectation but'; Viand honest are in 
Lakoff's view (near-)antonyms in that they both share the same semantic characteristic; 
i. e. poor differs from honest in that the former is assigned the feature 1-good thin 
while the latter f+good thing7. Therefore, according to Lakoff's account, (27) 
must be assigned the interpretation determined by the semantic opposition use of 'but' 
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"depending on circumstances". * On the other hand (27) must have a place in 
the category of the denial of expectation use of 'but', and this claim is based, as 
has been argued here, on the fact that the two sentences conjoined in (27) have 
identical subjects. To clarify this point consider (65), 
(65) John is poor but Bill is honest, 
where John and Bill are unrelated. 'But' in (65) can be only that of the semantic- 
opposition 'but'. 
As the reader can provide as many examples of cases like (27) which will belong 
to group /] in figure 9, as he wishes, we consider it unnecessary to pursue this point 
any further in order to prove that group L"J can have as many potential members as 
any of the other two groups. Having established however that group IJ cases are 
numerous, and bearing in mind that they can belong to any of the other two groups, 
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it becomes obvious that any distinction between a 'semantic opposition but' and 
a 'denial of expectation but' becomes void. 
Further, the criteria that were provided here, as shown in figure 9, do not 
seem to be either necessary or sufficient for the determination of the type of 'but'. 
To illustrate this point consider (66), 
(66) She is poor but her parents were rich. 
Clearly poor and rich are true antonyms and not just near-antonyms. Besides, 
the subjects of the two conjuncts are not identical. Therefore both conditions 
for group lýcases are fulfilled and yet the type of 'but' used seems to be that of 
the denial of expectation. ' It can be rephrased with although, a'feature claimed 
to be characteristic of the denial of expectation use of 'but', as shown in (67)29 
(R. Lakoff, op. cit., p. 141); 
(67) Although her parents were rich she is poor. 
On the other hand, as shown in (68), 
(68) Her parents were rich but she is poor, 
(66) is symmetric, i. e. reversible, a feature, claimed by Lakoff to be, characteristic 
of the semantic opposition use of 'but' (ibid., pp. 135-36). An allegedly para- 
digmatic example of semantic opposition would be (69), 
(69) John is poor but BiI I is rich (ibid. , p. 141) 
since it contains paradigmatic antonyms and non-identical subjects. Lakoff 
claims that "semantic opposition but's tend to be a little strange with 'although"', 
and, as an example, she gives (70), which she asterisks as unacceptable: 
(70)* Although John is rich, Bill is poor. (ibid., p. 141) 
However, you only have to consider the case in which John and Bill are brothers, 
and (70) becomes a perfectly appropriate and acceptable utterance. But, in this 
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case, according to Lakoff, despite the paradigmatic antonyms, (69) would have 
to be a case of the 'denial of expectation but', the expectation being that Bill is 
not expected to be poor since he is John's brother. 
In support of Lakoff's thesis it can be proposed that (i) in /17, in figure 9 
be further constrained by the addition of the condition that the subjects should 
not only be non-identical, but also unrelated. However such a proposal is 
untenable for two reasons: ' firstly, we have to provide a definition of the concept 
of relation, and the difficulties facing us here are notorious; moreover, the notion 
of relation is a two place predicate and points of reference are not readily available 
or fixed. Secondly, any such constraint on (i) would of necessity run counter to 
the condition specified in Lakoff's account that the two conjuncts be related in that 
they share a common topic: 
... 
'but' requires a common topic ... The two members 
of the conjunct joined by 'but' must be related to one 
another, in some way. Again, the relationship is based 
on semantic rather than purely lekical similarity. 
(ibid., p. 131) 
It could be counter-argued, however, in defence of Lakoff's thesis, that the' constraint 
applies only to (i) in group111and not to (ii), which (ii) will provide the ground for 
the common topic. The invalidity of this claim, however, is illustrated in (71): 
(71) John is a bachelor but the President of the United States 
is married. 
As Dascal and Katriel, 1977, note in this respect: 
Just as it is not the conjuncts themselves that determine the 
nature of the contrast between them, so their contents do 
not necessarily determine the common topic. 
(p. 147) 
The upshot is that, even ignoring the circularity involved in Lakoff's definition 
of antonymy, her account of conjunction cannot be formulated in any clear-cut terms. 
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Besides, the postulation of any formal criteria that might be regarded as sufficient 
or necessary conditions of the presence of either type of 'but' is proved to be 
unfounded. Lakoff's thesis fails on more than one score. 
3.3.4 Antonymy and the speaker's presuppositions: a conflation 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Lakoff fails to differentiate between the speaker's knowledge and presuppos- 
itions' and those of the hearer. How can we define what constitutes expectations, 
and hence denial of expectations? Is an example Ilke (57), 
(57) She is a woman but she is intelligent, 
considered to be a case of the semantic opposition use of 'but' or of the denial of 
expectation one? Are the lexical items woman and intelligent contrasted-in any 
semantical way? If Lakoff feels free to extend the notion of antonymy to make 
out a case for a contrast between dumb and rich, by parity of reason and method, 
we can make out a case of antonymy for the pair woman and intelligent. That is, 
woman: [-good thinq7, intelligent: ß+good thin7. 
However if this claim is unendorsable on the grounds that such beliefs are not 
generally held and hence Lakoff's notion of antonymy is not present in (57), then 
one is left wondering on what grounds one can meaningfully claim that (57) can be 
a case of the denial of expectation use of 'but'. Is there any reason "to assume 
that, since the first part of the sentence is true, the second should be false"? 
(R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 133). Is the conclusion that she is dull derivable from the 
first conjunct? These are, however, preconditions for the denial of expectation 
use of 'but' in Lakoff's analysis; that is the presence of the expectations derivable 
from p are a prerequisite if these expectations are to be denied in g. If Lakoff 
wants to persist in her claim that this is a denial of expectation use of 'but', then, 
it seems obvious that she has to difFerentiate between the speaker's and the hearer's 
presuppositions and beliefs (in the obvious case that at least half of the population 
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on our globe would not hold such a belief). 
However, if expectations do not have a general character but are narrowed 
down to individual beliefs, there is no sound basis for a distinction between a 
semantic opposition type of 'but' and a denial of expectation type of 'but', as her 
notion of antonymy and her concept of the speaker's expectations seem to merge. 
It is a matter of individual belief whether 'dumbness' or 'richness' or 'womanness' 
or 'intelligence', or what have you, are to be assigned features like Li good thing7 
or f- good thing7. Besides, another point that escapes Lakoff's notice is that the 
attribution of such features is only relative to points of reference and dependent on 
the circumstances. In one situation 'intelligence' maybe assigned the character- 
istic 1+good thin a7- for example if my son is concerned - and in another 
'good thiny7, for example if my business rival or my prospective wife is concerned 
-- in accordance with my belief that less intelligent woman make better wives; 
(cf. 'She is beautiful but she is intelligent'). 
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It all boils down to the some conclusion: Z+ good thing7 and [good thin97 
are not inherent properties or intrinsic qualities of things. They are realizations 
of our evaluations or expressions of our judgments. 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
It has been shown that R. Lakoff's distinction between the two types of 'but' 
is unprincipled'and circular because it is based on a conception of antonymy, on 
the one hand -a purportedly semantic notion but nevertheless pervaded with 
pragmatic features like speaker's value-judgments in her analysis - and on a 
characterisation of speaker's general knowledge and expectations, on the other. 
Besides, the presuppositions of knowledge and expectations need not be univerval: 
"others are confined to a subclass, or are idiosyncratic with the speaker" (R. Lakoff, 
op. cit. , p. 
148). The circularity of her distinction between the two types of 'but' 
resides in the fact that the two notions of antonymy, a semantic notion, and of 
speaker's general knowledge, beliefs and expectations are conflated in her account. 
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The over-all, conclusion that emerges is that from whichever angle Lakoff's thesis 
is examined, it is indefensible and therefore untenable. 
3.4- - 
On the vacuity of Lakoff's distinction between the two types of 'but' 
We will now endeavour to show, as was argued in section 3.3.1 above, 
that many, if not all of R. Lakoff's examples of the 'denial of expectation but', 
do not involve any general presuppositions, or expectations, "as claimed by Lokoff, 
and that, moreover, these presuppositions are invoked by the hearer, or, rather, 
the linguist in the case in point, in order to impose an acceptable interpretation 
on what he hears, or reads in limbo. This method of analysis, therefore, comes 
very close to being an 'overhearer's' method of understanding what is said, with 
all attendant consequences, the most significant of which being, that, whatever 
the results of the analysis are, they cannot tell "the whole story". 
Although this remark is not meant to denigrate the method of analysis of 
language that concentrates primarily on sentences in isolation, the point that 
should be emphasized is that we cannot follow this traditional line of research, 
and, at the same time, claim that such an analysis can embrace all pragmato- 
semantic aspects of the use of linguistic items, as the Lakoffs seem to do. For 
example, it seems paradoxical that, while they focus on sentences (sentence types, 
and not sentence tokens), yet, they bring pragmatic presuppositions to bear on them. 
Such presuppositions are not germane to sentence types, but, rather, to utterances 
of sentences, since they pertain to speaker-hearer specific relations. 
Moreover, the presuppositions that are brought to bear on the appropriate 
use of 'but' are neither predictable nor regular in Fillmore's, 1971a, b, fashion, 
as they extend to the conjuncts; for example, Fil, lmore's felicity conditions, or 
happiness conditions, are addressed to the question: "What do I need to know in 
order to use this form appropriately, and to understand other people when they use 
it? "'(1971b, p. 274). Neithe°r can they (the presuppositions) always be translated 
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into 'appropriacy conditions' (Kempson, 1977), or 'felicity conditions', that 
would constitute the grounds on which a comprehensive characterization of 
meaning could be based. 
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If we are to utilise such a pragmatic apparatus, 
we should do so in the context of utterances, and, as is well known, "an 
utterance will occur some place sequentially" (Schegloff, 1976). 
Although R. Lakoff is talking about the 'acceptability' of, sentences, she, 
nevertheless, examines them as if they were to be uttered' in limbo, abstracted 
from any situational or linguistic context. But this method had better be'our 
last resort in trying to understand what can be conveyed by the utterance of a 
sentence, whether it is 'acceptable', or 'unacceptable' and so on. Utterances 
are-not made out of the blue, in isolation from a complete co-text or a situational 
context (cf. Longuet-Higgins, 1972, "human utterances are not produced in 
vacua"). As Schegloff, 1976, put it, 
The use of the sheer occurrence of the lexical items without 
regard to the placement of the utterance in which they 
occur in the sequential organization of conversation, can 
be badly misleading, though not implausible. 
Let us, therefore, try and see some of Lakoff's examples in some sort of 
context, before we pass judgment as to which 'but' is involved in each case. 
Consider therefore (63): 
(63) John hates ice cream, but so do I. 
(R. Lakoff's 'denial of expectation but, ', p.. 133) 
(63) can be uttered as a reply to Uncle Tom's offer: 
(72) I' II buy you ice cream, kids. 
(72) could also be replied to by (73): 
(73) John hates ice cream but I like it. 
Now in both (63) and (73) it is not at all clear that 'but' operates within the 
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conjunction, i. e. that it contrasts in some way the two conjuncts, or that it 
denies expectations aroused by the first conjunct as Lakoff would claim the case 
to be for (73) and (63) respectively. Indeed, it is arbitrary and unreasonable 
to assume that by uttering (63) the child is denying the expectation that "one 
would expect (for whatever reason) that anything John hates, I would like" 
(R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 133). It has been claimed in section 3.1.1 that if this 
utterance is abstracted from any context, the most generally acceptable inter- 
pretation that will be given to it is via the invocation of the assumption that 
people are expected to like ice cream and that, therefore, the referent of 'I' is 
expected to do so also. This is a general assumption that springs to mind while 
the one Lakoff appeals to must be invoked via the knowledge of particular cir- 
cumstances obtaining in the specific case in point. 
And in any case - it can be argued in the same vein - what prevents 
us from assuming that the expectation is that (for some reason, having been brought 
up together and having developed the some likes and dislikes) I hate whatever 
John hates and vice versa? In this case (73) is a 'denial of expectation but', 
despite the fact that it contains paradigmatic antonyms. Neither can we see 
how using 'and' in (63) "would produce a greater change in the meaning of the 
conjoined sentence as a whole than that change of conjunction would produce" in 
(73) (ibid. , p. 133). On the contrary, (63a): 
(63a) John hates ice cream and so do I, 
would produce the same perlocutionary effect in Uncle Tom (he would not proceed 
with his plans to buy them ice cream). Nor would he understand anything less 
by it. Whereas (73a), 
(73a) John hates ice cream and I like it, 
would produce a greater change in the meaning(? ) or appropriateness of the con- 
junction. (73a) is just not as appropriate in the circumstances as (73) is. 
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These are linguistic facts that, are ignored by Lakoff. In her view 'but' is 
always operative within the conjunction. In the context constructed above, 
in our view, the 'but' 'reaches out', across sentence boundaries, into Uncle 
Tom's utterance. This becomes clear if the offer in (72) is responded to as 
in (74): 
(74) Thanks, but we don't like ice cream, 
or just as in (74a): 
(74a) But we don't Iike it. 
Kempson, 1975, p. 57, who argues against the claim that the use of 'but' 
involves presuppositions of expectations, maintains that a 'parallel' example to 
(63), 
(63) John wants ice cream, but so do I, 
uttered in a situation where there is not enough money to buy us both ice creams, 
so that neither of us can have one, need not involve any presuppositions of 
expectations. Here, it must be noticed, firstly that Kempson 'contextual izes, 
the utterance to 'rid it' from any presuppositions of expectations, as described by 
Lakoff, and, secondly, that, as we have seen, we need not draw on 'parallel' 
examples. (63) is a perfect case in point, as has been shown. 
With regard to (63) Lakoff says that the "denial of expectation is the only 
possibility" (p. 133). She defines the expectation, as we have seen, that one 
would expect that I would like anything that John hates. This clearly can be 
wrong. But the question that remains is whether there is still involved some 
sort of expectation that is denied, not necessarily between the two conjuncts but 
between the sentence following 'but' and some point of reference in a previous 
utterance that prompted the use of 'but', for example, in our case Uncle Tom's 
utterance. We will deal with this point later in our discussion. 
Let us now consider some more examples to establish the point made in the 
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above discussion. Consider (27): 
(27) She is poor but she is honest. 
(27) can be responded to as in (75): 
(75) She is poor but she is not honest. (Anyway I can't 
see the connexion; -) 
In the absence of any context it may be claimed that (27) is either a 'semantic, 
opposition but' or a 'denial of expectation but'. But what is the case with 
the 'but' in (75)? Clearly, it does not contrast 'poor' and 'honest' or 'not 
honest'. It is evident that the 'but' in (75) has as a frame of reference some- 
thing in (27). 
Imagine a situation in which a group of gangsters are trying to recruit 
members for carrying out their illegal operations. Prospective members of 
their group would have to be poverty-stricken people with no high moral standards. 
A woman is proposed for consideration to which one of the gangsters responds with 
(27). Now would we be justified in saying that the 'but' here contrasts the two 
conjuncts? That is, that we have any notions of antonymy regarding the two 
adjectives in question that are realised in (27)? Or is it a 'denial of expectation 
but' denying any expectations (that she is dishonest? ) aroused by the first conjunct? 
Notice that the conjuncts could be reversed (also reversed in terms of polarity) 
were the requirements specified by a different situation (cf. (75)). 
In our view the use of 'but' is motivated by the requirements specified by 
the context, i. e. our search in this case for somebody who is both hard-up and of 
dubious morality. That is, by contextual features germane to the specific 
situation. The criteriality of these features is therefore the determining factor 
of the appropriate or inappropriate use of 'but' in the case in point. 
It may be that there can be made out a case for a 'semantic-opposition but' 
or fora 'denial of expectation but'. But which of the two? Indeed, there 
f 
86 
are no independent criteria. We cannot argue that because she is poor she 
is expected to be dishonest, even in this specific situation. Remember that 
the conjuncts could be reversed ('She is honest but she is poor', 'She is poor 
but she is dishonest', 'She is not poor but she is dishonest', etc. ). As for 
the 'semantic opposition but', the same argument goes. What would the 
criteria be for contrasting (opposing) 'poor' and 'honest' as antonyms? Z+-good 
thing' for 'honest' and (good thin7for 'poor' clearly will not do in this case. 
Incidentally, this adduces more evidence for our argument in section 3.3.4 that 
such criteria `cannot serve in determining antonymic pairs, and hence trigger the 
use of the 'semantic. opposition but' since they are not only subjective but also 
situation-specific. It follows therefore that any criteria for contrasting the 
lexical items 'poor' and 'honest' are fluid - situation-specific - and 
reversible. 
However, it can still be claimed that 'poor' and 'honest' are contrasted in 
(27) uttered in the specific situation, but that this contrast is brought about, not 
by independent conditions - like antonymy between lexical items or general 
presuppositions and expectations - but by means of the particular requirements 
specified by the context in hand. To pass verdicts as to which 'but' is involved 
in each case - granting the distinction between the two types of 'but' - 
irrespective of the type of situation in which the utterance containing them 
occurs, is, as we have seen, justifiable. 
It is easy to construct another context in which her poverty would be 
considered a disadvantage while her honesty an advantage. It could, therefore, 
be claimed that there is a contrast - but surely, not a semantic one - made 
between her poverty and her honesty relative to the requirements specified by the 
context. But certainly it cannot be claimed that there is a contrast made in 
general between poverty and honesty (cf. Grice). Neither can it be maintained 
- given the specific situation - that this contrast is operative by appeal to a 
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general proposition of the form '(x)(Fx-Gx)'. 
Consider the above described context (group of gangsters, etc. ) and one of 
the gangsters uttering (76): 
(76) Do you think that Joan would like to cooperate? 
to which one could answer by (27). In this particular context it is clear that 
there is no specific expectation being denied. 'She is poor' (so she would 
welcome a good share of money), 'but - on the other hand - she is honest' (so 
she would be reluctant to get involved in an enterprise of a dubious nature). 
Mutatis mutandis the above criticism of R. Lakoff's thesis, and, more 
specifically, of her definition of the 'denial of expectation but', goes for G. Lakoff's 
analysis of deductive procedures allegedly involved in understanding conjunctions 
containing this type of 'but' (1971b). Consider (56), 
(56) John is a Republican, but he is honest (too). 
which, he says, is grammatical relative to the general presupposition that one would 
expect Republicans not to be honest. These presuppositions and the deductions 
involved in the derivation of the expectations in question were given in 3.1.2. 
However, imagine a situation in which some unscrupulous Republicans are 
planning to break into the offices of their rival party and they are, therefore, 
looking for volunteers who would, naturally, come from the class of Republican 
devotees. To a proposal that John might qualify for rendering his services one 
can respond by (56). Would then (56) be grammatical only relative to the pre- 
supposition that (x)(Exp(f(x)-*j-g(x)) where f= is a Republican, and g= is honest? 
Hardly so. Yet G. Lakoff claims that, 
Certain sentences will be grammatical only relative to 
certain presuppositions and deductions, that is, to certain 
thoughts and thought processes and the situations to which 
they correspond. This seems to me wholly natural. 
(1971b, p. 69) 
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It hardly does to us, however, it must be admitted. Besides, as is well known, 
these deductions and presuppositions should be represented in syntactic derivations, 
on Lakoff's view. It must be made clear that what is criticized here is not the 
proposal made by Lakoff regarding the deductive processes involved in cases of 
'but', but rather his claim that these sentences, like (56), are "grammatical only 
relative to certain presuppositions and deductions" (emphasis added), that is, that 
such conditions are essential or, indeed, necessary. 
It is evident that 'but' in (56), uttered in the above-described situation, does 
not have its anaphoric point within the bounds of the conjunction. (Clearly, it 
is not a 'semantic opposition but', in any sense. )33 Neither does it invoke any 
line of deductions deriving from any presuppositions whatever. And yet it is a 
grammatical and appropriate utterance in the specific situation. 
This criticism carries over to Harder and Kock, 1976, whose account of 'but' 
draws heavily on Ducrot, 1973. They maintain that, 
... by prefixing'; 'but' to the second conjunct, the speaker 'situates' it in a context where it contradicts a continunation 
to be expected in the light of the first conjunct. The 
provocative effect of examples like 'Harry is a Republican, 
but honest', is due to the fact that one is expected to inter- 
polate a conclusion from Harry's Republicanism which 
contrasts with his honesty. 
iP. 23) 
It is perhaps worth noting Isard's difficulty in finding an interpretation for utterances 
Ilke (i), 
(i) John called Harry a model-theorist and then HE insulted 
HIM. 
(an example discussed in detail in G. Lakoff, 1971a) when they are abstracted from 
their contexts; he notes: 
Given the minimal context of (i) the only candidate for this 
contrasting setting is calling Harry a model theorist, so HIM 
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must contrast with Harry. HE must then contrast with 
John, of whom the contrasting setting has been predicated. 
If we had a richer context, it would be perfectly possible 
to understand the pronouns as people other than Harry and 
John altogether, but if we are restricted to choosing from 
Harry and John, HE can-only be Harry, and HIM John 
(emphasis added), 
and he concludes: 
... 
but I also find it impossible to understand HE as Harry. 
(1978) 
This quotation is indicative of the limitations imposed on the understanding of 
utterances - one should be talking of sentences here - when these are 
considered in isolation from their contexts. 
However, to close the parenthesis, it is true that, in the absence of any 
particular context, on hearing (56), or examples that have been identified as 
cases of the denial of expectation use of 'but', we are inclined to appeal, roughly, 
to such general presuppositions, expectations and deductions in order, to 'understand' 
these utterances. This points to the fact that humans do not reject utterances 
(Wilks, 1975) without first utilizing all resources available to them in order to 
understand them. On hearing an utterance abstracted from its context - or 
-reading it as an example in a linguistics analysis - we have recourse first to our 
knowledge of the world in order to find an interpretation for it. We try to 
construct a 'general'34 framework that will fit what we hear in the same sense that 
upon hearing our interlocutor suddenly shout 'He's mad; he's going to jump into 
the river' - when his utterance is not connected to the on-going conversation - 
we will automatically look around in search of the intended referent of 'he'; if 
we can't see anybody around fitting the referring expression of the utterance then 
- and only then - we are likely to think that our interlocutor must be imputed 
the attribute that he ascribed to his imaginary referent of 'he'. 
Now why does the framework assumed have to be general? It doesn't. 
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But it so happens that in the absence of any particular situation we are more 
likely to construct a situation that is more general just because constructing 
a general situation (or appealing to a general statement) involves less effort 
and imagination on our part as hearers. (The Cooperative Principle concerns 
the hearer, too. ) For example, it may be argued that in (56) the speaker is 
understood as juxtaposing two 'themes' (Schank and Abelson, 1977), one regarding 
a societal role ('Republican') and another regarding a life theme ('honest'). What 
is understood is that these two themes are contrasted; this understanding is based 
on the 'extractable' inference that these two themes are contrastible and incompatible 
in the speaker's standing background knowledge and beliefs (cf. section 7.2). If 
such an inference manages to find room in our background knowledge and beliefs then 
the sentence is understood. However, if such an inference is not 'extractable', 
then the sentence is rejected as nonsensical. Compare (i), 
(i) John is a communist but yesterday it was windy. 
However that may be, it does not mean that, if we are confronted with a 
sentence 'in limbo', which may sound deviant or unacceptable, (i. e. which does 
not fit into a general frame), we will not utilise all the ingenuity we have at our 
disposal to impose an acceptable interpretation on it. For example, Chomsky, 
1964, notes: 
Linguists, when presented with examples of semi-grammatical, 
deviant utterances, often respond by contriving possible inter- 
pretations in constructed contexts. 
(p. 385) 
However, this hardly goes only for linguists. Bierwisch, 1967, makes the 
following generalization which he proposes as a principle: 
A sentence is the less normal the more conditions outside of it 
have to be met for it to be acceptable. 
(p. 8) 
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For example, when presented with (i), 
(i) The notes were sour because the seam was split, 
subjects could not comprehend it, but as soon as a cue was given (e. g. ''bagpipes'), 
(i) was comprehensible (Bransford and Johnson, 1973). 
It is therefore evident why reading or hearing sentences in limbo we will try 
to understand them. It is also clear why in trying to understand them we will 
first appeal to our general knowledge of the world rather than resort to the con- 
struction of contrived situation-specific contexts. We do not expend this effort 
unnecessarily. Human nature abhors waste: a straight route is always 
preferred to a zigzag if they both lead to the treasure. However in the absence 
of an available general frame it will fit what we hear, we do not reject the 
utterance, but resort to contriving a possible context in which it will 'acquire' 
meaning, i. e. will be appropriate. 
Bransford and Johnson, 1973, report with respect to example (i), 
(i) Bill is able to come to the party tonight because his car 
broke down, 
that people indicate that they understand it by way of fabricating an elaborate 
situation; they note that most people will give an account of what they under- 
stand similar to (ia) below: 
(ia) Bill was originally going to leave town, but now he could 
not leave because his car broke down. Since he could 
not leave he could come to the party since the party was 
in town. 
(p. 391) 
As Bransford and Johnson point out, "a listener is confronted with a problem-solving 
task of creating some situation in which the because structure makes sense". ' What 
seems clear, though, is that (i) is not uttered in a situation where antecedent cir- 
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cumstances of (ia) were not already known (given) or presumed to be known, to 
the hearer, so that he would not have to concoct them in order to make sense of 
(i). Part of the circumstances (or more aptly, the antecedent circumstances) 
in (ia) are part, or, rather, must be part, of the participants' CMCAs (see 
section 7.1) pertaining to the speech-act in (i). As Bransford and Johnson, 
1973, note, 
... results ... support the notion that semantic anomaly is largely a function of the degree to which one can relate a 
sentence to some relevant aspect of his knowledge of the 
world. 
(p. 405) 
Let us now consider R. Lakoff's example (1971, p. 136), 
(77) Bill murdered Alice, but he was caught, 
which, she claims, must be a case of denial of -expectation. But then, she 
says, this supposition makes it clash with (78), 
(78) Bi Il murdered Alice, but he got away, 
which is, naturally, claimed to be a case of denial of expectation. Lakoff 
fails to appeal to 'local' expectations in trying to 'understand' (77). (77) is 
appropriately uttered by a friend of Bill's to an audience to which it was well 
known that Bill had been planning over a period of time how to murder Alice and 
how to get away with it (thus giving rise to his friends' expectations that he might 
not get caught). It must be noted, though, that Lakoff does invoke 'local' 
expectations in trying to explicate the use of the denial of expectation 'but' in 
(63), as we have seen. 
What is argued here, therefore, is that it is totally unjustified to judge the 
grammaticality or-otherwise of sentences according to whether they can be under- 
stood by appeal to general presuppositions and expectations and legislate that these 
presuppositions, expectations and deductions be necessary conditions for their 
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grammaticality and be represented in their syntactic/semantic derivations. We 
have seen that this need not be the case and that, moreover, these conditions are 
appealed to only in our effort to 'understand' utterances in the absence of any co- 
text and other specific contextual features that take priority over our general 
knowledge in aiding us with giving an interpretation to what we hear. If such 
a context exists, it often renders our invocation of any general presuppositions, as 
the Lakoffs would have it, redundant. Whatever the case may be, the co-text 
and context take precedence over other general 'extra-textual' (extraneous to 
discourse at issue) presuppositions (knowledge) in the understanding of what we 
hear. An analysis of linguistic phenomena that disregards such facts is bound 
to be defective. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This lengthy discussion of 'but' must have convinced the reader of the multi- 
faceted linguistic character of this item and of the intractable problems that it 
would pose for a truth-functional account of its meaning that would aspire to embrace 
all aspects of its linguistic behaviour. Whether one would opt to include all these 
aspects within a semantic framework, if indeed this could be accomplished (cf. Parret, 
1977, KarttOnen and Peters, - 1975,1979), or. would like,, to account for only the 
conjunctive meaning of 'but' within semantics and let a theory of Conversation 
account for the non-truth-functional aspects of its meaning in the guise of conventional 
implications, is very much a moot point. The latter approach clearly envisages a 
dichotomy between semantics and, what has been called, 'pragmatics', with all its 
emergent problems and inadequacies - rather than a unitary theory of Language 
and Conversation - an approach not to be countenanced in this study. In any 
case, it should be borne in mind that those linguistic phenomena that Grice dismissed 
as conventional implications of certain linguistic items are not invariable and 
predictable aspects of meaning. 
In the next section we will tentatively sketch out the function of 'but' within 
a framework that would view conversation as an integral part of interaction. 
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4. 'BUT': THE PROBLEM REMAINS 
4.1 A tentative proposal 
It seems that not only the configuration of the clauses within the utterance, 
but also the configuration of the utterances within a piece of discourse, are deter- 
mined by the purpose of the utterance in relation to the goals of the conversation. 
Our roles as participants in the conversation also seem to be of some significance 
(cf. Halliday and Hasan, 1976). The configuration of our clauses and utterances 
will then reflect the significance we assign to our moves represented in these clauses 
or utterances. 
Gray, 1977, notes that "the great bulk of unmarked inter-assertional relation- 
ships are continuing" (Ch. 6). While both 'and' and 'but' effect 'descriptive 
inter-assertional' relationships, 'and' is a continuing conjunction, 'and 'but' is a 
contrasting one. Gray does not explain what he means by 'continuing' conjunction, 
but we think that 'and' can be said to be a 'continuing' conjunction in the sense that 
the clauses or sentences joined by it, represent positive moves leading to a goal either 
in the context of the conversation or in that of the utterance. In other words, 'and' 
connects clauses representing mainly positive moves forwarding the point of the con- 
versation. , 'But', on the other hand, is characterized by Gray as a 'contrasting' 
conjunction, but this term seems inadequate and misleading in a large measure, 
because 'but' need not contrast anything. Neither need it 'react' or 'cancel' (as 
Dascal and Katriel, 1977, would have it) some part of the meaning of a previously 
made utterance, or replace some part of the first conjunct. 'But' can signal a 
negatively1 assessed move relative to the goal set in the conversation or utterance 
which, however, is assessed as carrying at least equal, if not more, weight than 
other positively assessed moves. Davey and Longue t-H igg ins, 1976, note that 
connecting major clauses by conjunctions is indicative of the fact that "the moves 
are of comparable interest". 
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However, 'but' need not introduce a negatively assessed move; depending 
on the character of the antecedent relations in the discourse it can introduce a 
positively assessed argument or move in relation to the directionality of the utter- 
ance or conversation. If the determination of directionality and antecedent 
relations is not possible for want of context, for example, then we try and construct 
such relations within the bounds of the given utterance in order to facilitate our 
understanding of it. Such interpretation will be acceptable provided that it does 
not come into conflict with our SBKBs (see section 7.2) (cf. the Lakoffs). 
But it seems that a great majority of cases of the use of 'but', reveal this 
phenomenon of 'stepping back' from the 'same-directed' on-goingness of the moves 
in an utterance. This 'directedness'2 is set by other moves prior to the 'but'- 
introduced move. Consider: 
Well I want to wear it this weekend to Vegas but my Mom's 
buttonholer is broken. 3 
Positive move: I want to wear it, 
Negative move: I can't wear it though because .., 
It is noticeable that 'but', following a positive move, can signal that there is 
something untoward in what is coming next, thereby preparing the hearer's framing 
of the speaker's ensuing utterance: "What follows is to be taken as non- 
contributory towards the over-all point of my utterance. See it as a negative 
move (argument). " This seems to be the reason that enables the speaker to 
follow 'but' with a clause that 'overrides' in a way the negatively assessed move; 
this 'superceding' clause relies for its understanding, within the context, on the 
assumption of the negative move that is not explicitly stated. In such cases it 
is common for what follows 'but' to be the explanation of an argument or move that 
is negatively assessed by the speaker. In the above example, clause (i), 'my 
Mom's buttonholder is broken', is'understood as cohering with the clause preceding 
'but', because it explains something that is assumed by the utterance of (i). In 
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this case what is thus assumed is something of the order of 'I can't wear it though. ' 
The explanation of this assumption is the function of 'but' in conjunction with the 
clause following it. 
'But' is, in a way, a kind of orientating signal. It can characterize the 
nature of the next move in the light of what has preceded. If what has preceded 
is a negatively assessed, move or argument then 'but' will probably signal a move 
that positively contributes towards the point of the utterance or the conversation. 
The characterization of the contribution of the whole utterance as a positive move, 
or as 'stepping back' from the on-going point of the conversation, will depend 
greatly on whether the 'but' clause introduces a negatively or positively assessed 
argument. 
Consider the following fragment in which 'but' introduces a clause representing 
a positive move towards the on-going direction of the conversation: 
Fragment (1): 
Bess: ... the'Black Muslims are certainly more provocative than 
the Black Muslims ever were. 
Jean: The Black Panthers. 
Bess: The Black Panthers. What'd I, 
Jean: You said the Black Muslims twice. 
Bess: Did I really? 
dean: Yes you di; d, but that's alright I forgive you. 
(drawn from data from G. Jefferson's lecture, 
University of Warwick, 19 February 1979) 
'But' here introduces a clause signifying a move resolving a minor problem which, 
nevertheless, for a moment hampered the felicitous flow of the conversation. 
Note the interplay of 'but' introduced clauses representing positive and negative 
moves in the following fragment: 
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Fragment (2): 
1 Caller: They're not - 
1 B. B. C. In hand work, let's face it. Let's face it, you're uh 
only gonna be able tuh turn out a cert'n amounta work, 
2 Caller: It's rough buh - We'll al:: ways make a living, 
2 B. C.: Right, 
3 Caller: Buh we'll never be really rich. 
3 B. C.: Right. But on the other hand ... 
(ibid. ) 
Notice how C2, having made a negative move - 'It's rough' - goes on to 
contribute positively towards the desired direction of the conversation by introducing 
a clause by 'but' thus signalling a positive move: 'It isn't all that bad; we'll 
always make a living. ' In his next turn C3 'steps back' just a little bit from his 
positive contribution to make a negative point: 'But we'll never be really rich. ' 
BC3 accepts C3's negative point ('Right') and carries on, presumably, to make a 
positive move. Although the 'but' clause at BC3 is not completed, it is presumed 
to have been a positive contribution. This is predicted by the nature of his 
previous move, or rather his acceptance of a negative move ('Right'), in conjunction 
with the following 'but' signalling his next move. 
Of course, notions such as the 'directionality' or point of the utterance, or 
goal of the conversation (cf. Grice's notion of "the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk-exchange", 1975, p. 45) are admittedly very vague concepts and require 
researching. But this should not bar us from looking at clauses in the context of 
utterances and at utterances in the context of broader pieces of discourse. Anal- 
ogously we should view the directionality of clauses in terms of the directionality of 
whole utterances containing them, and this, in turn, should be viewed as determined 
by the overall directionality, or goal, of the conversation. 
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Moreover, the notion of move, as used here, in relation to the goal of a 
conversation, is rather vague and undefined, as this goal is a vague and undefined 
notion. However, ' the concept of conversational move has been employed lately 
in the analysis of conversation'(Grice, 1975, p. 45, Goffman, 1976, Weiner and 
Goodenough, 1977, Owen, 1978). Weiner and Goodenough define'a'con- 
versational move on the production side, as "an action taken by a speaker to; 
accomplish something with words". Seen in this light, then, speech acts 
(Austin, 1962; 'Searle, 1969) constitute conversational moves. '`°' Despite the 
obscurity of the concept of conversational move, it can be'argued that its use as 
a unit of analysis "shows promise of dealing with'a variety of relevant variables 
at different conversational levels within an integrated theoretical framework", as 
Weiner and Goodenough, 1977, p. 224, conclude. However, it must be noted 
that the term 'move', as has been used in recent literature, carries a 'static' 
implication which is not countenanced in this study and is, certainly, not a 
desired interpretation of the term as employed here. Davey and Longuet- 
Higgins', 1976, and Levinson's, 1978a, b, employment of this term is not subject 
to such an interpretation but is used rather 'dynamically'. 
My hypothesis is that 'but', being in a sense a metal inguistic device in that 
it partly functions to characterize inter-clausal relations and thereby label the 
moves signified by them, is acquired at a later stage in child language acquisition, 
as is indicated in the following conversation between a father and his four-year-old 
son: 
Father: Let's have some coffee. 
Child: We always have tea"'. 
Father: Yes, 'but now we'I) have coffee. 
Notice that the child's utterance has the illocutionary force of a question, or, in 
any case, of aresponse-begging assertion, as becomes clear in Father's second 
utterance. This is connected with the assumption of an implicit 'but' prefacing 
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the child's utterance as indeed is understood to be the case by his father. 
The distinction made by Halliday and Hasan, 1976, p. 53, between two 
types of conjunction seems to be of some relevance here. (Also, see Halliday, 
1977, p. 190) Their characterization of the internal type of conjunction 
which is effected at the inter-personal level may be seen as a metalinguistic 
contribution towards the flow of the conversation, whilst external conjunction 
is characterized as a relation within the thesis (see below) at the level of the 
ideational components of meaning and, therefore, can be seen as a linguistic 
contribution. Halliday, 1977, characterizes these two types of conjunction 
as follows: 
Each one of the types of conjunctive relation has in principle 
two interpretations, according to the functional-semantic 
component from which it is derived. Either the conjunctive 
meaning resides in the ideational component, as a relation 
within the thesis, or it resides in the interpersonal component, 
as a relation within the speech process. These have been 
referred to respectively as 'external' and 'internal' taking the 
communication process as the point of departure; a relation 
between things - between phenomena that constitutes the 
ideational content of the discourse - is one that is external 
to the communication process ... 
(p. 190) 
However theoretically attractive and intuitively plausible this distinction may 
seem to be, it becomes clear that it is not equally viable when we try to apply 
it to conversational data. 
It should be noted that accounting for the use of 'but' in terms of positively 
or negatively assessed moves in relation to the directionality of the utterance or 
conversation will enable us to tackle in the some framework both cases of what 
have been called 'semantic. opposition but' and 'denial.. -of expectation but', as 
these have been described by R. Lakoff, 1971. Moreover, a unified analysis 
is called for, since, as has been shown, such a distinction cannot be justified in 
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the terms in which it has been made. 
It has been argued here that a sentence like (51), 
(51) John is a Republican, but he is honest, 
can have several interpretations - contra G. Lakoff, 1971b - depending on 
the context in which it is uttered: 
(a) Suppose (51) is uttered in a context in which a group of unscrupulous 
Republicans are trying to recruit some Republican devotees, but of rather low moral 
standards, with a view to raiding the offices of a rival party: in this situation (51) 
is understood as follows: 
(i) John is a Republican: positive move, 
(ii) But he is honest: negative move of equal or more weight. 
., 
The negative move follows the positive one and this is deemed to be decisive for 
the whole outcome at that stage of the conversation: i. e. the contribution of the 
utterance is negatively assessed in relation to the set goal of the conversation - the 
question of John's candidateship. If the speaker had instead uttered: 'John is 
honest but he is a Republican' then the whole utterance would have been regarded as 
positively assessed in relation to the set directionality of the conversation. This 
is so because the 'but' introduced clause is always central to the characterization of 
the whole utterance as regards its directionality as has already been argued. It 
carries as much weight as, if not more than, the 2 conjunct of the 'abut g' utterance. 
In other words both p and g conjuncts can be 'new' information, but whilst the a 
conjunct can sometimes be 'given' information, as in the following example, 
Fragment (3): 
Jean: I still say that the sewing machine's quicker, 
Harmon: Oh it c'n be quicker but it doesn't do the job, 
(Jefferson, op. cit. ) 
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this cannot be the case with the q conjunct. The 'but' introduced clause has 
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always to be 'new' information as we shall see below. 
(b) Now consider a context in which a firm is looking for a candidate 
for a job for which the quality of being honest is considered an asset whilst 
Republicanism a disadvantage. In this situation then (51) would be understood 
as positively contributing towards the overall directionality of the conversation, 
as against its utterance in context (a) above. Conjunct q, carrying more weight 
than p, and being assessed as a positive move, determines the overall point of the 
utterance. 
(c) Two friends at a cocktail party, where gossip, as usual, thrives, are . 
exchanging their views about John's virtues and vices. One of them utters (51) 
in the course of their conversation. As there have been no antecedent relations 
in this case in connexion with John's Republicanism and honesty, as in the other 
two contexts (that is, no relevant CMCAs, see 7.1) the listener of (51) will try 
and construct such relations within the bounds of the utterance. In this case, 
therefore, understanding (51) requires the listener's appeal to Standing, Background 
Knowledge and Beliefs (SBKBs, see 7.2) which can be connected only with the 
speaker of (51), and not necessarily shared by the listener. However, if such a 
relation is constructible then (51) is 'understood', i. e. is felicitous. In this 
case, therefore, a direct antecedent for 'but' is not to be located within the 
province of Current, Mutual, Contextual Assumptions (CMCAs), and the listener 
resorts to the invocation of possible SBKBs that would supply such an antecedent. 
Here again the moves can be regarded as positively or negatively assessed in 
relation to antecedents provided, not by the relevant CMCAs, but by the SBKBs. 
As we have seen, G. Lakoff maintains that (51) is grammatical only as interpreted 
in context (c); but, as has been amply illustrated, his claim is unfounded. 
'Semantic opposition but', a la Lakoff, can also be accounted for in this 
framework. A sentence like 'John is tall but Bill is short' can be uttered in a 
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context in which there are antecedent relations (CMCAs) for the use of 'but', 
introducing negative or positive moves relative to such relations - looking 
for young tall people for our football team, for instance; or it may be uttered 
in a situation in which such relations are non-existent. In the latter case 
such relations are constructible by appeal to SBKBs (in this case: 'tall', 
positive, 'short', negative). It is widely held in the literature that one polar 
extreme is considered positive. We don't say: 'How small is the house? ' but 
'How big is the house? ' even if it is known that it is small. 
4.2 Dascal and Katriel's thesis reviewed r ýý 
We now turn to the consideration of the most comprehensive and most recent 
account of 'but', that given by Dascal and Katriel, * 1977. They are mainly 
concerned with the linguistic behaviour of the two Hebrew equivalents of 'but', 
'oval' and 'elo' in 'pAq' and 'pEq' sentences. 
The framework proposed requires a broad notion of meaning which consists of 
several layers and sub-layers, "ranging from the more to the less explicit, from an 
inner 'core' of content to contextually conveyed implicatures via layers'and sub- 
layers such as presuppositions, modality, illocutionary force, and felicity 
conditions" (p. 153). 'Aval' and 'ela' ('but') are used to mark explicitly some 
separation between a pair of layers or sub-layers of meaning, or a contrast within 
a specific layer. In (79)B, therefore, B acknowledges A's question as valid, 
but questions A's commitment to it - so that 'but' is interposed between the 
,. "; i' '!.. _T7 ýeiý,, 7n.. ., -I 
'laye, r'Mof phrastic and neustic (cf. Hare, 
1970): 
(79) A: Why did he react that way? 
B: It would be interesting to find out, but why should 
you wrack your brain? 
'But' can operate on the layer of meaning referred to as 'felicity conditions', 
as in (80) B: 
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(80) A: Give me this book as a present. 
B: But you don't need it, 
in which B, they say, cancels out the felicity condition of A's request. In- 
cidentally, it can be noticed that the notion of felicity conditions needs to be 
stretched if it is to embrace such features as these noted here by DascaI'and 
Katriel (cf. Heringer, 1976, Searle etc. ). 
It can also be noticed that in many 'oval' utterances in which the p conjunct 
is omitted, q actually overrides an implicit reaction by B to As utterance (or to 
part of it); q is no more than the explanatory part accounting for B's reaction or 
negative move. Therefore in (80) B, B. questions (makes a negative move in 
relation to the point of A's utterance, as we would put it) the overall warrantability 
of A's speech-act. What is understood, though not uttered, is something of the 
order: 
B(i) Why should you be asking for it, since you don't 
need it? 
It, therefore, seems to be arguable whether B accepts any layers of A's utterance, 
as Dascal and Katriel claim, while rejecting an outer layer of meaning. 
Further Dascal and Katriel claim that 'pAq' sentences can reject presuppositional 
aspects of a previously made statement, as in (81) below: 
(81) A: Dan stopped beating his wife a long time ago. 
B: But he has never beaten her. 
Dascal and Katriel write: 
By rejecting one of the presuppositions of A's utterance, B 
accepts part of its meaning, the proposition that Dan does 
not beat his wife, but rejects the suggestion that he once 
did beat her, thus invalidating A's utterance as a felicitous 
assertion. 
(emphasis added, p. '155) 
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It is not surprising that Dascal and Katriel prefer the term suggestion to the term 
presupposition in their attempt to present the '(p)Aq' utterance as accepting one 
part of A's utterance meaning while rejecting another. It should be reminded 
that it is widely held in the literature that if the presupposition of a sentence 
fails, the question of whether the sentence is true or not (and hence accepted or 
rejected) does not arise. Besides, we are here faced with the most well-known 
example of 'classic' (semantic) presupposition, and the bulk of the literature on 
the subject would militate against Dascal and Katriel's claim that, while rejecting 
the presupposition in the case at hand, you can nevertheless claim that you accept 
the propositional meaning. As Dascal and Katriel themselves note, the failure 
of the presupposition "invalidate/JA's utterance as a felicitous assertion". 
Their two claims are clearly in conflict. 
By the same token it can be argued in connexion with (80)B, with regard to 
which Dascal and Katriel claim that, 
B acknowledges A's utterance as a command, pointing out 
that one of its felicity conditions does not hold. 
(p. 165) 
that the satisfaction of the felicity conditions is a prerequisite of the felicitous 
coming off of the speech-act in question. ` It follows therefore that if a felicity 
condition is questioned as invalid, a fortiori the speech-act dependent on the 
satisfaction of such felicity conditions cannot be regarded as 'happy' or felicitous. 
Dascal and Katriel regard the function- - as they define it - of 'pAq' 
sentences in examples like (81)B and (80)B as evidence for the postulation of the 
following principle: 
When a 'pAq' sentence is uttered as a reaction to an 
utterance U, the meaning layer of U rejected by the 
utterance of the 'pAq' sentence is either more 'external' 
than or as 'external' as the meaning layer accepted by 
it. 
(p. 165) 
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However, as their claims regarding their examples (81 )B and (80) B are shaky, 
so are their grounds for the postulation of the above principle. 
., _Indeed 
it seems that Dascal and Katriel would be prepared to claim that 
Bin (82)B below accepts part of the meaning of A's utterance that Robin danced 
with Aruna, while rejecting another part of it, that he went to the party: , _. 
(82) A: Robin danced with Aruna at the party löst night. 
B: But he didn't go to the party. 
They do not seem to think that by rejecting the one part, a fortiori B rejects alI 
that is left unexplicitly negated in his utterance. However, such a view would 
take little notice of how language functions. 
Moreover, Dascal and Katriel purport to have constructed a framework that 
will afford a "unified description of the linguistic behaviour of 'oval', 'ela' and, 
of many other related linguistic facts" (p. 153). It is clear, therefore, that 
their aspirations regarding the explanatory power of their framework extend well 
beyond its being adequate for accounting only for a limited range of 'but' sentences. 
As is noted, however, 
'pAq' and 'pEq' utterances share a common characteristic with 
respect to the positions they can occupy in discourse. In 
Schegloff and Sack's, 1973, terminology, to say that 'aval' 
and 'ela' utterances typically function as reactions in discourse, 
and cannot serve to initiate a conversation, is to say that 'pEq' 
and 'pAq' utterances can function only as second pair parts in 
adjacency pairs. The pair type utterances they are associated 
with are 'offer/acceptance, refusal', 'argument/agreement, 
disagreement', etc. 
(p"164) 
Indeed all their examples of '12 but g' sentences fall within the category of utterances 
that can be characterized as second pair parts in adjacency pairs. But, although 
many 'p but q', sentences can be second pair parts of adjacency pairs, it would be 
far from true to claim, as Dascal and Katriel in fact do, that they cannot occupy 
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other positions in discourse, as a quick look into real conversational data will 
readily show. Indeed, the bulk of ý2 but q' sentences cannot be accounted 
for within Dascal and Katriel's framework. But it seems that this is the fate 
of most analyses of linguistic phenomena that are not based on real conversational 
data but rather on constructed artificial-looking examples that always fit the 
theses. (cf. 'You seem to imply that I should open the window, but you can't 
really mean it' (p. 166), 'You don't really mean that I should throw it out but 
just say so' (p. 156)). Moreover, as will be evident in many fragments below, 
many 'but' sentences are 'split' between two utterances '- allocated in distinct 
'turns' (Sacks et al., 1974) - but made nevertheless by the some speaker (cf. 
Fragment (6) C3 below). This fact does not accord with Dascal and Katriel's 
neat allocation of 'E but g' sentences to, second pair parts. 
In what follows we will test Dascal and Katriel's thesis on data in which 
'p but g' sentences do not occur as predicted in their account. They write: 
The point of using an 'oval' or 'ela' utterance is to mark 
explicitly some particular separation between a pair of 
layers (or sublayers), or a contrast within a given layer. 
(p. 153) 
However attractive this argument may seem to be, it cannot purport to embrace 
the majority of cases of 'but' despite the generality assumed in the notion of 
meaning. The clause introduced by 'but' may often have no such bearing on 
what preceded it. A fortiori it cannot be claimed in such cases that 'but' 
marks "a contrast within a given layer" of meaning. To take only one example, 
consider the following fragment drawn from Heritage, 1978: 
Fragment (4): 
L: Okay maybe we can go when Dave 'n Steve go to school on 
Monday. 
R: ya sure. Oh by the way ((sniff)) I have a big favor to ask ya. 
L. Sure, go 'head. 
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R: , 
'Member the blouse you made a couple weeks ago? 
L: Ya. 
(i) R: Well I want to wear it this weekend to Vegas but my Mom's 
buttonholer is broken. 
L: Rob I told ya when I made the blouse I'd do the buttonholes. 
Clearly 'but' does not operate across the 'abut q' utterance boundaries as all 
'pAq' utterances in fact do in Dascal and Katriel's study. Neither is (4 i) a 
'pEq' utterance asp is not negated here as is required for the use of 'ela'. We 
are, therefore, constrained to consider the function of 'but' as operative within 
the utterance boundaries. 
What is the relation between the two sentences conjoined by 'but' in (4 i) 
then? Can it be justifiably claimed that 'but' "marks explicitly some particular 
separation between a pair of layers (or sublayers) or a contrast within a given layer"? 
Surely the clause 'my Mom's buttonholder is broken' does not cancel any felicity 
conditions of the assertability of the clause 'I want to wear it this weekend to Vegas', 
or any part thereof. Moreover, as has been noted, (4 i) would definitely be a 
'pAq' utterance since 'pEq' utterances are corrective and must have their e conjunct 
negated. But as noted by Dascal and Katriel, 
The job performed by 'oval' and, to some extent, by 'ela' 
is to indicate a differential attitude of the speaker towards 
different layers of meaning. Therefore ... each 'oval' 
example falls under two layer-labels, one referring to the 
layer accepted by the speaker and the other to the layer 
rejected by him. 
(p" 154> 
That is, 'but' utterances have 'cancellatory' or 'corrective' functions: 
'oval' and 'ela' perform similar cancellation jobs whether 
they cancel out implicatures derived from factual or 
contextual knowledge or features of meaning proper 
derived from dictionary entries. 
(p. 169) 
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However, although this seems to hold for a number of uses of 'but', it is by 
no means true of all occurrences of 'but'. For example, it is 'not at all clear 
what can be said to be 'cancelled' in (4 i) above. Moreover, as regards this 
example, it cannot be claimed that one layer of the meaning of a previously 
made utterance is accepted in its p-conjunct while another is rejected in its 
q-conjunct, or vice versa, by the speaker. This would entail that the use of 
'but' is motivated by a preceding utterance made by another speaker which can 
hardly be the case in this example. It is worthy of note that this claim is 
applicable to cases of 'but'-utterances which have a 'reactive' character; that 
is, when they are second pair parts in adjacency pairs, as has already been noted. 
In such cases then it makes sense to talk of accepting one layer of meaning while 
rejecting another; but then we are referring to the layers of the overall meaning 
of another speaker's utterance, preceding the 'p butg' utterance, in which these 
layers of meaning are separated. 
However, straining Dascal and Katriel's thesis, in an attempt to make it 
work within the bounds of the 'E but g' utterance, we can see that problems still 
persist: If any part of the meaning - in its broadest sense - of the p-conjunct 
in 'p but q' is cancelled obt in q, then it must be understood that this cancellation is 
not only not straightforward but also inexplicit. What is cancelled out is under- 
stood as assumed to be so cancelled on the strength of the q-conjunct, which can be 
seen as an explanation. Further, one's looking on q as an explanation in the 
context at hand, is motivated by this very assumption of an inexplicit cancellation. 
Put differently, the assumption of the inexplicit cancellation of inferences(? ) drawn 
from the assertion of the p-conjunct is necessitated by the clause introduced by 
'but'. This clause can be seen as relevant to what has preceded it, on the 
condition that it be looked upon as explaining and, therefore, necessitating a 
certain cancellation of inferences. 
Cases like this, however, cannot be captured in Dascal and Katriel's thesis. 
However, if we allow for 'but' to signal positive and negative moves, as has been 
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explained, then in the light of what precedes it, it is clear what significance 
the next move is assigned in relation to the overall point of the utterance. 
Admittedly, Dascal and Katriel's framework for accounting for 'but' 
sentences is very attractive indeed. But in order to encompass such cases 
of 'but' as the above, and many more, as will be shown below, it needs to be 
so broadened that the thesis will be rendered con tentless, as there can be 
envisaged no such stretching of the notion of meaning that will enable us to 
account for cases like (4 i) and others, more intractable, in terms of it. 
4.2.1 An-illustrative example of types of moves signalled by con junction 
Dascal and Katriel hope furthermore that their framework might be "fruit- 
fully applied to the study of other linguistic phenomena as well" (p. 170).. One 
such phenomenon they go on to consider, is the case of 'although'.. They note 
that a constraint, not shared by 'but'-sentences, is in evidence in 'although'- 
sentences; that is, the clause introduced by 'although' must be in the indicative 
mood as shown in (83)B: 
(83) A: Shut the window. 
B: I'll shut it, although I don't want you to give 
me orders. 
* I'll shut it, although don't give me orders. 
They do not offer any explication of this linguistic fact; however, an account 
is readily available if conjunctions (conjunctive relations, elements) are seen as 
introducing clauses representing moves in relation to the overall direction of the 
conversation or to the local aim of the utterance. 
As has been noted 'but' introduces clauses signifying moves that play a 
central role in relation to the point of the conversation (cf. Davey and Longuet- 
Higgins, 1976). This is not the case with 'although'-clauses. As Davey 
and Longuet-Higgins would put it, 'although' introduces moves that are not 
"tactically important": 
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When a move is futile or vacuous, its description may be 
relegated to a subordinate clause. 
If this argument is accepted it is clear why 'although'-clauses do not admit of 
the imperative mood. The issuing of orders or requests represented in the imp- 
erative mood (direct speech acts) is always 'tactically important'; that is, cannot 
be seen as a futile or vacuous move since it purports to change the world in some 
sense or other (Searle, 1976). It is of significance to the overall on-goingness 
of the utterance or conversation. It follows therefore that such a central move 
cannot be relegated to the less significant status of those signified by 'although'- 
clauses. On the other hand, if the q-conjunct is in the indicative, as in (83)B, 
it can be taken as not signifying a 'tactically important' move. The speaker of 
(83)B does not 'put his case' strongly. He only mentions that he does not want 
the speaker of (83)A to give him orders, but he certainly does not make an issue 
of it. A will probably think twice before he gives an order again to the speaker 
of (84): 
(84) I'll shut it, but don't give me orders. 
Not so with the speaker of (83)B. As Searle, 1976, would have it, (83)B and 
(84) differ with regard to their direction of fit between words and the world. Whilst 
the direction of fit in (84) is clearly a 'world-to-word' one (hence the listener's 
second thoughts about issuing orders to him in the future), in (83)B the direction of fit 
is ambiguous. It can be either a 'world-to-word' one if the content of the 'although'- 
clause is meant as an attenuated form of an indirect speech act, or it can be a 'word-to- 
world' one if it is taken as a description of a particular state of affairs, (aIthough I don't 
want you - and you know it - to give me orders). Clearly, if the 'although'- 
clause is taken as a request, it cannot have the same illocutionary force or, rather, 
strength, as the 'but'-clause in (84), even if they have the some illocutionary point 
(Searle, 1976). 
The notion of the distinction between 'given' and 'new' in an utterance is of 
relevance here. What is conveyed in g of a 'p but q' utterance must necessarily be 
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new. That is what must be understood by 'tactically important'. It has a` 
high degree of dynamism in relation to the determination of the purpose of the 
utterance or, generally, the directionality of the conversation. Not so with 
'although'-clauses. What is conveyed in the 'although'-clause is given, or 
regarded as given, by the speaker. This explains its lack of significance in 
the context of the overall utterance and conversation. In (83)B, therefore, 
the 'although'-clause, 'although I don't want you to give me orders', conveys 
either something that is known to the hearer, or something that is looked on as 
given by the speaker and, therefore, is not attributed any current significance 
in the context of his overall utterance. Moreover, in 'although'-clauses 
following the main clause, 'although' is "normally unaccented", as noted by 
Halliday and Hasan, 1976, p. 252. This is conducive to the intended under- 
standing of the 'although'-clause as given material. 
5 
As has been noted, the clause introduced by 'but' signifies the latest move 
that is to be taken as decisive for the determination of the overall direction of 
the utterance or conversation at that stage. For instance, consider (84)B and 
(84)C as regards the overall direction of the utterance: 
(84) A Shut the window. 
B Don't give me orders, but I'll shut it. 
C I'll shut it, but don't give me orders. 
It is clear that the q-conjunct in both (84)B and (84)C is of a greater centrality 
to the direction of the utterance. In both cases what is impressed on the hearer 
is not so much the p-, but the q-conjunct. Indeed, in (84)B the p-conjunct is 
heard as having the illocutionary force of a request rather than that of an order (or 
at least it is an order of a lesser illocutionary strength than that in C), in view of 
its positioning and of what follows it. This is not the case with (84)C. 
It is clear, therefore, that the 'but'-introduced clause carries more weight 
than the preceding clause in relation to the point of the utterance, and seems to 
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have a decisive role in determining the goal of the conversation. To illustrate 
the overriding significance of the second conjunct introduced by 'but', consider 
what effect the TV advertisement of fresh cream cakes would have, if, instead of 
being, 
Naughty, but nice, 
it were, 
Nice, but naughty. 
The latter would be more likely to feature in Health or Slimming magazines, but 
not in advertisements promoting the sale of fresh" cream cakes. 
Moreover, 'but' can follow a p-conjunct that has served to 'set the stage', 
so to speak, for the q-conjunct which is introduced by 'but' and carries all the 
information that the utterance purports to convey. In this case, twill usually 
refer to 'given' information that is considered to be part of the hearer's knowledge 
of the world. Consider the following example, 
I don't know whether you guys know about quizzes but this 
one is really fantastic, 
in which the speaker presumes that his audience do know about quizzes, but his 
p-conjunct, nevertheless, serves to forestall possible unwanted reactions (protest- 
ations, etc. ); g, prefaced by 'but' signals that here something different, new, 
is to follow. 'But' serves to 'hammer in' the point made in the q-conjunct. 
This construction is very common in repeating questions, or a point made earlier 
in a different formulation. Also, consider the following example, from a radio 
interview on ambassadors: 
Obviously, the man's policy is the important factor, but 
the desirability of the wife is of some importance, too. 
'Obviously' is indicative of the fact that the p-conjunct is considered by the 
speaker as 'given' information; a, in a way, is complimentary, a courtesy 
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move, towards the listener, before he 'presses on' with the new information 
contained in the q-conjunct. 
4.3 Conclusion 
We have made the point that Dascal and Katriel's analysis holds for 
cases of 'p but g' conjunctions which are 'responses' to a previous utterance 
made by another speaker and in which a separation of different layers of meaning 
can be effected. However, if their thesis is not applicable to cases of 'p but g' 
sentences which are not seen as responses to a previous utterance made by another 
speaker, the scope of the explanatory power of their analysis is significantly 
diminished. Consider, for instance, their claim that 'but' can serve to cancel 
out presuppositional aspects of an utterance (p. 155). In a sentence like (85), 
(85) *John knows his wife has left, but he's wrong, 
'but' cannot be claimed to felicitously cancel in its q-conjunct the presuppositions 
of its p-conjunct. Mutatis mutandis this goes for all other layers of meaning 
with the possible exception of the most outer ones. It follows, therefore, that 
their analysis holds only for 'but' sentences which form second pair parts in 
adjacency pairs, and in which 'but' is seen as cancelling or correcting something 
uttered by another speaker in a previous utterance. 
But this is not all: in many cases, in which 'but' occurs in second pair 
parts of adjacency pairs, it is evident that its relation to the preceding utterances 
is not so clear-cut as to enable us to put our finger on what exactly it is that 'but' 
cancels out, corrects, or, generally, responds to. That is, it is not at all clear, 
not only what separation of layers of the meaning of the preceding utterance can 
be effected, but also how, and in relation to which utterance, this overall 
meaning is to be located. The example of fragment (1) (p. 96 ) is illustrative 
of the problems mentioned here. 
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Furthermore, the use of 'but' need not be motivated by something in 
the preceding utterance - i. e. in its first pair part. In real conversation 
the factors motivating the use of 'but' can stretch across several turns. In 
such cases it is rather implausible to claim that 'but' neatly and squarely 
cancels or corrects one specific layer or sub-layer of the meaning of a previous 
utterance and not a sum total . 'meaning' gleaned from more than one utterance 
previously made. This problem is illustrated in fragment (5) below: 
Fragment (5): 
Janet: Guess why I'm calling. 
Larry: I_know cuz I didn' do my math, 
Janet: Well-u-how w'd I know. I wasn' et th' school today. 
Larry: Oh: 
Janet: Right? 
Larry: Right. 
(i) Janet: hhh But I am calling about-moth. 
Larry: I knew it'. 
Notice that the use of 'but' here is motivated not by one or two preceding utter- 
ances, but by the sum total of the preceding utterances, which set the stage for 
the felicitous introduction of J (i)'s utterance by 'but'. 
Moreover, even in connection with adjacency pairs, it is not at all evident 
that Dascal and Katriel's analysis is always applicable. Consider fragment (3) 
(p. 1 00), for example, in which, clearly, 'but' does not have a cancellatory or 
corrective function; that is, it does not accept one layer or sub-layer of the 
meaning of the preceding utterance. Instead, in the p-conjunct of his 'E but 
q' utterance, Harmon accepts Jean's utterance in its totality (all layers of its 
meaning), and in the q-conjunct he goes on to add a negative argument, which, 
constituting the q-conjunct, signals a negatively assessed move towards the point 
of the utterance. 
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Besides 'but' can introduce utterances that 'complement', in a way, an 
utterance made by the'same speaker, perhaps in a previous turn, as in C3, 
fragment (6) below. 
There follow a number of cases of 'but' from real conversational data 
which cannot be accounted for within Dascal and Katriel's framework. These, 
however, can be satisfactorily handled in terms of a framework, as adumbrated 
here, in which 'but' is seen as signal ling positively or negatively assessed 
moves: 
Fragment (6): (Telephone conversation) 
(C = caller, R =recipient) 
C, : So er anyway Christina the next time I shall be able to have a 
go at Julia is next Thursday 
RI : yes 
and I'll certainly do that but you know she feels that you sh I 
think she's not quite clear what the fuss-is , about 
R2 : yes 
C2 : as far as she's concerned I'm telling you it's alright 
R3 : yes 
C3 : but you know as for as I'm concerned that's not really legal 
and it's very much better to have a letter 
R4 :: yeah 
C4 : and I really will do what I can about it as 
R5 : yes 
soon as I can. 
(from M. Owen (forthcoming) 'Units of 
Natural Conversation') 
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Fragment (7): 
Bob: Don't they have those new snaggies or, you know non-snaggies? 
Sue: Mesh? 
Kit: I'm gonna get me () 
Sue: If you, uh, if you, uh put them, they run up, they don't run 
down. 
Bob: Oh boy. 
Sue: But if you, you know, rip here it runs up - and then it doesn't 
run down. 
Fragment (8): (Telephone conversation) 
R: 691 2264 
C: 's that Michael 
R: yeah 
C: it's Jane 
R: hello Jane 
C: hello I've got a lot of mail down here of yours 
R: have you 1-1 
C: yes but I've got my big conflict tonight and I just can't bring it 
up hhhh so if one of you wants to pop down and get it I hate to 
be mean but I (daren't) I can't 
(M. Owen, op. cit. ) 
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CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 
In this part our main preoccupation will be with the class of con- 
versational implicatures. We therefore propose to examine in detail some 
of Grice's examples of conversational implicature, while some other cases 
will be dealt with more cursorily. The motivation is to see whether these 
examples can be claimed as genuinely belonging to the class of conversational 
implicatures. To be members of a homogeneous class they must all instantiate 
the same linguistic phenomenon, and hence be amenable to a definition by a 
homogeneous class of criteria, rather than exhibit distinct, idiosyncratic 
features. The findings will support the view that a wide range of phenomena 
have been explained in terms of conversational implicature. It will, there- 
fore, be contended that the term 'conversational implicature' has been used as 
a blanket term to accommodate linguistic phenomena of a multifaceted 
character, and hence has been abused. The concept of conversational 
implicature will be redefined in more stringent terms. 
Some cases of alleged conversational implicature can be explained in 
terms of shared background knowledge and assumptions. Due to their important 
role in language use, bodies of background knowledge will be examined, and 
their significance for language use will be illustrated. A typical case of 
"indirection" will be considered as the background of such bodies of knowledge. 
Finally, a class of generalized conversational implicatures will be looked at 
closely, and shown to be misbegotten in so for as it fails to adequately explain 
intriguing issues of language use. 
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5. GRICE'S PARTICULARIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 
In this chapter we will look closely at some of Grice's examples of 
particularized conversational implicatures. However, before examining 
each case in depth, it may prove profitable to consider Grice's early account 
of implication in general and, in particular, his account of the vehicles of 
implication, to which we may now turn. 
5.1 The vehicles of implicature 
In this section we would like to examine some examples which Grice 
presents as cases of implication, that is cases in which particular locutions are 
used in such a way as to generate certain implications in virtue of general 
features or principles governing the use of language, rather than in virtue of the 
meaning of such locutions. 
What gave rise to his account of implications was his dissatisfaction with 
the state of affairs regarding the Theory of Perception and, more specifically, 
the stalemate in which it was, because of the alleged unsuitability of such 
locutions as 'it looks red to me' for describing sense-data: 
The primary difficulty facing the contention that perceiving 
involves having or sensing a sense-datum is that of giving a 
satisfactory explanation of the meaning of the technical 
term 'sense-datum'. 
(Grite, 1967a, p. 87) 
One kind of objection to a Causal Theory of Perception (hereafter CTP) 
consisted in the contention that one cannot use such locutions as 'looks to me' 
to describe sense-data in cases where there is no implication of denial or doubt; 
that is, in cases where there is no fulfilment of the implication, accompanying 
the utterance of such locutions, that there might be doubt about the state of affairs 
thus described, or in cases where we know that denials have been expressed, or 
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might be expressed. ' This'implication, Grice calls, the 'D-or-D' condition 
('doubt-or-denial' condition) and describes it as follows: 
When someone makes such a remark as 'It looks red to me' 
a certain implication is carried, an implication which is 
disjunctive in form. It is implied either that the object 
referred to is known or believed by the speaker not to be 
red, or that it has been denied by someone else to be red, 
or thafi the speaker is doubtful whether it is red, or that 
someone else has expressed doubt whether it is red, or that 
the situation is such that though no doubt has actualT been 
expressed and no denial has actually been made, some 
person or other might feel inclined towards denial or doubt 
if he were to address himself to the question whether the 
object is actually red. 
(ibid. , pp. 87-88) 
Grice goes on to say that this implication is not attached to such locutions 
as a feature of their meaning, but as a feature of the use of language. It 
follows, then, that the implication of the fulfilment of the 'D-or-D' condition 
is not logical in character,. and therefore not a precondition of the truth or 
falsity of the locution in question. The upshot of this claim is that the sense- 
datum theorist can use such locutions to describe sense-data. In order to come 
to this conclusion Grice considers four examples, the utterance of which, he 
thinks generates similar implications as locutions of the form 'it looks to me'. 
As we are here concerned with his account of implication, and not with 
his account of a CTP, we will concentrate on the examples of implication considered 
there, which are the following: 
(1) 'Smith has left off beating his wife'; the implication is that Smith 
has been beating his wife. 
(2) 'She was poor but she was honest'; what is implied is roughly that 
there is some contrast between (her) poverty and (her) honesty. 
(3) A teacher reporting on a pupil at Collections says'Jones. has beautiful 
handwriting and his English is grammatical'; the implication is that 
Jones is no good at Philosophy. 
r, 
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(4) 'My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom'; what is 
normally implied here is that the speaker does not know in which 
of the two rooms his wife is. 
In all cases, except in the first, Grice says that the truth or falsity of the impli- 
cation is irrelevant to the original statement's truth conditions. As regards 
the first example, which he says is "a stock case of what is sometimes called 
'presupposition"' (ibid., p. 90), he admits, not without reservation, that the 
truth or falsity of the original statement is dependent on the truth of what is 
implied. 
Grice considers what the vehicle of the implication is in each case and 
offers four candidates: 
(a) what the speaker said (or asserted). 
(b) the speaker ('did he imply that ... '). 
(c) the words the speaker used. 
(d) his saying that (or again his saying that in that way). 
As regards the first candidate, (a), Grice says that while in the first case, (1), 
it holds, i. e. one could say that what the speaker said implied that Smith had 
been beating his wife, in the second case, (2), one could not say that what the 
speaker said implied that there was a contrast between for example, honesty and 
poverty. The test he offers is that whereas it is true to say that 'If Smith left 
off beating his wife, then he has been beating her', one cannot accept the hypo- 
thetical 'If she was poor but honest, then there is some contrast between poverty 
and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty'. As has been seen, Grice, 
in his later article 'Logic and conversation', adopts the view that the implicatures 
generated by 'but' are conventional in character. He thus modifies his view that 
such cases should be classed on a par with cases of type (1). In the light of this 
modification we will not consider several points he makes in connection with these 
two examples. As far as the second vehicle of implication is concerned, Grice 
claims with regard to both (1) and (2) that "the speaker could be said to have 
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implied whatever it is that is implied" (ibid., p. 91). 
Let us now examine candidate (c) in relation to example (1), and see 
whether it carries over the implication: 
(c) 'the words the speaker used implied ... ' 
Grice is sceptical about whether this candidate would hold in this case. One 
tends to say that it does not: candidate (c) refers not to the utterance as a 
whole, as candidate (a) does, but to the specific words the speaker used and, as 
seems to be clear, the presupposition of (1) is not the work of any specific word 
or words as is the case with the implication of example (2). 
There remains to be examined the fourth candidate of the vehicle of 
implication, (d), with regard to the first two examples: 
(d) 'his saying that (or again his saying that in that way)'. 
In relation to this candidate Grice says that "in neither case would it be evidently 
appropriate to speak of his saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as 
implying what is implied" (ibid., p. 91). Evidently, Grice is right in excluding 
(d) as a vehicle of the implication in both cases, with one restriction though, 
which Grice seems to assume by the addition of the qualification: '(or again his 
saying that in that way)'. The expression "his saying that" may refer either to 
the utterance as an act of issuing a statement (act-sense), or to the utterance as 
what has been stated (object-sense). It is clear, however, from the qualific- 
ation added that Grice intends to refer to the act-sense of the expression 'his 
saying that', because it is only in this sense that the phrase is subject to 
qualifications with regard to the manner in which the statement was made. 
With regard to the third example, Grice says that, uttered in this context, 
its implication is in no truth-conditional relation with the statement made; and 
in this respect, he says, (3) is much closer to (2) than (1). 
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As for the candidates for the vehicle of the implication, he argues that 
the speaker could be said to have implied that Jones is hopeless, and he 
apparently feels it imperative to add the qualification "(provided that this is 
what Zt-he speake7 intended to get across)" (ibid. , p. 93). What Grice 
here 
seems to have in mind is that, when we say that the speaker implied that S, we 
are referring, not only to his utterance and its implications, but also to the 
implications he wanted it (his utterance) to impart. In other words we , 
recognize the speaker's specific intentions in uttering the statement. However, 
he does not seem to have the some view when he examines the same candidate in 
relation to case (1), either because he thinks that the verb 'imply' is ambiguous 
between these two uses (the intentional and the unintentional one), but sees no 
reason to distinguish between them, or, because he confuses the two possible 
uses an utterance of (1) can be put into. 
We must distinguish between at least two cases of the use of (1): " one is 
the presuppositional one for which no 'setting of the scene' (linguistic or situational) 
is required; the other use is the one whereby the speaker avails himself of these 
presuppositional aspects of the sentence which he deliberately puts to work in order 
to convey implicitly (imply) what conventionally should be treated as an established 
fact. Is there any gain in drawing the line between presuppositional and 
'implicational' uses of the same sentence? It might be useful to distinguish 
between what is treated as presuppositional stock (known and believed by all 
participants in a talk exchange to be so), and what is intentionally drawn out of 
this presuppositional 'pool' and so manipulated that it impart information beyond 
the conventional meaning of the utterance in whose guise it functions. If we 
view the two utterance-tokens of the sentence from the point of view of their 
information increment, and therefore their functional nature in conversation, we 
see that they carry out distinct tasks in furthering our conversational purposes. 
The imparting of the information in the guise of a presupposition may either be 
drawn out of the common presuppositional pool, as noted above, and in, this case 
124 
the additional information will not be the presuppositional stock per se, but 
possibly the information, for instance, that the speaker is aware of the state 
of affairs being such; or it may be treated by the speaker intentionally as 
if it belonged to the shared presuppositional pool with a view to conveying 
his message indirectly. Thus it seems as if the notion of intention is a 
distinguishing factor for cases generating implication. 
As regards the fourth candidate, (d), 'his saying that', or 'his saying just 
that and no more', Grice thinks that it carries the implication in (3) that Jones 
is hopeless. Although we feel inclined to agree with Grice in this respect, 
we should not fail to notice that he alters the wording of this candidate, probably 
unintentionally, from 'his saying that (or again his saying that in that way)' to 
'his saying that (at any rate %hi J saying just that and no more)'. 
We would like to examine the two different phraseologies of the some 
candidate more closely and see what, if anything, is the difference between 
them. As has already been argued, the former formulation refers, in all like- 
lihood, to the statement in its act-sense, i. e. to the speaker's making a statement 
in a particular manner; besides, it should be remembered, it was in this sense 
that this candidate was excluded as carrying the implications in the first two 
examples, obviously, because such a formulation attaches significance to 
intentional aspects on the part of the speaker, with regard to his statement's 
implications. 
On the other hand, however, it is not clear whether the latter formulation 
refers to the statement in its act-sense or its object-sense. Let us see what we 
understand by the expression 'his saying that' in the former formulation first and 
then in the latter: The former formulation evidently refers to features like tempo, 
intonation, tone of voice, as well as to paralinguistic features like gestures, 
movements, posture, proximity (proxemics), or, generally, to the manner in which 
the statement is made; it therefore refers to the act of making an assertion. 
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On the other hand the latter formulation, ('his saying just that and no 
more'), seems to refer to the statement in its object-sense rather than in its 
act-sense. However, it is not evident what should be understood by the 
phrase 'his saying just that and no more' if we are not aware of the specific 
context in which the statement was issued. What, therefore, the added 
qualification does in this case is to pin the utterance against the background 
of the situation at issue, and therefore against our conventional expectations. 
The utterance then in this formulation is not considered in abstraction from, but 
within, its linguistic or situational context; it thus invokes set conventions, 
and consequently set expectations, shared by all the participants involved in 
the linguistic event. However, the statement fails to meet our expectations, 
hence the wording: 'his saying just that' and the generated implications. 
In order that the implications of the latter formulation of the fourth 
candidate, (d), be better understood, we could try to apply it, thus formulated, 
to utterances of the first two examples: 
His saying that (at any rate his saying just that and no more) 
Smith has left off beating his wife implied that Smith had 
been beating his wife, 
and, 
His saying that (at any rate his saying just that and no more) 
she was poor but she was honest implied that there is some 
contrast between poverty and honesty (or between her poverty 
and her honesty). 
The incompatibility of these embeddings becomes even more evident if the examples 
are phrased as follows: 
His saying just that Smith has left off beating his wife and 
no more implied that ... 
In our view this incompatibility is due to the fact that, if there are any implications 
in the first two examples, they do not emanate from the function of the linguistic or 
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situative context in conjunction" with the utterance. The implications in 
the first two cases are neither the function of the speaker's intentions nor the 
function of the context. 
As for as the other two candidates are concerned, 'the words the speaker 
used' and 'what the speaker said', Grice thinks, quite rightly, that in relation 
to the third example they do not hold as carriers of the implication. 
We would now like to apply the hypothetical test to examples (3) and 
(4) with a view to determining whether the implication is carried by (a), i. e. 
'what the speaker said'. With regard to (3) the hypothetical sentence would 
run as follows: 
If Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is 
grammatical then Jones is no good at Philosophy. 
Obviously this will not do. However, we might try and contextualise the 
utterance by adding some features of the fourth candidate of implication and see 
whether it works: 
If Jones has beautiful handwriting'and his English is 
grammatical and nothing else is said about Jones (or, 
and this is just w at is sai about Jones) then Jones 
is no good at Philosophy. 
Whichever way we formulate the hypothetical it does not seem to work. 
The reason for the inapplicability of the hypothetical here seems to be the 
abstraction of the utterance from the speaker; this is effected by treating his 
utterance as a fact of the world and not as something the speaker uttered. Com- 
pare with the following formulation: 
ep 
If he said just that Jones has beautiful handwriting and 
his English is grammatical and no more, then Jones is no 
good at Philosophy. 
This again will not do because, although the utterance is not treated as a fact of 
the world but as a statement made by the speaker, the implication is; and this 
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obviously will not do. However, taking care of this point, the hypothetical 
can be formulated as follows: 
If he said just that Jones has beautiful handwriting and 
his English is good and no more, then he implied that 
Jones is no good at Philosophy. 
This formulation will do, with the proviso though, that we have knowledge of 
the context at issue. The qualifications required here are-not, interpretable, 
unless they serve to invoke the situation at issue. Therefore 'what the 
speaker said', abstracted from pragmatic factors, like the context of the 
utterance and the speaker's intentions, will not carry any implications in (3). 
It should be remembered here that this was not the case with (1). 
Let us now consider the same test with regard to the fourth example, and 
try to answer the question whether (a), i. e. 'what the speaker said' carries any 
implication; Grice does not consider (a) in this respect. The hypothetical 
would run as follows: 
If my wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom then 
I do not know in which of the two rooms she is. 
This formulation will not do; it is also reminiscent of the results obtained. from 
the application of the hypothetical test in the second case. Candidate (a), 
therefore, does not hold in this respect. 
However, if the utterance and the implication are not abstracted from the 
speaker, then the hypothetical is not out: 
If I say that my wife is either in the kitchen or in the 
bedroom then I imply that I do not know in which of 
the two rooms she is. 
Thus formulated the hypothetical test would also hold in the case of (2) because 
in this formulation both the utterance and the implication are given as attaching 
to the speaker. Therefore in this respect both (2) and (4) seem to behave 
uniformly. 
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We should not fail to note, however, that although in all three cases, 
(2), (3) and (4), the hypothetical test holds with the proviso that the utterance 
and the implication are not divorced from the speaker, in the case of (3), 
there is one more proviso that makes this example stand out: Not only 
should the hypothetical formulation make reference to the speaker in (3), but 
it should also make reference to the context of the utterance by way of various 
qualifications, as has been seen. This is vital for the generation of the 
implication in this case. 
As regards the second vehicle of the implication in connection with the 
fourth example, Grice says that we could say that the speaker had implied that 
he did not know, and in this respect too it is very much like (2); Grice also 
maintains that in relation to the third example "(the speaker) could certainly be 
said to have implied that Jones is hopeless (provided that this is what Z 
; el 
intended to get across)" (1967a, p. 93). 
Grice seems to put all four cases on the same footing. With regard to 
(I), it can be argued that-if we say that the speaker implied that S, then we are 
faced with a different case of implication than the one in the cases in which the 
'implication' is carried just by the words the speaker used; therefore, we would 
Iike to put this case aside. As for as the remaining three examples are concerned, 
we would like to differentiate between (2) and (4), on the one hand, and (3), on 
the other. 
In alI three cases we could say that the speaker implied that S; however 
we must not fail to notice that in the cases of (2) and (4), in which we have an 
utterance abstracted from any context, either linguistic or situational, this vehicle 
of implication holds, without any qualifications. This is not the case with (3); 
in an utterance of "Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical", 
considered outside its context, we cannot say that the speaker implied that S. It 
should also be noted that Grice adds a proviso: "(provided that this is what I 
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intended to get across)", to buttress up his argument that the speaker implied 
that S. However, how do we, as hearers, get to the recognition of the 
speaker's intentions with regard to his implications? Even if the speaker's 
intentions playa significant role in all three cases - (2), (3) and (4) - 
regarding the generation of the implication, weymust'recognize that two 
different notions of intentions, or, rather, two different facets of the same 
notion, are involved in cases (2) and (4), on the one hand, and (3), on the 
other. In (2) and (4) the speaker's intention to imply that S does not rely 
on factors other than his choice of the specific word or words in order to get 
across his message (implication). In (3), however, this intention is not 
realized in the speaker's choice of the vocabulary; rather, it is a function 
of the specific context on his choice of the words or phrases, or on his utter- 
ance. His implication and, therefore, his intention to imply that S, is not 
realized, or understood, if the context of the utterance is not considered. 
The hearer relies on the context in question to recognize the speaker's intention 
and thereby deduce the intended implication; it is with a view to stressing the 
significance of this intended recognition of the speaker's intention that Grice 
adds the qualification "(provided that this is what I intended to get across)". 
The upshot is that although in all three cases the speaker could be said to 
have implied that S, the recognition of the speaker's intention by the hearer, is 
grasped via different routes: in (2) and (4) by the use of specific word(s), 
whereas in (3) via the function of the context on the utterance. In (2) and 
(4) there is an immediate perception of the generated implications, whereas in 
(3) the recognition of the implication is achieved only via the hearer's reasoning. 
This should suffice to differentiate the implication generated by (3) from the ones 
generated by (2) and (4). 
In connection with the fourth candidate of the vehicle of implication ('his 
saying that') with regard to (4), Grice says that "his saying that (or his saying that 
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rather than something else, viz. in which room she was) implied that he did 
not know" (ibid., p. 94). It is immediately noticed that Grice again alters 
the phraseology of this candidate by appending yet another qualification to 
it. We have already seen that this candidate, modified by the other two 
qualifications - see tables (p. 132) (di) 'his saying that in that way' and 
(dii) 'his saying 'Lust that and no more' - does not carry any implications in 
the cases of (1) and (2), whereas (dii) seems to hold in the case of (3). There- 
fore, we concluded, the inapplicability of (dii) in the first two cases and its 
applicability in the third example yield evidence that points to the significance 
of the function of context in the generation of the implication in (3). Although 
the significance of the context in this connection is noted in Grice's account, in 
his view, it does not seem to play any differentiating role in characterizing the 
generation of implications. 
However, thus altered candidate (d) - (diii) - seems to carry the 
implications, not only in the fourth example, but also in (1) and (2), in which 
the context does not have any functional role to play: 
His saying that she is poor but she is honest, 
(rather than that she is poor and she is honest), 
implied that in his view there is some 
he believed that 
etc. 
contrast between poverty and honesty. 
Clearly, we cannot put all three formulations of candidate (d) on the same 
footing: (di) makes reference to paralinguistic features of the utterance; 
(dii) makes sense against the background of the hearer's, knowledge of. the context 
of the situation; as regards (diii), however, it is not clear what purpose the 
qualification serves. 
As for as the third candidate is concerned - 'the words the speaker 
used' or 'the speaker's words' - Grice does not say whether it is a carrier 
of the implication in (4); we think, however, that it would not be strained 
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to say in this connection that the speaker's words implied that he did not know. 
If this candidate carries the implication in this case, as it does in the case of 
(2), then in both these two utterances the implication will be carried by the 
some vehicles. 
Below (p. 132) there are two tables; in table (1) are shown the vehicles 
of implication in each case as described in Grice's account; in table 2 they 
are shown as revised in our account. What we see in our revised table is 
that both (2) and (4) behave uniformly with regard to the carriers of their 
implications. As regards the remaining two examples, they seem to behave 
idiosyncratically with regard to the vehicle of their implications. We must 
note, however, that only in the third case is the implication generated in a way 
which takes into consideration the context of the utterance (if we put aside a 
possible interpretation of the utterance of (1) in which the context seems to play 
a significant role). 
Therefore if the experiment, offered by Grice, concerning the vehicle of 
implication and the results from its application on the four examples is anything 
to go by, we should be inclined not to lump all four cases of implication under 
the general heading of 'implication' as if they were all instances of the same 
linguistic phenomenon.. 
We would now like to turn to the question of another test Grice offers, 
that of the detachability and cancellability of the implication. With regard 
to the first example, Grice says, the implication is not detachable from what 
is asserted. Moreover, the implication cannot be annulled without annulling 
the assertion itself, whichever form of words is used to state or assert just what 
the first sentence might be used to assert. Therefore, the implication is not 
cancellable in so for as you cannot intelligibly add a further clause ('but I do 
not mean to imply that S') denying just the implication. 
132 
Table 1 
Examples 
Vehicles of implication (1), (2) .. 
(3).. (4) 
(a) what the speaker said t x' X ? 
(b) the speaker t t t t 
(c) the words, the speaker used 
(the speaker's words) 
'x t x 
(d) hit-saying 
that 
(di) (his saying that in that 
way) 
x 
(dii) (his saying Lust that 
and no more) 
t 
. 
(diii) (his saying that rather 
than something else) 
t 
ý, 
f= 
Table 2 
Examples 
Vehicles of implication (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) what the speaker said t x x x 
(b) the speaker t t t* t 
(c) the words the speaker used t x t (the speaker's words) x . 
(d) his saying (di) (his saying that in that x x x that way) 
(dii) (his saying just that x x t x 
and no more) 
(diii) (his saying that rather t t x t 
than something else) 
t* = context-dependent implication 
q 
", I Examples 
(1) Smith has left off beating his wife. 
(2) She was poor but she was honest. 
(3) Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical. 
(4) My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. 
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If we apply the some test to the remaining examples, we see that it is 
only in (1) that the implication is inextricably tied up with one's utterance. 
In the second case the implication is both detachable: "She is poor and she 
is honest", and cancellable: "She is poor but she is honest, though I do not 
mean to imply that S". 
As regards the third example, Grice argues that the implication is can- 
cellable but not detachable: 
The implication is not ... detachable; any other way 
of making, in the some context of utterance, 'Lust the 
assertion I have made would involve the same implication. 
(ibid. , p. 93) 
This quotation makes it fairly clear that, if the implication is not detachable, 
this is not a feature of the semantical aspects of the utterance itself, as might 
be the case with (1); rather, it is a feature pertaining to the functional nature 
of the context with regard to the utterance at issue. In this respect then, the 
non-detachability of (3) cannot be viewed on a par with that of (1). 
In the fourth example, Grice says, 
The implication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if 
in a given context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence 
would involve the implication that the speaker did not know 
in which room his wife was, this implication would also be 
involved in the utterance of any other form of words which 
would make the same assertion. ... In another possible 
sense, however, the implication could perhaps be said to be 
detachable; - for there will be some contexts of utterance 
in which the normal implication w Tnot hold. 
(ibid., p. 94) 
Here, again, context plays a significant role in determining whether the 
implication is detachable or not. The conclusion to be drawn from the above 
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is that the implication is truly non-detachable and non-cancellable only in the 
first example; it seems to be part of the semantic aspects of the sentence. 
Another test Grice offers with regard to the four examples is to ask 
whether the implication is generated by the meaning of some particular word 
or phrase occurring in the sentences. In the second and fourth examples he 
views the presence of the implication as being a matter of the meaning of the 
words 'but' and 'or' respectively. On the other hand, the presence of the 
implication of the utterance of (3) does not pertain to the meaning of any 
lexical item, or of the whole utterance; as regards (1), he writes that "we 
should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this 
word is, or words are" (ibid., p. 92) the meaning of which generates the 
implication. Regarding this question, therefore, we can conclude that here 
again examples (2) and (4) behave uniformly. 
5.2 On implicatures generated by stress 
Before examining in detail some cases of particularized conversational 
implicature, as described by Grice, we thought it was rather constructive to 
review his account concerning the vehicles of implication. We reached the 
conclusion that amongst all the examples considered there by Grice, only the 
ones containing the conjunct 'but' and the disjunct 'or' seemed to display an 
identical linguistic behaviour in respect of the vehicles of their implications. 
However, it should be borne in mind that Grice maintains that whereas 
'but' is a paradigm case of conventional implicature, the implicatures generated 
by 'or' are 'conversational' in character, but 'generalized', nevertheless, in 
contrast to particularized conversational implicatures (cf. example (3) of previous 
section). It has been shown here that at least in respect of the vehicles of 
their implications both 'but' and 'or' behave uniformly. 
In this section we would like to examine in some depth a case of purported 
conversational implicature in which the vehicle of implication seems to be (d), 
I 
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as this was formulated in (di) 'his saying that in that way'. More specif- 
ically, (di) in this case refers to the prosodic structure of the utterance. 
(cf. Uldall, 1972, p. 250: "It wasn't what she said, it was the say she 
said it: ") 
In dealing with prosodic features in relation to implicatures Grice is 
concerned with stress, and, in particular, with cases in which words are being 
stressed variably, namely with cases in which stress plays a significant role as 
far as the conveyance of meaning is concerned. 
1 
Although he says that 
stress often makes a difference to the "speaker's meaning", and on many 
occasions it helps to generate implicatures, he is reluctant to attribute any 
conventional meaning to it. He therefore extends the jurisdiction of the 
maxim of relevance, not only over what is said, but also over the means used 
for saying what is said: 
This extension will perhaps entitle us to`expect that an 
aspect of an utterance which it is within the power of 
the speaker to eliminate or vary, even if it is introduced 
unreflectively, will have a purpose connected with what 
is currently being communicated. 
(Grice, 1978, p. 122) 
He distinguishes between at least three types of context - and, I take 
it that, he is thereby referring to linguistic context - in which "stress occurs, 
CnJ whi ch seem to invite ordering" (ibid. , p. 122). However 
he does not 
seem to provide any ordering whatsoever, neither do these three types of 
context - if indeed they deserve to be so called - exhaust the variety of 
linguistic contexts in which stress occurs. 
One basic distinction that has been made is between utterances with 
marked intonation contours and those with unmarked intonation contours, 
though such a distinction has been objected to (Schmerling, 1971). This 
distinction is linked with the question of what is asserted in an utterance and 
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what is presupposed, what is focused' upon and what is assumed or uttered 
as 'given' (cf. Halliday, 1967). There are various problems in such 
distinctions we do not want to go into; however, it should be added that 
Grice's examples of stress generating implicatures are clearly examples of 
utterances with marked intonation patterns. 
One of the types of context in which stress occurs, Grices says, includes 
utterances which constitute replies to 'wh-' questions: 
A: 'Who paid the bill? ' B: 'Jones did. ' 
A: 'What did Jones do to the cat? ' B: 'He kicked it. ' 
He adds that in such examples stress is automatic and nothing is meant or 
implicated. However in the second example the word 'Jones' may have 
markedly higher pitch than the other elements in the utterance, and, therefore, 
it might convey the speaker's concern, or even anxiety, about what 'Jones' 
(and not the others) did to the cat. He is not concerned about what other 
people did, or perhaps he already knows. Accordingly, the reply 'He kicked 
it' may receive different intonation patterns. The heavy stress may lie on the 
element 'He', especially if the context is such that it is known that the poor cat 
has been kicked by others already. However a reply with the stress on the 
verb is in order if the information that the cat has been kicked is not recoverable 
from the context; in the former case, by stressing the element 'He', the 
speaker is focusing on the same element in the utterance as is his addressee. 
This first type of context, Grice seems to suggest, would include utterances 
which are made in reply to 'wh-' questions, and therefore these utterances will 
share a certain stock of presuppositions (common knowledge) with their questions. 
However it must be noted that these presuppositions (tentatively so called) are 
not definable merely in terms of the signification of the words of which the 
question consists. Another decisive factor should be taken into account, and 
this is specific intonation contours which such 'wh-' questions may take: for 
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example, the question 
21 
'Which books has John read? ' 
with this particular intonation pattern will imply that John has read some books 
but only skimmed others, or at least the speaker's belief that this is so (Bresnan, 
1971). So 'wh-' questions have by no means a uniform intonation contour, 
nor can one always predict what intonation contours their replies will have. 
Therefore the assignment of specific intonation contours is by no means 
so readily amenable to systematic rules as Grice seems to suggest; for example 
one cannot always predict that questions asking about the actor (agent etc. ) of 
an action (process etc. ) will give rise to replies with the heavy stress on the 
some element, or that questions inquiring after the action will demand replies 
with the heaviest stress on the verb and so on. Such treatment would ignore 
the unpredictability of stress placement and would do scant justic to its power. 
Furthermore, linguistic context is not adequate to account for specific 
intonation patterns in all cases. For example, suppose that I hear my son 
crying in the garden and I go out to see what the matter is with him; finding 
out that his brand new toy is badly smashed,, I ask him what happened. The 
boy, who is aware that I have already seen the smashed toy, replies as follows: 
10, John smashed my new toy with his bike. 
The question 'What happened? ', abstracted from any situational context calls for 
a reply with 'normal' stress, i. e. with unmarked intonation pattern, since there 
are no presuppositions attached to it - other than the one that something 
happened. The unmarked intonation contour will be expected to highlight- 
the action, though without reducing the stress of the accented syllables. How- 
ever, in the above situation my son's reply highlights the elements referring to 
the agent of the action, 'John', and to the instrument, 'with his bike', with 
which John smashed the toy and the utterance is 'felicitous'. 
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An argument, therefore, that assumes that stress in replies to wh-questions 
is dependent upon the questions themselves is debatable, to say the least. As 
has been seen, shared presuppositions as well as the knowledge of the participants 
of a specific talk-exchange that they share the same stock of presuppositions may 
contribute to the selection of a particular intonation contour. Moreover, 
these presuppositions need not be of a semantic nature; they may be pre- 
suppositions pertaining to actual situational contexts: (cf. Schmerling, 1971). 
Another type of context in which stress occurs, according to Grice, is in 
exchanges of such forms as; 
(i) A: Jones paid the bill. 
i 
(ii) B: Jones didn't pay the bill; Smith paid it. 
In such cases stress, Grice maintains, "is automatic or a matter of habit" (Grice, 
1978, p. 122), but we will come to that later. 
However, this description is rather crude and unsystematic. It may be 
argued that such an intonation contour, as described by Grice, whereby the 
heavy stress lies on the word 'Jones', is rather "unnatural", and therefore not 
"automatic or a matter of habit", and this is at odds with Grice's claim that 
nothing "is meant or implicated" (ibid., p. 122), i. e. that the assignment of this 
particular intonation pattern is of no special significance. Anyway, Grice 
will have to explain what he means by the word "automatic", but I take it to 
mean that nothing more is conveyed over and above what is conveyed by the 
meanings of the words in the sentence. He says "we are not inclined to say 
that anything is meant or implicated" (ibid., p. 122). (What he means by 
"meant" here is rather vague. ) He falls into the pitfall of ignoring the variety 
of intonation contours such an utterance might take, and he therefore leaves out 
of account various attitudes and feelings of the participants which such an utter- 
once might convey. 
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As has already been suggested, this intonation contour is by no means 
automatic. Reading out (ii), for example, one would be inclined to lay 
as heavy a stress on 'didn't' as on 'Jones'. This can be'explained in terms 
of the thematic structure of the talk-exchange: 'Jones may be characterized 
as the topic of the talk-exchange and 'didn't pay the bill' would then be the 
comment. (cf. Schenkein, 1972, Sgall, 1972, Ha. jicova, 1972,1973). Follow- 
ing Halliday's terminology'the utterance 'Jones didn't pay the bill' could be 
assigned either marked or unmarked information structure. In the latter case 
the utterance 'Jones didn't pay the bill' would be assigned the status of one 
information unit: //Jones didn't pay the bill//'Jones' would be the theme 
and 'didn't pay the bill, ' would be the rheme. In this case the focus of the 
information will fall on the rheme and the main emphasis will lie on the 
negation, this being the focus of the message, 
that which is represented by the speaker as being new, 
textually (and situationally) non-derivable information 
... ... But the non-predictability of the new 
does not necessarily imply factually new information; 
the newness may lie in the speech function, or it may 
be a matter of contrast with what has been said before 
or what might be expected. 
(Halliday, 1967, pp. 205-6) 
This utterance would then receive tone 5, which is a rounded rising- 
falling tone with the main force on the rise and in the case in point on the 
negating element. This intonation contour is speaker oriented in the sense 
that there is a finality in the assertiveness of this utterance, the speaker is 
quite sure of what he has said and his utterance is not intended to prompt any 
objection or confirmation from his addressee, 
The claim that it is common for utterances with unmarked intonation 
contours fulfilling a negative speech function to have the heaviest stress on 
the negating elements (since this is what is usually "focused upon by the speaker) 
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is corroborated by the fact that the speaker has an alternative option in hand, 
if he wants to lay the main emphasis on 'Jones'. However, again in this 
case, the negating element will be attached to the most heavily pitched ele- 
ment, and in the case in point, to the word 'Jones'. Thus the whole 
structure of the utterance - and consequently its thematic structure - will 
change, and, therefore, the utterance will carry different presuppositions: 
'It wasn't Jones who paid the biII'= 
(or 'The one who paid the bill was not-Jones') 
It should be noted that the intonation pattern of the preceding utterance, 
i. e. (i) 'Jones paid the bill', is relevant to what intonation contour will be 
selected for the following utterance, i. e. (ii); for instance this talk-exchange 
- (i)A and (ii) B- may be viewed as part of an argument as to whether Jones 
paid the bill or not. Speaker A may place special emphasis on the word 'Jones' 
- which, again, will be accountable for in terms of previous linguistic context, 
or situational context, or a combination of both. (In situationaI-context we 
include sets of beliefs and knowledge shared by the participants of the talk- 
exchange. ) In this case then, if speaker B stresses the element 'Jones' in 
his utterance, more heavily than any other element, his utterance will have a 
content equivalent to 'It wasn't Jones who paid the bill', though it is not obvious 
how this utterance would felicitously go through, and, if it would, how it would 
differ from the same sentence uttered as in (iii). 
However, if the heavy (main) stress lies on the element 'Jones', then one 
is led to think of this utterance as consisting of two information units though it 
is not clear how this would tally with the argument that such an intonation contour 
"is automatic or a matter of habit[that isj7 difficult to avoid" and that nothing is 
"meant or implicated" (Grice, 1978, p. 122). 
In this case then the utterance 'Jones didn't pay the bill' does not have 
"the regular distribution of new information" (Chafe, 1970, p. 230) according to 
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Grice. It might be claimed to have marked information structure consisting 
of two information units: 
(iii) //Jones// didn't pay the bill// 
The first information unit has focus on 'Jones' and the second on the negating 
element. The assignment of two information units - and therefore of two 
focuses - to the utterance reflects the speaker's decision to highlight two 
elements in his utterance. 'Jones' is focal, and therefore it should be new 
(what is focal is 'new' information). However what is new, here, is not the 
element 'Jones' but the speaker's attitude towards the statement that Jones paid 
the bill, which is revealed by selecting a specific intonation contour, and there- 
fore a particular information structure for his whole utterance. This utterance 
would be assigned two intonation contours and therefore it would have two tone- 
groups: 
(iii) //Jones// didn't pay the bill 
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(Hall iday, 1967) 
Tone 5 would express assertiveness as above - when the whole utterance would 
receive tone '5 - but it could also convey surprise or some sort of personal 
reaction through its assertiveness (ibid. ) The falling contour of tone 1 would 
just express certainty. 
Grice claims that this sentence, ` uttered with the heavy stress on the word 
'Jones', and without a preceding statement to the effect that Jones paid the bill, 
will generate the conversational implicature that someone might think that Jones 
did pay the bill; however this alleged implicature is nothing more than what is 
conveyed via the selection of particular intonation contours for our utterances. 
As has already been mentioned, tone 5 on the word 'Jones', in the utterance in 
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point, could be interpreted as conveying surprise or some sort of reaction; 
in this case the reaction is directed towards the assumption by the speaker, or 
his addressee, or by, both, that Jones was expected to pay, the bill, this being 
the topic of previous conversation. But even previous mention need not be 
a condition for this interpretation of the selected intonation contour. Con- 
sider a point made by Schegloff and Sacks, 1974, in relation to contrastively 
accented utterances which is of relevance to the point under consideration 
here: 
An accent on the second part of'a contrast pair whose first 
`part is not explicit can none the less serve to display the 
-relevance of 
the first part. Thus,, to cite another 
example, a particularly clear display of what is 'going 
through someone's mind' though: it is not spoken or gesturally, 
etc. , conveyed, is provided by a person waiting to take an 
elevator down, who is told upon its arrival that the elevator 
is going up, pauses a moment, and then says, 'I guess, I. will 
wait. ' The contrast accent displays his prior, now 
abandoned, decision to 'go along for a ride'. 
(p. 260) 
Would Grice persist with his claim that this utterance, 'I guess, I will wait', 
(or its speaker) unnpreceded, as it is, by any other utterance that would serve 
to account for its intonation contour, would implicate that someone might think 
that S (i. e, that he/she wouldn't wait? Therefore, accounting for these 
instances in terms of pragmatic inferences, implicatures, is not only gratuitous 
but can also be incorrect as shown by Schegloff and Sacks. 
Grice's further claim that the some utterence (iii) might generate the 
implicature that someone (other than Jones) paid the bill (Grice, 1978, p. 123) 
can be connected with the phenomenon of presupposition, the presupposition in 
question being that someone paid the bill or at least there was a bill to be paid. 
For all the speaker/hearer knows this may be someone other than Jones, indeed, 
given Jones' habits the reasonable presumption may be that it is someone other 
than him. 
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An intensification of the speaker's feelings and attitudes revealed, 
or conveyed, by the intonation pattern of the utterance as analysed above, 
would be better instantiated in a similar utterance with the same intonation 
contours but-with a slightly different structure: 
'Jones: he didn't pay the bill' 
'ones' is singled out because it has been assigned a separate intonation 
contour, and in so uttering 'Jones' the speaker expresses his feelings (or 
opinion) towards the immediately preceding utterance, which may range from 
embarrassment or disagreement to sarcasm. It may be noted that a falling 
intonation contour is not hearer oriented in the sense that it is not question- 
begging. 
Note how many different functions a sentence may perform, if uttered 
with different intonation contours: 
(1) Speaker A: Tone 4: Jones: // 
(2) Speaker B: Tone 5: Jones 
(3) Speaker A: Tone 5: Jones 
((1) expresses reservation, difficulty to believe and it is hearer-oriented, 
(2) expresses assertion and reassurance, "there may seem to be strange 
but it is so", 
(3) expresses surprise "that's what you say, but are you sure? " (Halliday, 1967) 
Alternatively, the utterance 'Jones didn't pay the bill' might receive an 
entirely different intonation pattern: 
(iv) Speaker A: Jones paid the bill 
(v) Speaker B: Jones 
didn't bill. 
pay the 
Perhaps this is what Grice had in mind when he claimed that the heaviest stress 
would lie on 'Jones'. However it should be noticed that 'Jones', though an 
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accented word, is uttered with a low pitch though one higher than the other 
elements in the utterance and especially 'didn't' which is a highly accented 
word. 
This fact, however, is not consonant with Grice's suggestion that stress 
is automatic, and nothing is meant or implicated; the selection of this 
particular intonation contour should not be attributed to mere chance, or to 
automatic behavioural patterns; its significance should not be underestimated, 
neither should its potentialities to convey the speaker's feelings or attitudes on 
the matter. In the case in point the speaker may want to express his mild 
objection to A's utterance without offending or aggravating his interlocutor. 
(cf. Bolinger, 1972, p. 152 "... low-pitched accented Cyllable] blunt the 
impact of whatever facts are reported ... and the rising terminals remove any 
impression of assertiveness. ") The selection of such a contour for the utter- 
ance is a motivated choice and reveals "control" on the speaker's part over the 
situation. 
If we try to analyse this intonation contour in terms of Halliday's account, 
we would see that Grice's example uttered as in (v) would receive tone 4 which 
is a rounded falling-rising tone: 
// -\-_-' - 
Halliday's description of tone 4 agrees with Bolinger's account, that such an 
intonation pattern blunts the impact of what is asserted, and is used for mild 
objections: 
Tone 4 falls and then rises, meaning something like 'it 
may seem as though all is clear, but in fact there is more 
involved; characteristically it is used to make statements 
carrying some reservation, implying a 'but' and also ... a tentative opinion. 
(Halliday, 1967) 
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However, the point, which is the objection to the previous utterance, is made, 
though mildly, through the fulfilment of the negative speech function in this 
case; the argument goes through by the fact that the maximum force and 
intensity which comes on the fall is borne out by the negating element; this 
is connected with what has been argued above with regard to the negating 
elements in the utterance. The overall rise manifests a 'hearer orientation' 
in the utterance, in the sense that things are not settled and some sort of 
reaction to what has been uttered from the addressee is in order and actually 
expected by the speaker. 
This stretch of conversation, 
A: Jones paid the bill. 
B: Jones didn't pay the bill; Smith did. 
might be assigned an altogether different thematic structure: if speaker B 
selects the unmarked intonation pattern for his utterance 'Jones didn't pay the 
bill' as described above but goes on to add 'Smith did', stressing the elements 
'did' and 'Smith', then perhaps the participants are not really interested in 
whether the bill has been settled; their main concern may lie with the 
generosity, or other virtues, of the members of a club, for instance. This 
is an additional indication pointing to the power of intonation patterns with 
regard to the construction of the thematic structure of utterances. 
We would now like to come to Grice's claim that stress is automatic or 
a matter of habit in exchanges of such forms as, 
A: Jones paid the bill. 
B: Jones didn't pay the bill; Smith did, 
or in such cases as incomplete versions of this conversational schema, i. e. without 
a preceding statement to the effect that Jones paid the bill. It will be argued 
that his claim is rather tenuous and in any case at variance with his argument 
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concerning stress. He acknowledges the significance of stress, but in order 
to avoid attributing to it conventional meaning, he extends the maxim of 
relevance to make it encompass, not only what is said, but also features of 
the means used for saying what is said. 
However the maxim of relevance falls under the Cooperative Principle, 
which participants in a talk-exchange will be expected to observe and con- 
sciously abide by. Observance of the Cooperative Principle and its maxims 
is rational and intentional, and is based on the awareness on the part of the 
participants that it pays to conform to the maxims. "The participants have 
some common immediate aim", says Grice, 1975, p. 48, and therefore to ignore 
the significance of intentionality with regard to the conformity to the Cooperative 
Principle is to take the substance out of the claim. It should be noted that the 
notion of intentionality is central not only to fulfilling a maxim but also to 
violating it. 
If therefore stress is made to enter the province of the maxim of Relevance, 
it should not be claimed to be introduced automatically, and yet generate 
implicatures. Stress, here, is a function of the speaker's intention in the 
specific linguistic context and situation. The speaker will decide what the 
distribution of "communicative dynamism" (cf. Firbas, 1964) to his utterance 
will be. We can talk of 'automatic' stress only with reference to sentences, 
in abstraction from their linguistic and situational context. Automatic stress 
then is what we might understand by the terms 'colourless' or 'normal' intonation 
pattern, as opposed to 'intentional' stress, which is a function of the speaker's 
intentions to highlight a specific item (or more) in his utterance. Stockwell, 
1960, defines a 'normal' intonation pattern as: ' ,, c 
that pattern which emerges from the application of 
constituent structure rules and those optional trans- 
formations which do not operate specifically to shift 
the position of the intonation pattern in the string. 
'Normal' intonation is ... the consequence of 
failing 
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to elect an optional transformation of shift. We think 
of it as the 'normal' pattern because it is the obligatory 
pattern equivalent to zero, in the sense that it occurs 
automatically if the Intonation Pattern rules are, so to 
speak, left alone. 
(p. 362) 
Halliday (1967) makes the some point: 
The significance of the 'neutral' tone is that it is the 
one that always can be used in the given speech function. 
It implies no previous context and can always be selected 
therefore, if there is doubt about the appropriateness of 
the other tones. 
If therefore automatic stress is identified with the failure to select an optional 
intonation-shifting transformation, then it is obvious that there is no connection 
between automatic intonation and utterer's intentions. 
On the other hand, in a specific linguistic context like the one discussed 
here, by highlighting the element 'Jones' in his utterance, the speaker expresses 
his intention to argue against the content of the previous utterance that it was 
Jones who paid the bill. However, were B's objections of another nature, he 
could opt for a different intonation pattern shifting the prominence to another 
element in his utterance; for instance: 
B: Jones didn't pay the bill; he only passed it to Smith. 
Grice goes on to claim that in an utterance such as (ii), which however 
is not prompted by a preceding remark to the effect that Jones paid the bill, the 
stress may be automatic again. He then adds that, here we have an instance of 
implicature, the implicature being that someone thinks or might think that Jones 
did pay the bill. Grite says: 
The maxim of relation requires that B's remark should be 
relevant to something or other, and B, by speaking as he 
would speak in reply to a statement that Jones paid the 
bill, shows that he has such a statement in mind. 
(Grice, 1978, p. 122) 
Pages missing in the 
original 
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However, if in order to effect such an implicature a major role should be attri- 
buted to intentionality on the utterer's part then Grice is inconsistent here, 
because on the one hand he says that stress may be automatic and on the other 
that the speaker is implicating something or other. (If by "automatic" he 
means that it is introduced unreflectively - which I do not believe to be the 
case - then he fails to distinguish between cases of stress in which the speaker 
is shown to have control over the situation and cases in which he does not. ) 
We hope to have shown that Grice's claim concerning cases of conversation- 
al implicatures generated by stress is eliminable. On Grice's view, implicatures 
are pragmatic inferences which do not appear to be amenable to any formal treat- 
ment. However with regard to his examples of implicatures generated by stress 
we have argued that the alleged implicature of (ii) is not a genuine case of 
implicature. His account in terms of implicatures is gratuitous, since these 
aspects of meaning can be systematically accounted for in terms of intonation 
patterns and their interpretation. 
The advantages accrued from an account of these aspects of meaning in 
terms of intonation patterns, rather than in terms of inferences are obvious. 
Although Grice's account of implicatures is able to handle 'pragmatic' meanings 
conveyed over and above lexical meanings in individual cases - though not in 
a uniform way - his programme affords no actual gain to .a 
general systematized 
theory of language, or of language use. However, if we have a systematic 
description of speaker's attitudes and feelings, and therefore of attitudinal 
meanings (intonational meanings), over and above lexical meanings, conferred 
on utterances, accountable along these lines (systematic description and there- 
fore interpretation of intonation contours) then such an account would contribute 
more significantly to a more valid and general theory able to handle these aspects 
of meaning. An extra bonus would then be that the specification of intonation- 
contours of utterances would help determine those contexts in which they could 
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occur. As Lyons, 1977,2: 611, noted, "to know the meaning of an utterance, 
a word, an intonation-pattern, etc., is to know the contexts in which it can 
occur". However the problem remains in what terms these aspects of 
meaning, conveyed by the intonation contours of connected speech, are to be 
described. 
5.3 Group A: cooperative principle observed 
In his paper Logic and Conversation II, 1975, Grice offers a number of 
cases of conversational implicatures which he divides into various groups. One 
such group is formed by those cases of conversational implicature in which no 
maxim is violated. As my thesis will eventually be that a necessary condition 
for the generation of a conversational implicature is the violation (apparent) of 
at least one of the conversational maxims, I propose to examine closely these 
cases of purported conversational implicature, offered by Grice, in which the 
Cooperative Principle is observed. Interestingly enough, Grice himself says 
that a conversational implicature is not generated on the trivial assumption that 
someone is cooperating: 
When I speak of -the assumptions required in order to 
maintain the supposition that the cooperative principle 
and maxims are being observed on a given occasion, I 
am thinking of assumptions that are non-trivially required; 
I do not intend to include, for example, an assumption to 
the effect that some particular maxim is being observed, 
or is thought of by the speaker as being observed. 
(1978, p. 114) 
5.3.1 Mutual, factual know ledge__implicated? 
One of the examples falling in the group of cases in which none of the 
maxims is violated is the following: 
GROUP A: Examples in which no maxim is violated, or at least in which 
it is not clear that any maxim is violated: 
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A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the 
following exchange takes place: 
(86) (i) A: I am out of petrol. 
(ii) B: There is a garage round the corner. 
(Gloss: B would be-. infringing, the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he 
thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol 
to sell; so he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be, 
open etc. ) 
(Grice, 1975, p. 51) 
Firstly, we would like to rule out any supposition that the purported 
conversational implicature might be a regular feature of the uttered sentence, 
of the conventional meaning of the words used, or an aspect of it. Indeed 
exactly the same sentence may be uttered by my friend at my home in reply to 
my enquiry regarding his complaints about noises heard in his flat. (Presumably 
Grice would claim that my friend implicated that the noises came from the 
garage. ) The allegedly conversational implicature cannot be conventional. 
At first glance therefore, Grice seems to be right in offering the following 
data on which the hearer must rely to work out the presence of a particular con- 
versational implicature: 
(1) The conventional meaning of the words used, together with the 
identity of any references which may be involved; 
(2) The Cooperative Principle and its maxims; 
(3) The context, linguistic or otherwise of the utterances 
(4) Other items of background knowledge; 
(5) The fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under 
the previous headings are available to both participants, and 
that both participants know or assume this to be the case. 
(1975, p. 50) 
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However we should not fail to notice that what is under consideration 
here is. an 'adjacency sequence' (Sacks and Schegloff, 1974) which suffices 
to delineate precisely the type of situation at issue. This talk-exchange 
- or, more specifically, A's utterance, without any introductory remarks describing 
the situation at hand, enables any human being who shares our most elementary 
knowledge of facts about cars to 'fill in the picture'. As Brazil et al., 1980, 
would put it, the grammar and the lexis of (86i) are "sufficiently suggestive of a 
rudimentary discourse setting" (p. 84). We will understand that A must not be 
very far from an immobilized car and we will also understand that A's first 
priority at that moment is to get his car moving again. This understanding is 
due to our social competence, and not to purported implicatures of the. utterance 
'I am out of petrol'. (One may want to attribute this social competence to 
implicatures of this utterance, but we will come to that later. ) The first 
utterance (86i) therefore - not to mention the description prefacing it - 
occurs in a very specific situation, one which involves a matter of great urgency 
for the person involved. The 'set up' requires that the next utterance must 
contribute, if minimally, towards a possible resolution of A's predicament; it 
dictates that the second utterance has to fall within a rather narrowly delimited 
domain of discourse in order to satisfy the requirements set by the first utterance. 
Indeed, A's utterance is one of those utterances belonging to a class that Grice 
would characterize as fixing the purpose or direction of the talk-exchange 
right from the start (1975, p. 45). In other words, it places heavy constraints 
on the acceptable purposes (degree of 'variationability') with which the next 
utterance can be uttered. This is an important social correlate of speech 
which must not be ignored. 
2 
The function, therefore, of the first utterance in this case is to call on 
the next utterance to be 'in line' with it, i. e. to meet at least some of its 
requirements. However, this bounding of the domain within which the second 
utterance has to fall must be flexible, as far as its coherence is concerned. 
3 
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The hearer, on, the other hand, must, have some latitude at his disposal , 
('permissible variation'4) to adjust his response to the requirements and, hence, 
expectations set by the f irst, utterance. 
Imagine what other utterances would be satisfactorily produced in 
response to the first utterance. ' Those utterances will be termed 'satisfactory' 
or 'well-fitted', which will not, at least minimally, fail the social expectations 
which the speaker trusts that the hearer will fulfil. Consider the following 
talk-exchange: ' 
A: I am out of petrol. 
B: I've got some in my car. 
According to Grice B would be implicating by his utterance that his spare petrol 
is in a portable tank in the boot of his car (and not in his car tank, as in the 
latter case his petrol would be of no avail to A). (Gloss: B would be 
infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he knows that the petrol he has got in 
his car can be used in my car. As the petrol in his car tank cannot be trans- 
ferred to my car, he implicates that the petrol in his car can be used to set my 
car rolling again - should one find this reasoning adequate, or should one 
proceed as follows? Therefore he implicates that he keeps this petrol in a 
portable tank in his car. ) Or, perhaps, he would be implicating that - 
although the petrol is in the car tank - he keeps a pump in the boot of his 
car which can be used to put an end to A's plight. 
5 
In short the number of implicata attached to any utterance can be, in 
principle, vague and indefinite, following Grice's account. An account 
of implicatures along these lines does not seem to be adequate, because it 
does not offer an answer to the question of how speech functions; neither 
does it offer a systematic description of the generation of implicatures. It 
should not escape our notice that in this case the pivot, ' on which the inter- 
pretation of B's utterance depends is determinate; it is A's very utterance. 
A is trying to work out, if this is not obvious, in what way B's utterance 
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satisfies A's immediate needs revealed to B- if not by the situation - by 
A's preceding utterance. Upon receipt (uptake) of B's utterance, A will 
categorize it as relevant (contributory) to a possible resolution of his troubles, 
and will act on it accordingly. (He may get a container, out of the boot of 
his car, or he may ask B if he has one, or he may ask B to help him push the 
car to the petrol station, etc. ) B's utterance is intuitively relevant; 
6 
it raises A's expectations with regard to putting an end to his predicament. 
It would still be relevant if the utterance were as follows: 
B: There's a garage round the corner, but it is closed on 
Sundays, 
uttered on a Sunday, as it would count, as a comment on A's troubles there 
and then. But it would not be relevant if uttered in exactly the some circum- 
stances on a Monday morning because the speaker would be changing the topic 
set by the first utterance, before it had been, at least minimally, dealt with. 
In other words, B would be ignoring 'the conversational demand' set up by A's 
utterance, or he would not be correctly identifying the priority of a resolution 
of A's predicament set by A's utterance. To put it in the ethnomethodological 
terminology - which however of late seems to be finding its way into the 
linguistics literature (see Levinson, 1978, Freedle, 1979, Holdcroft, 1980) - 
B would fail to exhibit 'recipient design' in his next utterance. 
The following utterances by B are also acceptable uttered on a Sunday: 
(i) B: There's a garage round the corner and you are lucky 
that it is open on Sundays. 
(i i) B: There's a garage round the corner and it is open on 
Sundays. 
The second clause in (i) and (ii) is offered in anticipation of A's relevant query. 
However the utterance 'There is a garage round the corner' is intuitively relevant 
uttered on a weekday during normal business hours; it needs neither any quali- 
fications by the speaker nor any construal by the hearer to make it fall within 
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that range of utterances which is delimited by the first utterance as intuitively 
relevant and, therefore, satisfying the conversational requirements set by it. 
The sentence 'There is a garage round the corner' uttered in these circumstances 
during normal business hours on a weekday is not apt to prompt any question 
from the hearer as to whether the petrol station is open or closed. However, 
the same utterance on a Sunday afternoon, or on a late evening is very likely 
to prompt such an anxious question. This purported conversational implicature, 
occasioned by B's utterance, seems to be very much 'time-dependent'. One 
is left wondering. 
Indeed B may have no idea whatever as to whether the garage is open or 
not. All he knows is that there is a petrol station round the corner and this is 
what he wants to convey to A, knowing that this piece of information is welcome 
to him. Wouldn't his utterance still be appropriate? And would he still 
be implicating according to Grice's account that the garage might be open? 
Grice's gloss can be taken, if a bit strained, to cover this case too. But the 
stdtus of such a conversational implicature is very flimsy indeed. But doesn't 
all this boil down to the same point? If B knows that there is a garage round 
the corner and if he knows what garages are for (and he must know that much to 
say what he did in response to A's utterance) then both A and B must have a 
pretty good idea about the hours of business of garages. 
Consider the following talk-exchange: 
A: I am out of petrol. 
B: There's a garage round the corner. 
A: It can't be open at this hour. 
B: Oh yes, it is. 
Does A fail to take up B's conversational implicature in this exchange? If he 
does, why should this be so? On our view, there are other factors in the 
situation at hand that determine the 'status' of B's utterance, whether, that is, 
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it is likely to be taken as a piece of helpful information or as a mere comment. 
Suppose that there were maps on roads indicating the location of nearby 
petrol stations; suppose that our traveller came out of his immobilized car, 
walked a few yards and came across such a map. On that map he could 
read that there was a petrol station a mile away from his car. Now if this 
took place during normal business hours wouldn't our stranded traveller have 
high hopes that the garage would be open and have petrol to sell? Wouldn't 
his expectations be low though, if it were 10 o'clock in the evening and if he 
knew that such businesses were not likely to be open on a 24-hour basis? 
Clearly the sign on the map did not imply anything; neither was it meant 
to implicate anything; it was intended to offer the information about the 
location of the nearest garages and service stations (and possibly other 
information that might prove relevant in different situations). Yet this 
sign on the }map can function in exactly the some way as B's utterance does: 
they both raise A's hopes (generate conversational implicatures, Grice would 
say) that his troubles may soon-be over. 
A socially acceptable response to A's utterance might be some sort of 
action taken by B- possibly not accompanied by any linguistic correlates - 
with the intention of bringing about an end to A's plight: for instance, if, 
upon hearing A's utterance, B walked to his own car, opened the boot and 
took out a container with petrol, which he kept there for an emergency. 
7 
Seeing B going away without saying anything, A might be either puzzled, or 
think that B was refusing to adopt the role that was socially expected from him; 
but open seeing B coming back with the petrol, A would consider B's behaviour 
justifiable and only seemingly unacceptable; B would be seen to be doing 
what was expected from him after all. 
A's utterance, therefore, lies on the borderline of those initiating 
utterances which are made with the intention to elicit, at best, a behavioural 
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response from the hearer to the satisfaction of the speaker. The spectrum 
of the responses may extend from a word of sympathy to a positively contri- 
butory behavioural response. Whereas a first utterance that is heard as a 
request or command usually has 'sequential implicativeness' for an unspoken 
next action to borrow a term from ethnomethodology, 
8 
an utterance like (86i) 
'I am out of petrol', spoken in the context described, can have 'simultaneous' 
(cf. Atkinson, 1979) sequential implicativeness for a spoken next turn, whether 
accompanied or not by an activity other than speech. (86i) therefore can 
elicit either an unspoken next action, or a spoken next activity, or both, that 
is, indeed, a wide range of 'nexts'. This is due to the formulation of the 
first utterance which makes it possible for the next party, the addressee, to 
direct his next (whether spoken or unspoken, or both) to any of, the levels of 
the purpose (intention) with which the first utterance was made (see Weiser, 
1974). 
By uttering 'There is a garage round the corner', therefore, B is not 
implicating anything at all. If we accept that what is at issue here is a 
case of conversational implicature, then the very concept of conversational 
implicature will be trivialized. We have seen that such alleged conversational 
implicata can be indefinite in number. It can be argued, moreover, that even 
if B's utterance were: 'There is a garage round the corner and it is open', by 
the same token, Grice would still be forced to maintain that there is a case of 
B's implicating that the garage which is open has petrol to sell and does sell 
it. 
9 (Gloss: B would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he 
thinks, or, thinks it possible, that the garage had petrol to sell; so he 
implicates that the garage does sell petrol. ) We think that this gloss offends 
against our most basic linguistic intuitions and the assumed indisputability of 
our most rudimentary knowledge of the surrounding, perceptible, factual world. 
Yet all we have done was to take Grice's gloss just one stage further, in an 
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attempt to explicate what purportedly underlies B's utterance. On this 
point it might be constructive to cite Frege, 1972: 
A strictly defined group of modes of inference is simply 
not present in ford marl language, so that on the basis 
of linguistic form, we cannot distinguish between a 
'gapless' advance. ... and an omission of connecting links. We can even say that the former almost never 
occurs in /ordinary] language, that it runs against the 
feel of language, because it would involve an insuffer- 
able prolixity. 
(p. 85) 
Stating the putative conversational implicature by conjoining it to the 
utterance, that allegedly generates it, will result in the odd utterance, 
(a) There's a garage round the corner and it sells petrol. 
As R. Lakoff, 1971 
, would put 
it "the oddness arises out of the conjunction 
itself: the first point involves certain presuppositions that make the second 
party empty" (p. 124). Now if the conjunction were, 
(b) There's a garage round the corner and it is open, 
the oddity of (b), uttered during normal business hours, would arise, not out of 
the conjunction itself, but because of presuppositions pertaining to our knowledge 
of the factual world around us, which is shared by all participants in a conver- 
sation. 
Now, Grice might opt to claim that, although 'It is open' is a legitimate 
conversational implicature of the utterance 'There's a garage round the corner', 
at least under the circumstances at hand, 'It sells petrol' is not. However, he 
has not provided us with any procedure, whereby the conversational implicature 
of 'It is open' is legitimately generated, whereas that of 'It sells petrol' is not. 
On the contrary, by parity of the reasoning he has offered, we are forced to 
accept the legitimacy of the generation of both implicatures by the some utter- 
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ance under the circumstances. Further, he may want to claim that it is a 
condition that conversational implicatures cannot be stated explicitly by 
conjoining them to the utterances generating them. In this case, however, 
he would be in the impossible situation having to rule out, as unacceptable, 
an utterance like (b), which is a perfectly acceptable utterance issued, for 
instance, on a Sunday, or during non-business hours. 
We want to argue rather that the case at issue here is a case of an 
intuitively well-fitted (relevant) utterance whose purpose is not determined 
independently by what B wants to implicate. The delimitation of its purpose 
is determined by A's utterance. If the same sentence is uttered by B in A's 
house as a response to A's enquiry about the reason for B's complaints about 
the noise heard in his flat, A would not conclude that the garage was open or 
closed at that moment; neither would B be implicating anything at all as 
this would be beyond the requirements set by A's utterance. A would be 
expected to understand that the garage was responsible for the noise, but that 
understanding would not be implicated in any reasonable sense. 
What should be stressed here is that if B's utterance imparts more to the 
hearer than what B actually says by it, this is not because of what B intends to 
implicate, as Grice suggests. Rather it is because of features of the whole 
social setting in which the utterance is issued; more specifically, in this 
case, it is the first utterance (A's utterance) that serves as the touchstone in 
classifying the ensuing utterance. Rather than look at an utterance in isolation 
and dump whatever else we understand by it in a basket labelled 'implicature', 
we should view it as part of an integrated whole, the talk-exchange or the 
discourse at hand (cf. Holdcroft, 19786); this will most probably help to place 
it within a social context which will provide us with the necessary clues. 
Social correlates should not be ignored or termed the speaker's conversational 
implicatures in issuing an utterance. 
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A connected point that could be made here is that if a taxonomy of 
linguistic situations is envisaged, (cf. Levinson's, 1978a, sketch of activity 
types) then there is a strong likelihood that our example would be categorized 
under some such heading as 'emergency cases'. Among the various speci- 
fications characterizing this class there would probably be some such maxim as 
the following: 
When he has understood what is said10 the recipient 
of the message must try to do what he can to help the 
sender in his problem situation. He must return, at 
least, a word of sympathy, or a piece of information 
that has a bearing on the sender's predicament (priority 
at that moment). 
The degree of predictability of the content of the prompted linguistic utterance 
or behaviour is much higher than, say, in a casual conversation. Put differ- 
ently, the degree of permissible variation is lower. 
Seen in sociological terms this talk-exchange may be taken to constitute 
a 'supportive interchange' (Goffman, 1971, p. 3). The main formal feature 
that such acts seem to have in common is, as described by Goffman, "the 
ritual ization of identificatory sympathy. The needs, desires, conditions, 
experiences, in short, the situation of one individual, when seen from his own 
point of view, provides a second individual with directions for formulating 
ritual gestures of concern" (Goffman, 1971, p. 92). The utterance 'I am out 
of petrol' in the specific situation invites the offer of a "free good", i. e. a 
relevant piece of information or some other helpful gesture, in the case at issue. 
We would now like to turn to the question of the data mentioned by Grice, 
on which the hearer relies to work out the presence of a particular conversational 
implicature (this has been given on p. 151 ). It is not clear whether Grice 
attaches any importance to the order in which the data are given. If this is 
the case we would I ike to argue that it seems fairly obvious that factors (3) and 
(4) - (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise of the utterance, (4) other items 
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of background knowledge - seem to precede factor (2), the Cooperative 
Principle and its maxims, as for as their order is concerned in the deduction 
of the conversational implicature. The grounds for this claim is as follows: 
the observance of the CP and its maxims by both (or all) participants is 
a priori to any talk-exchange; it is in the background of any potential 
talk-exchange and its observance by any one of the participants is not called 
into question unless something goes wrong in the flow of the conversation. 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that what we understand to obtain in 
all types of discourse is an attenuated form of CP, or rather, various maxims of 
it. For a relevant discussion, see Holdcroft, 1978. He writes: 
... CP as it stands certainly is not universally applicable; 
.......... ............................... 
... The claim that acceptance of CP and of its general - 
ized version can involve the acceptance of different sets of 
maxims in different discourse-types, and even within 
different discourses of the same type carried on with rather 
different ends in view, is plausible, but frustrating. 
(pp. 140,141) 
For example, in cross-examinations, even though the participants have opposed 
interests and the participation of one party is enforced rather than voluntary, 
there still obtains at least one maxim, that of Relation, that if the cross- 
examinee say anything, it should be relevant to the accepted or enforced 
purpose of the corss-examination. Moreover, as noted in Holdcroft, 1978b, 
a general principle of Cooperation must be understood as operative in such 
discourses institutionally. In this connection it can be noted that Levinson, 
1978b, too, sees different degrees of cooperation in a model of ineraction in 
which interactants can cooperate on lower-order goals but conflict on higher 
order ones. 
To close the parenthesis, therefore, it is evident that the CP and its maxims 
are not called into the foreground before the hearer has made full use of the 
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other data at hand. It is only then that the hearer can decide whether the 
violation is real or apparent; and, it should be emphasised, he will utilize 
all the data at hand to help him come to the conclusion that it was only 
apparent (as the observance of some form of the CP and its maxim is granted 
a priori). If he comes to a different conclusion then he must seriously pose 
the question about the normalcy or rationality of his interlocutor, as his flouting 
of the maxim will not be merely confinable to a linguistic violation of the CP, 
or to one of its maxims, or to a plurality of them, but may also reveal some sort 
of defect in the social competence with which all members of a society are 
supposed to be equipped. In this case the so-called implicature, 'The 
garage is open', follows merely from what is said ('There is a garage round the 
corner'), and what is assumed (''Garages are open on weekdays, and it is a week- 
day-today'), without any special further assumption as to whether the CP is being 
complied with or not. However, what is assumed is triggered by the previous 
linguistic context, and that is to say, not merely by what is said, 'There is a 
garage round the comer', but by what is said against the background of the 
previous linguistic or situational context; in this case this context consists in 
A's utterance: 'I am out of petrol. ' 
With regard to this example, therefore, we have contended that B's utter- 
once does not generate any conversational implicatures as the CP is followed 
and, hence, there are no grounds for calling its observance into question (con- 
sciously or intuitively, after all, what does "intuitively" mean here? ). Indeed 
Grice seems to add support to our contention in the following quotation: 
In this example ... the unstated connection between B's 
remark and A's remark is so obvious that, even if one 
interprets the super-maxim of Manner, 'Be perspicuous' 
as applying not only to the expression of what is said, 
but also to the connection of what is said, with adjacent 
remarks, there seems to be no case for regarding that 
super-maxim as infringed in this example. 
(1975, p. 51) 
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Next, if we try to apply the vehicles of implication offered by Grice in 
his CTP to this example we will see that none of these vehicles is applicable to 
B's utterance even if it is viewed as following from A's utterance (i. e. within 
its context). A brief glance will answer the question: 
(a) 'What the speaker said' does not carry the implication 
as the hypothetical test 'if there is a garage round the 
corner then it is open' fails. 
(b) 'The speaker' cannot be the vehicle of the implicature 
independently of previous linguistic context;. as (86ii), 
in isolation from (86i), does not seem to generate any 
such implicatures in the first place. 
Moreover, if an implicature is carried over by the speaker then the question 
arises as to whether the implicated message is not meant to be more significant, 
i. e. have a higher degree of intended communicative content than the actual 
sentence uttered. Any such intentional implicature is annulled or trivialized 
on the assumption that the sentence is uttered on a weekday during normal hours 
of opening. 
(c) 'The words the speaker used' is not applicable either, 
as the alleged implicature can in no way be part of the 
meaning of a word, or some words, used in the utterance, 
or part of the conventional force of the whole utterance. 
It is less clear, however, whether the last candidate, 
(d) 'His saying that' can be the carrier of the alleged 
implicature. This vehicle seems to break down in all 
its formulations when we try to apply it to our example: 
(di) 'His saying that in that way' is obviously ruled out; 
(di) clearly makes reference to the speaker's intentionality 
in respect of his utterance. The speaker has to give a 
clue to his intention if the hearer is to grasp it. But 
this he can only do by something special about his saying 
what he does 1 ence (dii and there is not anything in 
(86i i ). 
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(dii) 'His saying just that there is a garage round the corner 
and no more' seems to elevate our assumption of the most 
rudimentary shared knowledge of our world to the status 
of a well calculated, conversational implicature. (cf. 
the 'professor' example) 
(diii) 'His saying that rather than something else' seems to be 
guilty of effecting the some trivialization of the concept 
of implicature. 
In short, this example does not seem to be amenable to any such analysis 
of its purported impiicature; we conclude that this is the case just because 
there is no conversational implicature to be analysed. 
5.3.2 Toeics: 
__ 
conversationally implicated? 
-- ---------------- - 
In the foregoing we examined in detail two cases of what Grice calls 
particularized, conversational implicature, i. e. an implicature generated 
by saying that p on a particular occasion, and in virtue of special features of 
the context, whereas the utterance of p would not normally carry this implic- 
ature. We contended that both of them were not genuine cases of con- 
versational impl icature, In the case of the former example, (87) ('Jones 
didn't pay the bill'), the purported conversational implicature can be more 
adequately, fruitfully and systematically handled in terms of intonational 
meanings, whilst in the latter, (86) ('There's a garage round the corner'), it 
was accounted for in terms of mutual general background knowledge and 
specific assumptions., In short, (86) it was found that what Grice calls a 
conversational implicature amounted to no more than the'hypostatization of 
knowledge shared by the participants of a talk-exchange, against the back- 
ground of which linguistic events take place. 
In what follows we will consider briefly some more examples of particular- 
ized, conversational implicature, as described by Grice, only to be shown that 
these, too, cannot be regarded as instances of a uniformly defined class of 
homogeneous linguistic phenomena. 
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Another example of particularized, conversational implicature, falling 
into the group of cases in which no maxim is violated, 'is the following: 
(88) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girl-friend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
Grice writes, 
B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girl-friend in 
New York; 
and he adds, 
In both examples the refers to (88) and (86)7 the speaker 
implicates that in which he must be assumed to believe 
in order to preserve the assumption that he is observing 
the maxim of relation. 
However, (88) is a rather otiose example of a conversational implicature. 
In the first place, B need not be taken as implicating that Smith has, or may 
have, a girl-friend in New York, in order to preserve the assumption that he is 
observing the maxim of relation. Indeed, a number of interpretations can be 
given to B's utterance depending on the assumptions in relation to the subject 
matter (Smith) shared by A and B. Couldn't B's utterance be taken to mean 
(Bi)? 
(88) Bi: Indeed, he doesn't. He has been paying a 
lot of visits to New York lately. 
That is, could (88)B not be taken as performing the act of accepting as correct 
- as is Clearly the case in (88) Bi - rather than as rejecting, A's preceding 
statement, and further supplementing it with what seemed to B to be evidence 
that A's utterance was true? This understanding of B's utterance, however, 
would depend on common assumptions such as, for example, that Smith's parents 
live in New York, and that Smith is more likely to pay a lot of visits to his 
parents when he does not have a girl-friend, and so on and so forth. Or 
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perhaps such an understanding as (88) Bi of (88) B could depend on A's and 
B's shared knowledge that there are a lot of brothels in New York city, but 
not in the village in which Smith lives, and apparently, this is the attraction. 
for Smith's frequent visits to New York, given his present state and, probably, 
his past habits, too. In both cases, B's utterance is understood as having the 
force of concurring with, and corroborating A's statement. - Suffice 
it to 
say that the intonation contour assigned to B's utterance is as significant, as 
is mutual background knowledge, for the understanding of its force. 
Having shown that there are no grounds for supposing that a conversational 
implicature attaching to B's utterance is necessarily of the content described by 
Grice, we will now turn to his claim that the supposition of the presence of the 
impl icature is needed for preserving the assumption that B is observing the 
maxim of relevance. Suppose B's response to A's utterance was (88)Bii: 
(88) Bii: He has (may have) a girl-friend. He has been 
paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
It is quite clear that Grice would not want to claim that there is any case of 
implicature in (88)Bii attaching to B's utterance, since "the implicature" is 
stated in the first clause of B's utterance, i. e. (a) 
(a) He has (may have) a girl-friend. 
However, the question that should be raised is what is the status of (a) in B's 
utterance? Does it not refer to, or is it not a reformulation of the topic, as 
this was initiated and formulated in A's utterance? 
12 
If this is so, then what - 
Grice calls a conversational implicature, the presence of which must be assumed 
for the preservation of the assumption that the CP is observed, is no more than an 
idle inference, as a duplicated, and hence redundant, invocation of a topic can 
be called. Once the topic of a conversation, or talk-exchange is formulated 
and established, it need not be reiterated in each new contribution to it. More- 
over, the fact that in Grice's example the topic was lexically formulated, that is, 
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explicitly stated and thereby established in A's utterance, eliminates any need 
for its "reactivation or foregrounding" (cf. Sgall, 1975) in B's subsequent 
utterance. As the ethnomethodologists would put it, A's utterance provides 
for the next observation to be heard as about Smith's girl-friend, since it is 
the question of the possible existence of a girl-friend of his that has been 
"formulated as the topical focus of some projective conversational activity 
properly instigated upon uttering" (88)A (cf. Schenkein, 1972). In other 
words, once the topic has been formulated, the interlocutor's attention is 
directed to it, and it thus need not be relexicalized in the ensuing utterance. 
It is worth noticing that when the topic is contextually recoverable, as for 
example when one of my colleagues throws (b) out at me, while dashing past 
me down the stairs, 
(b) That's a nice colour scheme, 
13 
its verbalization is kept toa minimum. 
14 
Now Grice might raise an objection of a different form, relating to the 
identity of the pronoun he in B's utterance. How do we know that he refers 
to Smith of (88)A? He might want to claim that it does so by way of 
conversational implicature so that B's utterance is presumed to be relevant to 
A's utterance. However, this would be a further trivialization of the concept 
of implicature. Following Schenkein (op. cit. ) we could counter this rejection, 
were it to be raised, by saying that once the referential solution has been 
provided by a previous conversational formulation (Smith) "it need not be resolved 
de novo at each juncture" (p. 360). Indeed, it is 'referential cohesion' that is 
"a primary text-forming agency" (cf. Halliday, 1977), 
Although Grice does not argue that the maxim of relation is violated in 
(86) and (88), he does nevertheless appeal to it in a rather obscure way, in 
constructing the gloss of the reasoning to the presence of the conversational 
implicature. The status of this appeal to the CP on the part of the hearer is 
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not clarified in Grice's account, and we believe that the analyses of these two 
examples have made it clear that if indeed such an appeal to the CP is to be 
made, it would be trivially made. Therefore, there is no reason to believe 
that participants in a talk-exchange will trivially appeal to the CP or maxims 
thereof. Indeed, Grice himself want to exclude cases of trivial invocation 
of the observance of the CP (cf William James Lecture III, 1978, p. 114)... 
Moreover, it has been argued in relation to (88), not only that under- 
standing the force of what is said can be governed by the specific assumptions 
pertaining to the speech event, but also that what Grice calls conversational 
implicature amounts to no more than an inferred reformulation of the topic of 
the talk-exchange. We believe therefore that we have shown that (88), too, 
is a bogus case of conversational implicature. We will now consider some more 
of his examples of conversational implicature. 
5.4 More bogus cases 
Grice describes an example of conversational implicature exhibiting a kind 
of interaction between his maxims, as follows: 
Suppose that it is generally known that New York and Boston 
were blacked out last night, and A asks B whether C saw a 
particular T. V. programme last night. It will be con- 
versationally unobjectionable for B, who knows that C was in 
New York, to reply "No, he was in a blacked-out city". 
B could have said that C was in New York, thereby providing 
a further piece of just possibly useful or interesting information, 
but in preferring the phrase "a blacked-out city" he was 
implicating (by the maxim prescribing relevance) a more 
appropriate piece of information, namely, why C was prevented 
from seeing the programme. He could have provided both 
pieces of information by saying, e. g. "He was in New York 
which was blacked out", but the gain would have been 
insufficient to justify the additional conversational effort. 
(William James Lecture III, 1978, p"114) 
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Apparently, this example would belong, together with (86) and (88), to 
the group of conversational implicatures in which no maxim is violated. How- 
ever the status of the purported conversational implicature is as obscure and odd 
as is the claim that A would prefer the phrase "a blacked-out city" to the more 
concise and incremental Proper Name of the city, i. e. "New York". Once 
more Grice feels that the common assumptions in this case, i. e. the knowledge 
that New York was blacked out, have to be explicitly stated in B's response, as 
in "He was in New York which was blacked out", or as in "He was in a blacked- 
out city". He thus overlooks the common sense fact that (c), 
(c) No, he was in New York, 
as a response to A's question, and uttered against the background of the assumed 
common knowledge that New York was blacked out, triggers off this knowledge 
and it thus constitutes a relevant ipso facto, cooperative response, with the 
minimum of lexicalization and the maximum relevant information. 
To exemplify this point, think of a case in which someone expresses his 
surprise at the fact that doctor X shows expertise in tropical diseases that is unusual 
for doctors in the U. K. It is common knowledge that tropical diseases are very 
uncommon in the U. K., and, as a consequence, doctors trained and practising in 
this country are not expected to have a high degree of familiarity with such 
diseases. In giving an answer to satisfy his curiosity I may say either (i) or 
(ii : 
(i) He worked as a doctor in Malawi for two years. 
(ii) He worked as a doctor in Africa for two years. 
But, on the assumption that I am in a position to say either (i) or (ii), I certainly 
do not choose to say (iii), 
(iii) He worked as a doctor in a country (continent) with 
a tropical climate, where people suffer from tropical 
diseases, 
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unless I am talking to my five-year-old son or to an ignorant idiot. Both (i) 
and (ii) turn on our shared background knowledge of the world (SBKBs, cf. 
chapter 7). 
To take another example that would illustrate the way mutual specific 
assumptions (CMCAs, cf. chapter 7) are brought to bear on the production and 
understanding of utterances, think of a case that is very similar to Grice's, in 
which B explains to A the reason for her stomach upset as in (iv), 
(iv) I had to drink beer; I had lunch with John, 
when it is a well-known fact to both A and B, that B is averse to the consumption 
of beer, and that John, a common friend, is a fellow who insists that his co- 
lunchers have beer with him. We think it is obvious that no one would like to 
claim that a more relevant piece of information would be implicated in a response 
like (v), in those circumstances. 
(v) I had to drink beer; I lunched with a fellow (friend) 
who insists on treating you to beer. 
Grice would claim that the speaker in (v) implicates a more relevant piece of 
information by way of selecting a relative clause that actually furnishes the 
information that the proper name would call up in this instance. 
Yet, the speaker's formulation of a reference term in his actual response is 
geared to the hearer's knowledge, both general and specific (cf. chapter 7), and 
to an orientation for a minimal use of means, that would, however, be relevantly 
maximally incremental. Sacks and Schegloff, 1979, have pointed out two 
preferences that are widely operative in conversation in relation to the domain 
"reference to persons", those for "minimization" and for "recipient design". 
Reference for minimization is evidenced in the speakers' use of single reference 
forms. The notion of "recipient design" could be extended to include the 
speaker's orientation to "design" his utterance in such a way that it effectively 
takes into account his knowledge of the recipient's relevant assumptions, beliefs 
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and knowledge. Consequently, utterances are oriented towards being rele- 
vantly incremental but at a minimum cost. 
It can be pointed out that in all our examples proper names were preferred 
to descriptive expressions. Sacks and Schegloff's observations seem to carry 
over to references other than just personal ones.,. They note, 
names are prototypical and ideal recognitionals in part 
because they are minimized reference forms as well; 
and the stock of minimized forms includes a set (of 
which names are only one sort) which are for use as 
recognitionals. 
(ibid., p. 18) 
However, it must be pointed out that reference by way of proper names is often 
preferred on the grounds that it can function as a triggering device that will 
recall knowledge which is relevantly informational. If such knowledge cannot 
be assumed as possessed, then the speaker will haver to select some other form of 
reference, albeit more verbiose. 
Concluding, it is worth quoting Jespersen, 1924, who, in relation to 
referencing, writes: 
You have to make a selection, and you naturally select 
those traits that according to the best of your belief will 
be best fitted to call up exactly the same idea in the 
other man's mind. More than that, you select also those 
that will do it in the easiest way to yourself and to your 
hearer, and will spare both of you the trouble of long 
circuitous expressions. Therefore, ... instead of 
'male 
ruler of independent state' you say 'King', --tc. Thus 
whenever you can, you use single special terms instead of 
composite ones. 
(P"64> 
It is evident, we conclude, that this example, (' a blacked-out city'), is rather 
unfortunate, and, in any way, it'does not stand to reason to claim that something 
or other is conversationally implicated by it. 
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Conversational implicatures can be generated, according to Grice, either 
when the CP is observed at the level of what is said and when no maxim is in- 
fringed, or when there is an apparent violation, but the CP is observed at the 
level of what is implicated. But there is also another kind of implicature, 
though rare, that can be achieved by "real, as distinct from apparent, violation 
of the maxim of Relation" (Grice, 1975, p. 54). On such example of the 
latter group is cited in his William James Lectures, II: 
At a genteel tea party A says "Mrs. N is an old hag. " 
There is a moment of appalled silence, then B says "The 
weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't 
it? " B has blatantly refused to make what he says 
relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates 
that A's remark should not be discussed, and perhaps more 
specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe. 
(1975, p. 55) 
However, the case need not be as described by Grice in this example. 
The sole intention that could be attributed to the next speaker in relation to his 
speech activity is one of effecting a topic shift, not one of achieving a con- 
versational implicature. Indeed, in most cases of social gaffes, by shifting the 
topic the next speaker does not intend to thereby implicate that the previous 
speaker committed a social gaffe; rather, what he intends to do, and what he 
does do, is to terminate an embarrassing situation by way of changing the subject. 
This point is clearly illustrated by supposing that the gaffe was committed by the 
host, and the hostess, his wife, butts in, so to speak, to remedy the situation. 
Evidently, she would smother up her husband's inappropriate, remark, if she could, 
or, at least, let it go unnoticed, rather than expose it by way of implicating 
something or other. So much for the imputed intention to the next speaker. 
As for infringing the maxim of relation, Grice puts it as follows: 
B has blatantly refused to make what he says relevant to 
A's preceding remark. 
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This claim can be countered by considering A's remark, 
(89) Mrs. N is an old hag, 
and concluding that (89) is not a sequentially implicative utterance that would 
create a 'slot' for 'a next', i. e. one that seeks a response, and if such a response 
is not provided, its absence noticed as an event (cf. Schegloff, 1967, Sacks and 
Schegloff, 1979, Schegloff, 1976, Schenkein, 1972). It is not incumbent 
upon the next speaker to give a response to (89). It is implausible, therefore, 
to argue that topic shift at such a juncture would count as a violation of the 
maxim of relation (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979,99ff). 
Besides, B could have uttered (89i), 
(89i) Could I have another sherry? 
which in situations such as parties would have a priority over any other talk, 
since it expresses a more basic need of the speaker at that moment. (89i) 
could interrupt or even terminate the conversation on a particular topic, but we 
would be disinclined to perceive utterances like (89i) in such situations as 
violating the maxim of relation, and thereby implicating something or other. 
This example then, too, has been disputed as a genuine instance of con- 
versational implicature on the grounds that it. is not reasonable to attribute to 
speaker B the intention of implicating something or other, on the one hand, and, 
on the' other, because there is no violation, real or apparent, of the maxim of 
relation. 
Another group of conversational implicatures would involve what Grice 
calls exploitation of the CP, whereby'a maxim is flouted at the level of what 
is said. As extreme examples of a flouting of the first maxim of Quantity, 
Grice quotes patent tautologies, such as 'women are women', or 'war is war'. 
He writes: 
I would wish to maintain that at the level of what is said, 
in my favoured sense, such remarks are totally non- 
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informative and so, at that level, cannot but infringe the 
first maxim of Quantity in any conversational context. 
They are of course informative at the level of what is 
implicated, and the hearer's identification of their 
informative content at this level is dependent on his ability 
to explain the speaker's selection of this PARTICULAR 
patent tautology. 
(1975, p. 52) 
Surely, we would not want to dispute the fact that conversational 
implicatures can be generated when the CP is violated at the level of what is 
said, but it should be pointed out that patent tautologies have come to acquire 
a rather standardized meaning, and thus they might qualify as idiomatic phrases 
or expressions. For example, Venneman, 1975, writes in this connexion, 
a statement such as 'A woman is a woman' is never inter- 
preted as a tautology but as something like 'A woman must 
be expected to behave as male chauvinist pigs expect 
women to behave. ' 
(p. 327) 
Unlike other cases of conversational implicature that would belong to the some 
group, obvious tuatologies do not require a special content to be understood. 
Neither does their understanding - i. e. their conversational implicata - vary 
according to context of situation, previous linguistic discourse or speakers' 
intentions. Besides, such tautologies are not cancellable, either explicitly or 
contextually. In short, they seem to be conventionalized rather than to belong 
on an equal footing with instances-of conversational implicatures generated by 
violating the CP, or maxims thereof, as in the cases of other examples discussed 
by Grice, 1s since they lack most of the features characterizing conversational 
implicatures. 
16 
The conventionalized meaning of such patent tautologies is 
exhibited in conjunctive statements in which the conjunct is but: 
'Men are men but women are women. 
The tautological meaning of the two conjuncts is incompatible with the meaning 
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of the conjunctive element 'but' (unless 'too' is appended). But 'Men are 
men and women are women' is acceptable. 
5.4.1 Irony___Impl i sated? 
Another linguistic phenomenon that is claimed by Grice to be explicable 
in terms of conversational implicatures is irony. The example he cites is (90). 
(90) =X is a fine friend, ' 
uttered by A and addressed to B, in the common knowledge that X, a close friend 
of A's, has recently let him down. The conversational implicature is a 
proposition contradictory to the one expressed by (90), and is supposed to be 
conveyed by way of getting B to reconcile A's violation of the maxim of Quality, 
evidenced in (90), with the assumption that he is, nevertheless, observing the CP 
overall. By reasoning to the contradictory proposition of the one expressed in 
(90), i. e. by reasoning to the conversational implicatum, B has understood A's 
utterance as complying with the CP at the level of what is implicated. 
Irony, however, need not be propositional (cf. Holdcroft, 1976a, b) 
i. e. involve inversion of what has been said, as has often been assumed (cf. Grice, 
1975, Searle, 1979a, Bach and Harnish, 1978). 
17 It has been amply illustrated 
that ironical use of language (verbal irony) is too complicated- a phenomenon to be 
amenable to a Gricean treatment (cf. Holdcroft, 1976x, b, 1981). Furthermore, 
even in cases of propositional irony, in which the conveyed proposition is intended 
to be the contradictory of what has been said, it is problematical to claim that 
anything has been said at all. As Holdcroft, 1981, puts it, 
For if to say that p is to commit oneself to defending p, 
and, inter alia, is meant to provide an audience with a 
reason for t in ing that p, then it is surely wrong to suppose 
that A said that X is a fine friend. Grice's own remarks 
about w , mat it is to say that a seem to support a similar 
conclusion. 
ýP"15) 
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Besides, Grice, -'1975,, p. 58, writes, 
Since the truth of a conversational implicatum is not required 
by the, truth of what is said (what; is said may be true - what 
is implicated may be false), the implicature is not carried by 
what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by 
"putting it that way". 
Grice's explication of (90) in terms of conversational implicatures, however, 
does not tally with his claim that while p (what is said) may be true, g (what 
is implicated) need not be. Since the implicatum of (90) is the. contradictory 
of what is said in it, it is impossible to claim that both p and gare true, since 
they are contradictory and, hence, mutually exclusive. . 
If R is true then g, 
of necessity, Js false, and if g is true, then p is false. However, this state 
of affairs is not in Grice's spirit, since he argues that-to reason to what is 
implicated, one must first understand what is said. -The only way round this 
problem would be to argue that 'what is said' is defined in terms of sentence 
meaning, but such a definition is not in Grice's spirit either. 
Besides, irony seems to be tied to the utterance's propositional content in 
a way that other implicating utterances are not (cf. examples cited in footnote 
15). Another point that differentiates ironical utterances from other instances 
of implicature is that irony often seems to rest on evaluative assessments shared 
by the hearer, as well (cf. Miller, 1976); and, in so for as this is true, the 
generated implicature is hardly informative of anything else than, perhaps, the 
fact that the speaker, too, shares certain assessments of the situation. 
However, what is of significance is that Grice groups together cases like 
(86), in which the speaker means what he says, with cases like (90), in which 
the speaker does not mean what he says. In the former case, if e is false, so 
is q, the purported implicature; in the latter case, on the other hand, if Pis 
true, then, of necessity, q, the implicature, must be false. But if p is false 
then q is necessarily true. 
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5.5 On R. Lakoff's use of the concept 
We believe we have argued convincingly that most of Grice's examples 
of conversational implicature instantiate diverse linguistic facts that 
do not warrant a uniform treatment. Their heterogeneity precludes the 
possibility of a principled homogeneous account that could also be fully 
informative of the intricacies involved. 
Yet, the term 'conversational implicature' has been widely, if loosely,, 
used in the literature, as a blanket term to accommodate various forms of un- 
qualified inferences. 
18 
Recalling, however, Goffman's, 1959, observation 
that we live by inference, it becomes quite clear why, though convenient, it 
is utterly uninformative, as argued in this study, to label various inferences we 
make in language use 'conversational implicatures' and thus sweep them under 
the carpet, rather than to account for their diverse characteristics. . 
Robin Lakoff, 1973b, for example, says that if to the question 'What time 
is it? ' one answers as in (91), 
(91) My stomach says that it is nearly lunch time, 
we must assume that the respondent has trust in the 
communications of his stomach. If it is prone to 
suggest that it is lunch time at the wrong hours, this 
reply is useless to the questioner as an answer to his 
question. But if we assume it is accurate, then by 
conversational implicature we can assume further that 
the complement of this sentence will represent a true 
situation. 
(p. 457) 
Lakoff goes on to offer a pattern of deduction which runs as follows: 
A. One does not give false or irrelevant information. 
B. Therefore, the complement of the sentence 'My stomach 
says ... ' is believed by the speaker to be accurate. 
C. Lunch time occurs between twelve and one o'clock. 
178 
D. ,.. Therefore, it is shortly before that time.. 
(PP. 457-58) 
. d, - 
fý 
. 
It is worth observing that A lies in the background of any linguistic activity. { 
If it is not taken for granted, then the questioner would not expend the effort to 
ask the question in the first place, since he could not hope for a_true, or accurate 
answer. ,, 
Therefore, A is not included in the questioner's deductive pattern in 
trying to 'decipher' (91). Consequently, B has to go, too, since it"is. dependent 
on A. B can. be said to be a felicity condition on the illocutionary act of, 
stating, (91) (cf. Heringer, 1976, Searle, 1969) and as such it is a rule of a theory 
of speech acts. Alternatively, it can be looked on, as an instance of the 
observation of a pragmatic rule of conversation which obtains universally; hence, 
if this rule were to be appealed to in (91), it would be so, trivially. In con- 
clusion, it can be said that both step A and B and Lakoff's rendition of the deductive 
process involved in the understanding of (91 are vacuous, or, more aptly, granted 
un iversa Ily. 
. 
It is not clear what is conversationally implicated in LakoffIs view,, though 
step B seems to be the most likely candidate according to her account. She seems 
to conflate distinct. issues in it, however. If B is the conversational implicature, 
then she mistakes felicity conditions for conversational implicata; or, at best, an 
instantiation of the observance of the maxim of quality is taken to be a conversational 
implicatum. 
19 If, on the other hand, step C is to be taken as conversationally 
implicated, she is liable to the charge of hypostitizing common factual background 
knowledge by elevating it to the status of conversationally implicated meanings 
intentionally conveyed by the speaker. , In any event, the question that is raised 
is what the status of D is. If anything is intended to be conveyed as conversation- 
ally implicated in this example it would have to be D, since this is the ultimate 
import of the speaker's utterance (91). 
20 
If C, however, is meant to represent 
the conversational implicatum, then, taking into account that speech activities are 
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constantly dependent on background knowledge'; the question that is raised is, 
what the utility is of such an indiscriminate, 
aconcept. 
This notion of con- 
versational implicature would be too general to be anything but vacuous. 
Besides'there_is a further unpleasant consequence of such, a general and 
indiscriminate use of the concept: We would not be able to meaningfully 
account for instances of. communication in. which what is intended, to be con- 
veyed by, the speaker is something over and above,, or different from what is 
said in his utterance. (See following discussion). Indeed, according to 
Grice's account, one tends to think that this, is what he originally meant by 
conversationally implicated meanings. 
To illustrate what we would think to be a correct use of the term in the 
some example, consider a similar case in which the same talk-exchange takes 
place between a husband and a wife. The wife asks the time in the mutual 
knowledge (cf. Schiffers; °1972, definition of "mutual knowledge") that her 
husband is wearing a. watch. On the assumption that he was in a position to 
give a more relevant(? ) or informative answer, the wife will try and understand 
the import of her husband's utterance, and to this end she may have to draw on 
common assumptions and background knowledge, as well as make use of other 
facts that might be of significance in the understanding of what has been said. 
The wife is expected to reason as follows: 
A. It is obvious that the speaker (her husband) can give a 
more relevant(? ) or informative response in conformity 
with the maxims of relevance and quantity. 
Yet, he does not. He is in breach of the CP. 
B. Moreover, he intends me to see that he is violating the 
CP or a maxim thereof, since he knows that I know that 
he can give and is required to give a more relevant(? ) 
or informative answer. 
C. I have no reason to doubt his common sense and hence his 
cooperation in our communicative activity. Therefore, 
there must be some reason for selecting a rather deviant 
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answer to my answer (for violating a maxim). " This 
reason may be that he wants to communicate to me 
something else or something more than just what my 
question required. 
D. Given what he has said and given our mutual assumptions 
and background knowledge that 6, what he intends me to 
think is that q. 
It is significant that the addressee may have to resort to shared assumptions and 
knowledge in order to understand the speaker's import of his utterance..; teJPIn-this 
case the common assumptions may be any of a number of things. For example, 
it may wel I have been agreed that they are going to lunch out. In this case 
q, i. e. the speaker's conversational implicature, would be something like 'Let's 
go', to which the addressee might respond with any of the following: " 
I=changed 'my mind; I'm not coming. 
All right, I'll fetch my coat. 
Wimpy, as usual? 
it is worthy of note that in this case the speaker's utterance, (91) may have, and 
be intended to have, a perlocutionary effect, by manipulating the addressee's 
subsequent behaviour. 
In another case the common assumptions may have, been that, the wife is always 
expected to cook the lunch, and given that she has not so done, (91) may be 
intended to conversationally implicate that the addressee had-better cook some 
lunch. Given such assumptions, the addressee makes, for the, kitchen, or she 
may retort to (91) with (91 i), 
(91 i) I'm not cooking any lunch, today. - You get it. 
In both cases, however, what is conversationally implicated, is so, in virtue of 
'r 
the speaker's intentions and contextual features. The presence of the convers- 
ational implicature has to be worked out, and to do this the addressee has to rely 
on all the data given by Grice, i. e. s<° "'. ' +-ý "e 
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(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together 
with the identity of any references which may be 
involved; 
(2) the CP and its maxims; 
(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise of the utterance; 
(4) other items of background knowledge; 
(5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling 
under the previous headings are available, to both 
participants, and that both participants know or assume 
this to be the case. 
(1975, p. 50) 
In Lakoff's analysis, however, this data is not taken into consideration. To' 
be sure, there are no specific contextual features relevant to the situation. 
Neither is it shown that the main preoccupation of the speaker is to communicate, 
not p, but q. These facts lead us to conclude that the concept of conversational 
impl icature is abused in Lakoff's example. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We have so far considered cases in which we argued that what was claimed 
to be conversationally implicated meanings did not exhibit identical features, but, 
rather, that they were an array of heterogeneous linguistic facts. We conclude, 
that due to their heterogeneity, it is not plausible to claim that these facts form 
a homogeneously defined class of linguistic phenomena, as the class of conver- 
sational implicature would have to be. Besides, no class of homogeneous 
criteria would be applicable to such a variety of linguistic facts to identify 
instances of conversational implicature and distinguish them from other linguistic 
phenomena. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that most of these examples involved cases 
in which what was called a conversational implicatum amounted to no more than 
the invocation of mutual background assumptions and knowledge. It is claimed 
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that a notion of conversational implicature defined in those terms would un- 
justifiably hypostatize assumed knowledge by elevating it to the status of 
significant speakers'. meanings, intentionally conveyed by participants in a 
talk-exchange. 
In Chapter 7 we will be concerned with bodies of mutual backgroundknowledge, 
since they seem to play auch a significant role in successful 
communication. By arguing that background knowledge and assumptions are 
a universal fact '-'a sine qua non - of language use (cf. Searle, 1979b) we 
hope to show the necessity that language analysts be alerted to the study of such 
bodies and their relation to language use, rather than camouflage such important 
issues under the guise of conversation implicature. 
In chapter 8 we will examine in detail how bodies of background knowledge 
bear on the understanding of what has been called "a typical case of-the general 
phenomenon of indirection" (Searle, 1975, p. 61). Our 'motivation for this case 
study is the fact that such instances of indirect communication have been 
implausibly called conversational implicatures. 
Before turning to a consideration of the role played by background knowledge 
in communication, however, we would like to point out the lines along which the 
notion of conversational implicature should be more profitably defined. To this 
we now turn. 
s' 
, 
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6. PROLEGOMENA TO A REDEFINITION OF CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 
6.1 Two paradigms 
So far the thesis has been rather negative inasmuch astwe considered 
cases of linguistic facts that, on our view, cannot be plausibly called con- 
versational implicatures. We now wish to examine two of Grice's examples 
that, on our view, are genuine cases of conversational implicatures, and point 
out the criteria that would help us define the notion in more stringent, and thus 
less general and vague terms. 
Grite, 1975, defines a group of conversational implicatures as follows: 
GROUP C: Examples that involve exploitation, that is, 
a procedure by which a maxim is flouted for the purpose of 
getting in a conversational implicature by means of some- 
thing of the nature of a figure of speech. 
In these examples, though some maxim is violated at 
the level of what is said, the hearer is entitled to assume 
that the maxim, or at least the overall Cooperative 
Principle, is observed at the level of what is implicated. 
(p. 52) 
He then goes on to describe an example belonging to this group as follows: 
Example (92): " 
(1a) 'A flouting of the first maxim of Quantity. ' 
A is writing a testimönial about a pupil who is a"candidate 
for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: 
'Dear Sir, Mr. N's command of English is excellent, and 
his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc. ' 
(p. 52) 
The gloss Grice provides for this example reads thus: 
(Gloss: A cannot be opting out, since if he wished to 
be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot be unable. 
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through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his pupil; 
moreover, he knows that more information than this is 
. wanted. _: 
He must, therefore, be wishing to impart 
information that he is reluctant to write down. This 
supposition is tenable only on the assumption that he thinks 
Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he 
is implicating. 
(P. 52) 
Another example which Grice would apparently like to include in Group C 
is described as follows: 
.., t 
.. 
ýY t.. y 
Example (93): 
Suppose that A and B are° talking about a mutual friend, CO, fwho 
is now working in a bank. A asks B 'how C is getting 
on in his job, and B replies, "Oh'quite well, I think; he 
likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet. " 
(1975, p. 43) 
Grice's rendition of A's reasoning in those circumstances is as follows: 
(1) 'B has 'apparently violated the maxim 'Be relevant" and 
so may be regarded as having flouted one of the maxims 
conjoining perspicuity; yet I have no reason to suppose 
that he is opting out from the operation of the CP; 
(2)-given thecircumstances I can regard his irrelevance'as' 
only apparent if and only if I suppose him to think. that 
C is potentially dishonest; 
(3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So 
B implicates that C is potentially dishonest. ' 
(1975, p. 50) 
6.2 A comparison; a criterion on proposed 
In what follows we would like to compare these two examples with 86), 
which hd been claimed here to be 'a bogus case of 'conversational impl i cature. 
This comparison will reveal the lack of a common class of criteria that could 
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identify as conversational implicatures, linguistic phenomena, such as those ", 
manifested in examples (92) and (93), on the one hand; and (86) - 'repeated 
below for convenience - on the other. '' ` 
(86) (i) A: I'm out of petrol. 
'(ii) B: There's'a garage round the corner. 
One of, the characterizations of the notion of conversational implicature 
is described as follows: 
(2) the supposition that he Zhe specke) is aware that, or 
thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or 
making as if to sayp (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent 
with this presumption jhat the CP is observecJ7; and (3) 
the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that 
the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the s 
hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition 
mentioned in (2) IS required. "'' ` 
(Grice, 1975, p. 50) 
Now apply this to (86)B and the gloss would read as follows; Gloss: ; ý'""B' 
must be aware that,, or think that, the garage is open, (and has stocks of petrol ` 
to sell, etc. ), to make his saying that there is a garage round the corner consistent 
with the presumption that he is observing the conversational maxims, , 
or at least the 
CP. Granted that this gloss is consistent with our intuitions,. one should not 
fail, to notice that its significance is not on a par with that. of the gloss a potential 
hearer might use in the case of (92) and (93). The first point that differentiates 
this gloss from the one used in (92) and (93) is the following: The hearer in 
(86) does not make any conscious use of any gloss at all, as is the case with the 
other two examples. He does not pause to decipher, or reflect on, what the 
speaker said, as would be the case in (92) and (93). Neither is he left with 
the impression that what the speaker wanted to communicate to him, was, not p 
('There is a garage round the corner') but the implicature g ('The garage is open, 
or it has petrol to sell, etc'). There is no communicative import, other than E, 
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for the hearer of (86) B to. work out, as the case is in (92) and (93). In brief, 
the hearer of (86)B is aware that p is attributed a higher degree of intended 
communicative content by the speaker than is any possible q. Evidently, this 
is not the case with the two other examples; in these two, what the speaker 
really wants to impart to his audience is, not p, but g.. - He exploits p, which 
in turn functions as the springboard to get the hearer to argue to g. As 
Stalnaker, 1977, pointed out, I- T I- 
In the best cases of exploitation %of the rules governing 
, it is the main point of the speech normal conversation 
act to communicate what is only implied. 
(p. 146) 
It is clear, that p could be varied along similar lines in (92) and (93), 
without thereby hampering the felicitous communication of q. " In other words, 
the conveying of q, the impl icature, seems to have priority. over, and carry more 
weight than, the conveying of p, the sentence actually uttered. Indeed, it is 
not clear whether p has any autonomous function at all, other than to serve for 
the speaker as the vehicle of his implicature. Clearly, this is not the case in 
(86). 
Our claim that the communication of the conversational implicature is 
given priority to by the speaker, over the communication of what he actually 
utters, becomes clear in the following examples slightly altered by the added 
clauses; (The same context is presumed throughout in each case of (92) and 
(86) B): 
(92) Jones has beautiful handwriting and'his English is 
grammatical. 
(86) B There is a garage round the corner. 
(92a) Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is Y 
; grammatical; (it-oIz do not of-course "'mean to impy 
that he is no good at Philosophy. 
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(92b) Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is 
grammatical, but he is good at Philosophy. 
(92c) Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is 
grammatical and he is no good at Philosophy.., , 
(86) Ba There is a garage round the corner; I do not, of 
course, mean to imply that it is open. ,,, "" 
(86) Bb There is a garage round the corner but it is not open. 
(86) Bc There is a garage round the ý corner and it is open. 
In relation to (92), Grice offers the added clause in (92a) as an explicit 
cancellation of the implicature generated by an utterance of (92) in the described 
circumstances. ' But he adds: 
... my whole utterance 
is intelligible and linguistically 
impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial 
behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have implied ,_.. 
that he was no good, even though per Raps that is what my 
colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing 
else to say. 
(1967a, p. 93, emphasis added)1 
Now compare (92a) with (86)Ba: In (92a), though linguistically disavowed, 
the implicature still goes through, as Grice hints. Due to this fact the hearer 
is not left wondering about the purpose of (92); that is, he can see no point in 
the utterance of (92) in those circumstances, unless the implicature'is thereby 
conveyed. However, this does not seem to be the - case with (86)Ba. ' The 
wording of the explicit cancellation of the alleged implicature here seems'rather 
clumsy. The word 'imply' seems to be ill-chosen. ` `This may 
be due to the 
fact that the hearer, as has already been argued, is not left with the impression 
of any intended implicature on the speaker's part in (86). Hence, an explicit 
cancellation-of an alleged implicature is misplaced, and falls just short of 
being 
uninteIIigible. 
If, however, (86)Ba is formulated as an utterance adding further information 
rather than cancelling an alleged implicature, then it would go through felicitously 
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as shown below: 
(86) Ba i: There is a garage round the corner; I am not, of 
course, saying that it is open. 
or: There is a garage round the corner; I do not know 
if it is open, though. 
But even (86)Bai would not be spared the charge of causing unnecessary prolixity 
if it were to be uttered during the time when it is common knowledge that such ; 
businesses are open; the added clause would then be pleonastic. We con- 
clude that all this is, again, indicative of the lack of any conversational implicature 
generated by (86). 
Now compare (92b) with (86)Bb: In both cases the added clause is the 
reverse of the implicature in each case, conjoined to (92) and (86), with the 
conjunction 'but'. (92b) is rather infelicitous due to the fact that,, although 
the two clauses in it both refer to desirable qualities, these are qualities of, a µ 
different order, for the clauses to be'fel icitously conjoined with 'but', or with 
'and' for that matter. This fact, too, is conducive to the supposition that 
(92) functions as the means to get the hearer to argue to (86)Bb, on the 
other hand, seems to be a perfectly felicitous utterance. It is uttered as a 
comment relevant to the preceding utterance ('lam out of petrol'). Note 
that, in this context, the second clause cannot be uttered independently in any 
formulation: 'It is closed', 'The garage is closed', (which garage? ). (86) B 
has to be incorporated in some form for the second clause to be intelligible in the 
given context, as in 'The garage round the corner is closed. ' This is not so 
for (92b), however. The second clause of (92b) is semantically autonomous, 
and intelligible in its own right, under the given circumstances: 
hones 
, 
(He) is good at Philosophy. 
He is no good at Philosophy. 
Should it be granted that the semantic autonomy of the implicated message generated 
by an utterance is a criterion of the presence of a conversational implicature, then 
189 
the above discussion will give support to our argument that (92), in the given 
circumstances, generates a conversational implicature, whereas (86)B does 
not. 
' ýýýi la"aýt: 
_ 
Fý 
In other words, the question brought-out by the foregoing discussion . 
is 
whether a conversational implicature is communicable in its own right, i. e. is 
such that if made explicit, it will not be a conversational implicature any more. 
The explicit formulation will do away, with the sentence, the utterance of which 
gave rise to the implicature in the first, place. 
Further, (86)Bb uttered in the given circumstances, is felicitous, though, 
following Grice, one might be forced to. claim that it is irrelevant and, hence, 
uncooperative. The question is whether Grice would consider,; the added, 
clause in (86)Bb 'but it is closed', an explicit cancellation of the alleged 
implicature generated by (86)... However, the following quotation supports the 
supposition that Grice would consider the utterance of (86)Bb an explicit can- 
cellation of its implicature: + 
... a putative conversational implicature, that I is explicitly 
cancellable if, to the form of words the utterance of which 
putatively implicates that p, it is admissable to add 'but not 
e', or 'I do not mean, to imply that p'; 
(Grice, 1978, p. 115)'''"" 
Supposing that the utterance of the added clause is regarded as an explicit 
cancellation of the conversational implicature, then the whole utterance would 
be relevant on Grice's view. 
By the same token, however, we would be compelled to accept the utterance 
of its counterpart, (92b), as an explicit cancellation of the speaker's conversational 
implicature; (92b) is obviously not felicitous in the circumstances. ' Therefore, 
it seems as though Grice had to choose between regarding either the added 'but'- 
clause as an explicit cancellation of the implicatures, or (86)Bb as irrelevant, 
since it would not be covered by the gloss he offers in the specific example. In 
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either case his thesis seems to run into trouble. In any event, one wonders 
what it is that makes the utterance of (86)B6 felicitous in those circumstances, 
whilst the utterance of its counterpart (92b) is not. Moreover, an equivalent 
formulation of (93), uttered in the given context, is'as unintelligible as is 
(92b): ý., It, `j 1 
1. 
(93b) Oh, quite well. He likes his colleagues, and 
he hasn't been to prison yet, but he is honest: 
Let us now consider (92c) and (86)Bc. The question that these"two 
formulations pose, is whether a conversational implicatureýcan be made explicit 
in conjunction with the sentence, the utterance of which gave rise to this 
implicature. Obviously, (92c) would leave the professor's audience puzzled 
or confused. Moreover, an utterance of its counterpart, (93c); in the given 
context, does not make much sense, either: 
(93c) Oh, quite well, I think. He, likes his colleagues 
and he hasn't been to prison yet, and he is dishonest. 
On the other hand, (86)Bc goes down quite well uttered outside normal hours of 
opening.. . 
This fact shows up the significant function of (92) and (93) with 
regard to the generation of conversational implicatures. -Once the implicature 
is spelt out the functionality of. the implicating utterance is overridden, and 
hence its presence not required. 
6.3 A redefinition 
,,, ., 
Whilst the application of the foregoing tests to (92) and (93) gives 
identical results, as regards (86) it does not. This fact gives evidence that 
whereas (92) and (93) instantiate the some. linguistic phenomenon, (86) does 
not. It is hoped that it has been convincingly argued that in both (92) and 
(93) the main import of the speaker's utterance is not 2, what is said, but-9, 
what is conversationally implicated. The various tests applied to these three 
examples showed that, unlike the other two cases, in (86) the main import of the 
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speaker's utterance is what is said. What is purportedly implicated, ä la 
Grice, is claimed, here, to be only what is assumed, as part of the co-partici- 
pants' common background knowledge. Being such, 9 in (86) cannot have 
been the speaker's main import of his utterance. .. Consequently, the speaker 
cannot be imputed with any specific intention to convey q,. by way of saying 
p. Instead the speaker in (86) says p, intends to convey that a, and qý- 
part of what is assumed as common, . 
factual knowledge - is brought to bear 
on his utterance, if at all, solely by way of, having been triggered bye.: 
On the contrary, in both (92) and (93), g; the speake"r's'main import of 
his utterance, i. e. his conversational implicature, does not constitute, or is 
thought of as not constituting, part of the hearer's assumed background knowledge. 
Therefore, q is considered to be new, and possibly significant, information for the 
hearer. 
Moreover, it has been shown that the utterance of a; 'i. e. what is said, in 
(92) and (93), is of very little communicative significance. Its formulation can 
vary, but it can still give rise to the some implicature, given the same circum- 
stances (e. g. 'He hasn't been arrested yet, ') Indeed, the truth-value of a 
does not seem to matter to the generation and truth-valuation of q. As Grice 
noted, "the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of 
ff+ 
what is said or by 'putting it that way' ' (1975, p. 58). But whilst Grice 
argued that "what is said maybe true - what is implicated may be false", 
f 
(ibid., p. 58), we would like to add that, indeed, it may well be the other way 
round, as well. In a genuine implicature, p may be obviously false, and yet 
one can thereby felicitously implicate that q, and q may be true. It follows, 
therefore, that the meaning of the implicature is different from the conventional 
meaning of the implicating sentence. 
2 
Suffice it to say, that these observations 
do not carry over to (86). 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that, as argued in chapter 5,. the, 
question of whether, the CP is observed, is not to be raised trivially, as Grice 
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might have it. The observance of some form of the CP is assumed to hold 
a priori, that is, it is assumed to obtain in the background of any potential" 
speech activity. Hearers, therefore, do not trivially appeal to it'in the 
obvious case of its observance. The question of the observance of the CP, 
and its maxims, is raised only in cases in which they are violated in some 
way. As has been seen, whilst in (92) and'(93) the hearer has to actively 
assume that the CP is observed (i. e. raise the question of whether this is so) 
this is not the case in (86); (86) does not exhibit any violation of the CP, 
or maxims thereof. Summarizing, therefore, the important point so for 
seems to be that: 
- g, the conversational implicature, must not be: 
(i) part of what is assumed by both A and B (speaker and 
addressee) and known to be such; or, 
(ii) such that it follows from what is assumed, together 
with what is said, without any assumption that the CP 
is being observed. 
- 
Implicit in (ii) is that in genuine cases of conversational implicatüre, ''the 
CP, or maxims, must be violated. Now, we would like to claim that for a 
conversational implicature to be generated, at''least one maxim must be 
deliberately and apparently violated. This violation will actually alert the 
addressee to the presence of the implicature. The violation, being apparent, 
i. e. at the level of what is said only, will have to be settled at the level of 
what is implicated. Another feature that is of significance here, is the 
speaker's deliberate violation of the CP in the process of the generation of the 
conversational implicature. Therefore, the role of intention in conveying 
an implicature is significant. On our view, the notion of intention is a sine 
qua non for the generation of conversational implicatures. We would thus 
have to argue that the presence of an implicature would have to depend on the 
speakerY intentions and not merely on his assumptions, as is, perhaps reluctantly, 
conceded in Grice, 1978, p. 120. 
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Suffice 
: 
it to say that since "conversational implicature is a pragmatical 
phenomenon, it is a characteristic of contextualized speech activities and not 
of isolated utterances. It, therefore, primarily figures in contextualized 
adjacency sequences. 
In conclusion, it has been suggested that the mode of inference character- 
izing conversational implicate should be as follows: 
A says p 
II B's active assumption that the CP is followed. 
Analysed: (a) A is in violation of the CP as evidenced in a 
(6) A's breach is found to be only apparent on 
the grounds that, 
III A, having no grounds for opting out of the conversational 
activity, must intend B to argue to some q. 
IV Given and CK and on the strength of 11 and III B is to argue 
Jo q. 
A 
B= 
CK = 
Clearly, this analysis is given from B's perspective. 
speaker 
addressee 
context and common, background, knowledge, 
and assumptions 
The constraints on q, which however are implicit in'the analysis`, sire as in 
(i) and (ii). "-. It thus follows that p is incremental, and not thought of as part of 
already assumed facts. by B. Whilst conversational implicata have often been 
identified with items of our common background knowledge in the literature, this 
definition will not allow instances of assumed background knowledge to be thus 
hypostatized. In other words, A is not permissible In this definition: 
(A) CK -4 q -ý = gives the to 
+ CK .4q 
A definition along these lines is motivated by the view that "the presence of a 
194 
conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out" (Grice, 1975, 
p. 50) rather than intuitively grasped. As Cole, 1975, put it: 
If cases in which there is an. immediate perception of 
meaning are grouped with cases in which a deduction 
has taken place, the` distinction that motivated Grice's 
use of conversational principles in the first place will 
be lost. 
yam, . .. (p. 272) 
6.4 Further criteria: - cancellabilit , detachability, and the vehicles of imp icature 
The application of the tests"of cancellability and detachability can be re- 
examined in the light of a redefinition of conversational implicature along the 
lines suggested here, with a view to considering whether they can be sufficient 
and/or necessary criteria for the identification of the presence of a conversational 
implicatum. We suspect that the outcome of such an examination would be a 
uniform application of such criteria, as well as, of criteria regarding the vehicles 
of the implicature. In 5.1, it was found that the vehicles of the implicature 
in example (92) ('Jones' handwriting is beautiful and his English is good') were 
(b) 'the speaker' and (d) 'his saying that', in the various formulations we proposed 
therein. There are grounds for believing that these two vehicles will be 
applicable to all cases of conversational implicature as defined here. There 
are also grounds for believing that, whilst conversational implicatures will be 
non detachable - identical context presumed - they will be cancellable 
explicitly, though there is a possibility of claiming that the (conversational) 
implicature still goes through. They can also be cancellable according to 
context; however, there is a caveat: The claim made by Grice that all 
conversational implicatures are cancellable is vacuous in so for as the can- 
cellation depends on the context. Since conversational implicature is a 
pragmatical feature of language use, it cannot be identified outside the context 
of a fully contextualized speech activity. 
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This redefinition, therefore, has the merit of making it a distinct 
possibility that the same doctrine in relation to two tests can be applied to 
all instances for determining the presence of conversational implicata. This 
would be a positive gain because the systematic application of further criteria 
would contribute to a more adequate and rigorous account. - 
Another point to be noticed is that 'MR' ('Maxim of Relation') seems to 
be the one most prominently violated in cases of conversational implicature. 
This supposition gel Is with the assumption that 'MR' is weightier than the 
remaining maxims (see the next section). Characteristically, in adjacency 
pairs featuring conversational implicatures, in which 'MR' is violated, the need 
for other contextual factors in its derivation is often significantly diminished. 
For example, in relation to (92) it can be plausibly claimed - contra Grice - 
that the professor gives primarily irrelevant information, rather than less than is 
required. Had he been in a position to have said that Jones is either good or 
bad at Philosophy, nobody would have required the information he actually 
gave about his handwriting and his proficiency in English. Hence, we are 
inclined to say that it is 'MR' that is violated - or at least primarily 'MR' - 
rather than 'M. Ouant', as Grice claims. 
6.5 On the significance of Relevance 
It was mentioned in 6.3 that context, both linguistic and situational, is 
of paramount importance in cases of conversational implicature. Further, it 
was noted that, being a pragmatical feature, conversational implicature figures 
mainly in adjacency pairs, as these constitute the minimal formulation of inter- 
actional speech activities. 
Adjacency sequences give rise to certain expectancies in relation to what 
, comes next. 
This kind of expectancy is to be thought of as part of the domain 
of the Maxim of Relevance. However, little work has been done in the area 
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of Relevance (but see Kosher, 1976, Dascal, 1977, Holdcroft, 1980, Wilson 
and Sperber, 1979) and even less is understood about the way this maxim works. 
Grice acknowledges this fact in his William James Lectures; he writes that 
among the unanswered questions is that of relevance: 
Also needed: a clarification of. the. notion of relevance, 
and a more precise specification of when relevance is 
expected (filling out the maxim of relevance) and also a 
further consideration of why there is a general expectation .,.. that this maxim (and indeed alI maxims) be observed. 
QV, p. 12) 
Besides, the maxim of Relevance is the only one to be left completely un- 
explicated; Grice does not distinguish any submaxims therein, but instead he 
writes: 
... a its formulation conceals a number of problems which 
exercise me a good deal; questions about what different 
kinds and foci of relevance there maybe, how these shift 
in. the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact 
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, 
and so on. 3 
(1975, p. 46) 
He also notes that a specification of the nature of conversation depends in a 
large measure on the specification` of "the nature of Relevance and of the circum- 
stances in which it is required" (ibid. , p. 49). 
Although Grice acknowledges the significance of this maxim, he does. not 
seem to think that it is weightier than the rest. On the contrary, he. writes 
in relation to the maxim of Quality, that its importance "is such that it should 
not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come 
into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied" 
(1975, p. 46). He does not propose a hierarchy of the maxims though, partly 
because of the equal role they seem to play in the generation of implicatures. 
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'' However, we feel that the maxim of Relevance is weightier than all 
other maxims in so for as it determines the structure of conversation, and 
because other maxims often seem to be governed by it. For instance, the 
maxim of Quality enjoins truth in our everyday conversational transactions, 
but it is a patent truth that this is' notso (cf. O'Hair, 1969, 'Sacks, ' 1975, 
Heritage, 1978). Whether' our conversational contril ution should be a 
true one, depends, to a great extent, on relational parameters that would 
belong to the domain of the maxim of Relevance: Who is it addressed to? 
What are his presumed background assumptions? What is the relevant focus 
of conversation at the moment of our contribution? What is the overall 
conversational goal? or - What do we take the local intentions , of, 
the other, 
party to be in relation to our talk-exchange or his, utterance? -, For, example, 
ras shown in Sacks, 1975, our answer to a 'How are you? ' is often determined 
,. in relation to who the recipient. is. - To one we may answer with a-'Fine', 
to another with a 'Lousy', and this is why, as Heritage, 1978,, points out, ., _ ;. 
"the milkman remains untroubled by the endless round of. -'fines', in, response to 
his daily queries. , He, does not assume, the universal felicity of his customers 
because he is not oriented to the truth content of their response but rather to 
the sequential implicativeness of those responses, to the fact that they do not 
project the relevance of any further enquiries" (p. 19). ,.., 
Funny situations are often engendered by violating some form, of the 
maxim of Relevance, as when we make our response relevant to what was 
previously said, but not to the intention with which it was said; i. e. when 
we (deliberately? ) mistake one illocutionary force for another, or, as Searle, 
1975, would have it, when we }make , 
our response relevant to the secondary 
rather than, to the primary illocutionary force of the previous speech-act. 
Consider, for example, a scene in a reputable restaurant, where a customer 
all of a sudden starts stripping off. The waitress goes up to caution him: 
Waitress: Please, Sir, remember where you are. 
Customer: I know very well where I am, at the Barn Restaurant. 
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Or a talk-exchange in which A asks B the reason for his visit to Chicago. 
,, A: ' What brought you from Finley to Chicago? 
B: 'A plane. 
Or, another scene, in which an ex-army officer opens a trunk full of rifles at 
: his house and in the presence of a friend, picks up one, and, apparently 
intending to tell a story, assumes an appropriately mysterious expression and 
asks B:. -.,. ,. 
A: Do you know what. these are? 
B: (looking at A nonchalantly) Rifles? 
All these-funny situations depend on some form of failure in making our 
response relevant to the previous speech-act, by way of either ignoring the 
other party's intention and purpose in his utterance, or failing to take into 
account the presumed common assumptions pertaining to the speech activity' 
(i. e. We all know and we know that we know that they are rifles). 
4 It need 
not be pointed out, though, that they are all truthful responses, and hence the 
maxim of Quality can be said to be therein observed. Besides, there is no 
obvious. way in which it could be plausibly claimed that 'M. Quant' is at fault 
('violated', 'flouted', 'infringed'; Grice's use of these terms is rather indis- 
criminate and vague) without having to appeal to 'MR' first. 
A similar example, exhibiting inattention to other party's presumed factual 
knowledge, is provided by Lodge; 1962: 
5 
'One what? ' exclaimed Ludlow. 
'One egg-poacher' 
(i) 'What the fugg's that for? ' 
(ii) 'For poaching eggs. ' 
'I know its for poaching eggs you funny bastard. 
What's it doing in the P. R. I. cupboard? ' 
(P" 77) 
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Yet, not only is (ii) a truthful response, but it is also in conformity with the 
maxim of Quantity. Nevertheless, it is irrelevant to (i) in certain respects, 
and hence infuriating for the other party. 
Further, the speaker's intentions often determine whether, or to what 
extent, he should observe 'M. Qual'. The truth quality of our utterances 
may be geared to the perlocutionary effect we want to achieve, rather than to 
what we believe to be true. As for the role of scruples, it often seems to be 
insignificant. Recall Anthony's speech'to the mob and the repetitions-of 
what he believed to be untruths: 
do desire no more. 
And Brutus is an honourable man. - 
speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke. 
Anthony's utterances, being governed by his intentions, leave little room for 
truthfulness. It is not here argued that there is not a maxim enjoining that 
our utterances be truthful. But it is pointed out that it often seems to be sub- 
ordinated to other considerations relating to relevance. 
Relational parameters, like rank, office and status of the parties involved 
in a talk-exchange also seem to outweigh maxims of Quality. An example is 
to be found again in Lodge, 1962: 
It was the special delight'of the N. C. O. s to ask questions which 
could only be answered to one's disadvantage within the framework 
of military discipline. In the following illustration the words in 
italics, ere underline] represent possible truthful replies which 
had to be suppressed for obvious reasons. 
'What's all this shit? ' 
'I don't see any shit. ' 
'I don't know, Sergeant. ' -" 
'Well, I'm telling you, it's shit, See? ' 
'No' 
'Yes, Sergeant' 
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'Did yoü"cleäri'your kit last night? ' 
'Of course I'did as you very well know. ' 
'Yes, Sergeant' 
'Well yoü didn't clean it properly, `did you? ' 
'Yes' 
' No, 
, 
Sergeant'. 
'Why not?, ' ., ' 
'Firstly, I don't accept that my equipment isn't properly cleaned. 
Secondly, if it isn't cleaned to your satisfaction, that's because 
you are not to be satisfied. T ird ,, u 
know and now t at 
it's a question of no importance, that you have to pick on some- 
t ing to establish your authority, and t at we are going through 
an elaborate and meaningless ritual to create the illusion that 
am being made a soldier of. ' 
'I don't know Sergeant' 
' What are you? ' 
'A bloody sight more `intelligent than you, for 6 start. "' 
'Idle, Sergeant' 
(pp. 58-59) ' ý,, , 
By focusing on the maxim of Relevance we do not want to imply that the 
rest, of the maxims are unproblematic. For example, one of the submaxims of 
Manner, instructs: 'Avoid ambiguity'. Yet, there are instances in which we 
deliberately build our utterances ambiguously without intending the addressee to 
perceive the ambiguity, and hence without implicating something or other thereby 
(cf. Weiser, 1974). Another submaxim instructs:, 
_'Be 
brief'. But often 
,: 
brevity is sacrificed in the names of politeness (cf. Leech, 1981), chivalry, or 
prudence (cf. R. Lakoff, 1973a). But these issues, too, often seem to be 
governed by such factors as attention to social setting, or status of addressee, or 
relationship between the parties involved. In other words, we can see the 
maxim of Relevance "raising its ugly head" again (Kempson, 1975). But even 
when relational parameters do not seem to affect other maxims, we do not under- 
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stand why someone who has said "She has gone to her final rest°, -thereby 
breaching the maxim 'Be brief', does not implicate anything (cf. Holdcroft, 
1976b), whereas someone, -who 
has said "Miss X produced a series of sounds 
which corresponded closely with the score of 'Home Sweet Home'" (Grice, 
1975), has thereby generated an implicature. 
Kasher, 1976, dispenses with the CP, as 
described in Grice, 1975, and 
instead sees the conversational maxims as derived directly from'a rationality 
principle: 
(R) Given a "desired end, one is to choose that action 
which most effectively, and at least cost, attains 
that end, ceteris paribus. 
. 
(p"205) 
(R), he claims, is in Grice's spirit (cf. Grice, 1975, p. 47). By disposing of 
a mediatory, general cooperative principle of linguistic action, the advantages 
accrued are that the maxims "do not presume the existence of mutual ends for 
talk-exchanges, but merely the existence of an advantage for limited cooperation, 
in favor of each of the participants according to his own ends" (ibid., p. 210). 
This approach seems to solve the problem raised with the notion of co- 
operation concerning our linguistic acts in certain situations, such as in courtrooms 
(cf. Holdcroft, 1978b, Levinson, 1978b). The two parties' (defence-prosecution) 
incompatible goals in their speech acts can be viewed as conforming to some form of 
a general rationality principle, rather than to a cooperative principle.. E. g. , the 
precision with which language has to be used in courtroom situations, in which 
there are conflicting goals, is, but one characteristic. 
6 For example, the 
following fragment, cited in Pollner, 1979, p. 232, `''" 
Judge: How do you plead? 
Defendant: Well, I guess guilty. 
Judge: Well, is it guilty? 
,ý 
Defendant: Yes, guilty ... 
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illustrates the demand for linguistic precision in court. 
7 Another example 
illustrating the manipulation of imprecise language to the detriment of the 
defendant, would be the following: 
Prosecutor: Were you upstairs or downstairs when your 
father came in? 
Defendant: I think I was upstairs. " '17 - 
Prosecutor: (addressing the Jury) She thinks she was upstairs ... 
However, from this fact we need not assume that Grice's principles are 
relaxed in certain situations. or, worse, that in everyday linguistic situations 
parts of what we understand, that are not spelt out, are implicated. To take 
an example, (i) B is not intended to mean that B has not read the Economist, 
(i) A: Did you see last week's Economist? 
B: No. 
when it is uttered as a response to A who is obviously looking for something. 
On the other hand, uttered in the context of a discussion on politics, may well 
be intended to mean that B did not read the Economist. From this, however, 
we need not conclude that B, in the latter situation, implicates that he did not 
read the Economist, as has been claimed (cf. Levinson, 1978a). Indeed, 
one of the meanings of see, given in The Oxford English Dictionary, under the 
heading /ignification and uses] reads: "To look at, read (a book, document, 
etc. ). " 
In conclusion, it seems that the conversational maxims had better be seen 
as deriving from a broader principle of rationality rather than from a cooperative 
principle. This would be congruent with the view that language be seen 
within an interactional framework as part of a theory of action. Further, the 
maxim of Relevance seems to be more crucial in the domain of linguistic activity. 
Not only does, it provide for the coherence of utterances, but it also has to 
account for the ways speech events relate to situations, and how the` latter 
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determine the various forms in which linguistic acts are to be understood. 
These interrelationships are complicated, and very little work has been done 
in the area to unravel the intricacies involved. 
The other question that . has to be raised is whether, or to what extent, the 
maxim of relevance dominates the other maxims and hence, whether they are to 
be ordered and subordinated to it. (cf. Dascal, 1977). This question, however, 
presupposes that, at least, a partial solution must first be given to the painful 
question of how relevance works and in what terms it is to be specified. Ob- 
viously, 'semantic' notions of relevance will not do. For example, Dascal, 
1977, in arguing that (86) B ('There is a garage round the corner') is not a case 
of implicature, offers the following argument: 
When the semantic connection is obvious, the relevance 
is obvious and there is no need to make use of the 
principles of conversation in order to give a satisfactory 
explanation of the utterance. 
However, although he is right about the absence of any conversational implicature 
in (86)B, he seems to be wrong as for as his explication of the relevance between 
the two utterances (A: 'I'm out of petrol', B: 'There's a garage round the 
corner') is concerned. Surely, B in (86) could have responded to A's utterance 
with (i), 
(1) B: Garages should sell lead-free petrol, 
in which the semantic connections do not provide a method whereby (i) can be 
construed as relevant to (86)A. Mutatis mutandis, this criticism carries over 
to Halliday, 1967. 
In other words, relevance cannot be adequately defined in terms of either 
semantic relations, or lexical cohesion and tendencies of collocations of lexical items, 
(cf. Halliday, 1967) without specifying other interrelations that hold between 
them, and which might warrant us seeing them as parts of structured, stereotypical 
sets. 
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Finally, it seems as if we had better study Grice's maxims in a unitary 
perspective, rather than study and analyse each one of them in isolation from 
the rest, as has been the case in the past, (cf. Kempson, 1975, Gazdar, 1976) 
since they seem to interact to a considerable degree. 
yv6}, 
rt, 
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7. TWO CLASSES OF CONTEXT: CURRENT MUTUAL CONTEXTUAL ASS%, 
UMPTIONS AND STANDING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS 
Lyons, 1968, refers to the general knowledge and presuppositions shared 
by the participants in a conversation as "restricted contexts" of utterances and 
notes that they are "comparatively rare, since most utterances depend for their 
understanding upon the information contained in previous utterances" (p. 419). 
The participants in a conversation draw upon the particular context of the utter- 
once in order to understand it; by 'particular context' we understand not only 
situational features but also all the utterances in the same discourse that have 
preceded the one that is in focus and which, therefore, have become part of the 
context (cf. Lyons, 1968, Winograd, 1972, Isard, 1975, Karttunen and Peters, 
1975, Venneman, 1975, Harder and Kock, 1976, Schegloff, 1976, Stalnaker, 
1977,1978, Schnelle, 1979). 
It is useful therefore to distinguish between the immediate context of an 
utterance and the general knowledge and beliefs of the participants in a talk- 
exchange since the latter are not always activated in understanding what is 
conveyed in an utterance. We would like to call the former class 'Current 
Mutual Contextual Assumptions' (henceforth CMCAs), and the latter 'Standing 
Background Knowledge and Beliefs' (henceforth "SBKBs). 
7.1 'Current Mutual Contextual Assumptions' 
In the former class we include first of all the linguistic context of the utter- 
ance, i. e. all the utterances preceding the one in focus, which are taken to 
constitute part of the context. Preceding discourse may extend back in time 
and may have been interrupted and resumed. Secondly, the relevant status 
of the participants and spatio-temporal features that are relevant to the under- 
standing of the utterance. In this class we will also include any particular 
relevant knowledge, beliefs and assumptions shared, and known to be shared, by 
both or all participants and connected with the conversation at issue and the 
participants. 
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A number of such features relevant to the intended understanding of an 
utterance are given by Holdcroft (1978a, pp. 157ff). However,, this 
contextual class must be defined strictly in relation to the ongoing conversation. 
As Holdcroft puts it: 
It is prima facie plausible to suppose that there has to be 
a principled limit on what can count as part of the ' 1' 
relevant context, otherwise it would inexorably unfold 
to include everything. 
(ibid., p. 163) 
We call such features current because they are pertinent to the ongoing 
talk-exchange and because they do not necessarily have any status in felicitous 
communication in general. , We call them mutual because they are believed 
to be shared by both/all participants in stalk-exchange. We use`the term 
'assumptions' to do general service for the class of words, like 'knowledge' and 
'beliefs', that are relevant to the ongoing conversation. However, 'assumptions' 
is preferred to 'knowledge' because, firstly,, these features may not necessarily be 
true, but are rather assumed to be true; and, secondly, because the term 
'knowledge' may have unwanted connotations with our 'permanent' stock of 
knowledge, many items of which may not be connected with any ongoing con- 
versation. Indeed we reserve this term for our second contextual class. 
Further, 'assumptions' is preferred to 'beliefs' because the term 'beliefs' may 
connote idiosyncratic ways of perceiving our surrounding environment, and 
because it may also refer to our general beliefs. This term, too, is reserved 
for the other contextual class. Lastly, these features are called 'contextual' 
because they are germane to the utterance in focus; they are invoked by the 
utterance in the process of (our) understanding it and they constitute its immediate 
context. 
In our effort to interpret the Lakoff's examples of the 'denial of expectation 
but' we first appealed, as we have seen, to such contextual features - though 
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they had to be constructed - that have here been called CMCAs, because we 
recognized that utterances are not issued in vacua. They have a 'context', 
and therefore our interpretation must not divorce them from such a context. 
7.2 Standing Background Knowledge and Beliefs 
The other class of 'context' - and here 'context' has'to be understood 
in a very broad sense - has been referred to as Standing Background Knowledge 
and Beliefs (SBKBs). The word 'knowledge' is meant to cover all our back- 
ground, general knowledge of the world that has been accumulated in our lives, 
and the word 'beliefs' is meant to include beliefs that are not so obviously 
related to factual states of affairs, as well as our beliefs about other people's 
beliefs. Our knowledge and beliefs are not of course co-extensive with 
everybody else's, but there is a considerable overlap which facilitates our 
everyday dealings. Without the existence of this overlap society could not 
function. Moreover, the terms 'knowledge' and 'beliefs' are meant to 
cover our knowledge of widespread beliefs and convictions that, however, are 
not shared by everybody and may not be mutual to both the speaker and the 
hearer. Therefore, if I hear the following utterance in the context of a 
discussion about Italian politics, 
The fascists struck again, 
I can understand that 'the fascists' is intended to refer to the Red' Brigade 
although I, myself, may believe that the members of the so-called Red Brigade 
are extreme leftists and not fascists, as my interlocutor believes. ` We call 
such features 'standing' and 'background' because they form a permanent part 
of our general knowledge of the world. However, none of these features 
need be true - they are therefore subject to change. It suffices that they ,,.. 
are presumed to be true. 
Of course, there is no clear line to be drawn between these fwd classes, 
the broadly defined context and the narrowly defined one; the distinction can, 
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admittedly, be rather fuzzy on the borderline. However we think it is of 
some utility, and therefore worth making. This distinction is not meant to 
imply that these two classes are mutually exclusive. Indeed, very often they 
are both at play; we often have to appeal to both contextual classes in order 
to understand what is conveyed in an utterance. However, we must not lose 
sight of the fact that our invocation of any particular part of our SBKBs is always 
activated by the relevant CMCAs via what we hear or via the perceived context. 
The need to appeal to SBKBs is always to be found within the CMCAs (which 
includes, as has been noted, all preceding utterances). It cannot be, over- 
emphasized that the immediate context of an utterance (CMCAs) always has 
precedence over any other context - indeed it could be argued that our 
SBKBs should not be called 'context' at all. However, felicitous communi- 
cation is often dependent on our stock of SBKBs. For example the-answer 
'It's not lunchtime yet' to the question 'What time is it? ' is a satisfactory answer 
in virtue of the assumption of the existence of SBK. It is part of my standing 
knowledge of the world that lunchtime occurs ' between' twelve and one o'clock, so 
the answer to my question was satisfactory and accurate givenIcertain conditions; 
for example, that I have no reason to believe that my respondent' wants to deceive 
me (in that case I wouldn't have asked him in the first place); "' and generally, 
that the CP is adhered to, which is taken for granted and is not questioned except 
in'particular cases. But the invocation of that part of our SBKBs that, by 
'supplementing' the respondent's reply ('It's not lunchtime yet')', gives us the 
sought after knowledge that it is not quite 12 o'clock yet, is activated by the 
relevant CMCAs - in this case, the preceding question 'What time is it? ' This 
need not be the case in a different context in which different CMCAs would obtain. 
However, if the answer to the some question is 'It's not time yet, dear', we 
appeal to the CMCAs in order to understand the utterance. If it is known to the 
addressee that the speaker is interested in watching a programme on the TV - and 
he has this knowledge because of something said previously, or because of his 
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"r:. 
knowledge of the speaker's habitual actions .- and moreover 
the speaker is 
aware of the addressee's knowledge - then the response she gets has a fair 
chance of being deemed satisfactory. If however the speaker is interested 
in knowing the exact time because she wants to time her pressure cooking, then 
this response is not thought to be satisfactory; the answer 'It's not time yet' 
to the question 'What time is it? ' is not a satisfactory answer if it is to be 
considered in vacua,, that is abstracted from the CMCAs that are relevant to 
it. Indeed, if we have to consider the appropriateness of this response we 
are most likely to resort to concocting an appropriate context in which this 
response could be appropriately uttered. 
This distinction will help us to distinguish between what is conveyed in 
the utterance of (i) 'I love you like my brother', (drawn from Bach and Harnish, 
op. cit. ) when it is uttered in the context of CMCAs giving us the knowledge that 
the speaker hates his brother, and when it is uttered in a situation in which no 
such relevant CMCAs obtain. In the former case what is intended to be 
conveyed to the hearer is that the speaker hates the addressee, while in the 
latter case the intended meaning of the utterance coincides with what is said 
in virtue of the meaning of the word 'love', and of our knowledge that brothers 
generally love each other. If we do not make such a distinction between these 
, 
two sets, of our beliefs, but lump them together under the term of 'Mutual 
Contextual Beliefs' as Bach and Harnish do, then we will not be in a position to 
differentiate between cases of the utterance of the above sentence when the 
intended meaning coincides with the conventional meaning of the words' uttered 
and cases in which the intended meaning of the utterance is the opposite of that 
of what is said. The addressee does not have to infer what is meant in the 
former case. In the latter case, however, the addressee will have to infer 
what is meant by this utterance. And his inference will not be 'short-circuited', 
as Bach and Harnish might have it, but conscious. 
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Moreover, if we do not differentiate between a narrowly defined relevant 
context on which successful communication depends and tFie speaker's beliefs in 
general, there will be no grounds for the determination of relevant circumstances 
which standardly affect communication. This point is brought out. very clearly . 
in Holdcroft, 1978a, p. 163: 
.., if the speaker's aim 
is to bring about a certain effect in 
an audience, which effect he intends to produce by doing 
something in certain circumstances, he would have very 
little chance of succeeding if the relevant features of the 
circumstances could be anything whatsoever. For the 
chance that his audience would light on the right feature 
would in that case be exceedingly small. So the 
irrelevance of the vast majority of S's beliefs is hardly 
surprising. If any one of them could. be relevant, then 
it is very unlikely that the speaker would guess which one 
was. Additionally, if any belief whatsoever could be 
relevant in each case, it is difficult to see how there could 
be any systematic way of marking and classifying the ways 
in which it was relevant. 
7.3 The significance of SBKBs and CMCAs exemplified -. 
: i-. 
Background knowledge (SBKBs), by-supplying the'means, i. e. the relevant 
information, for interpreting sentences or clauses relative to each other, inäy'öften 
play a central role in understanding what is said'or read, as a connected discourse. 
Let us, then, consider some ways in which items from SBKBs are invoked in under- 
standing what is said. 
To begin with,. they often aid us in selecting the. intended antecedent for a 
pronoun. Consider an example quoted in Wilks', 1976; I 
(1) John went into a supermarket and put some soap in the 
basket. On impulse, he put a bar of chocolate in 
his pocket, ' but, when, he reached the checkout, his 
face went red and he said 'I didn't mean to take it. ' 
As Wilks points out, "Example (1) established the need of an item of knowledge"; 
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that is, in order to decide the reference of the pronoun it in (1), we must know 
what constitutes bad behaviour in a supermarket. f r.. - 
However, Clark and Haviland, 1977, report results of a study by Springston, 
which claim that the listener generally tries for antecedents for simple pronouns, 
first in the same clause, and then moves backwards. 
one is determined by a process of elimination. 
eliminable antecedent, his search is terminated. 
(2) John said that Mary shot him 
(3) John said that Bill shot him, 
His choice of the correct 
1 -4 a non- UponY locating' 
Therefore in (2) and (3), 
the listener starts his search first in the same clause, eliminates Mary and Bill 
on semantic and syntactic grounds respectively, and then goes backwards in order 
to find an antecedent. In finding the first antecedent that is not eliminable, 
i. e. John, the search is terminated. 
Springston's results may provide an explanation for our choice of 'a bar of 
chocolate' for the antecedent for it in (1) on grounds of proximity. If this is 
so, then, it may be argued, Wilk's claim that example (1) establishes the need 
for an item of knowledge;. what we would call an item of SBKBs, may be mistaken. 
However, this can hardly be so, as will be seen below. 1,1, 
Clark and Haviland, 1977, raise some questions regarding Springston's 
s trage g y: 
If Springston is right, the listener considers some candidate 
antecedents before others, eliminates them on syntactic 
and semantic grounds wherever possible, and settles on the 
candidate antecedent that cannot be eliminated. But 
this characterization is for from complete. IF cannot 
handle antecedents not directly derivable from prior 
sentences, and it provides no rule to say when to search 
further for a direct antecedent or when to draw an 
implicature for an indirect antecedent. 
(p. 29, our emphasis) 
212 
Note that Clark and Haviland do not consider Springston's strategy implausible, 
but only incomplete. One deficiency is that Springston's hypothesis does not 
provide any means for deciding between two or more candidate antecedents when 
there are no grounds of proximity or exclusion on which such a decision can be 
based. (4), drawn from Isard, 1975, illustrates this problem, which cannot be 
handled by Springston's strategy, since it is not clear whether the antecedent for 
it is 19 or its square: 
(4) First take the square of 19 and then cube it. 
2 
Even if Springston's hypothesis can tackle cases like (2), without any appeal 
to 'items' of knowledge 
3 
it is still disconfirmed, not because of the problems raised 
by Clark and Haviland, but, because of cases in which, though there are non- 
eliminable antecedents in proximity to the pronoun, our SBKBs are activated by the 
semantic structure of the sentences, and help us to select an antecedent farther 
away, probably, in a previous sentence, when trying to understand what we hear, 
or read as a piece of discourse. Consider, for example, (5), 
(5) The milkman said he would not deliver milk any longer. 
John said that his brother insulted him. 
In (5), according to Springston's hypothesis, John is the most likely candidate for 
the antecedent for him, as it is not excluded either on syntactic or semantic 
grounds, and satisfies the condition that it be the most proximate candidate ante- 
cedent to the pronoun. 'Yet out of 38 subjects, only 9 selected John for the 
intended antecedent for him. The rest, 28, selected the milkman. -,, (One 
subject selected 'his brother'. ) Subjects can generate a relationship between 
the two sentences of (5), which is based on their SBKBs, and can thus interpret 
the one sentence relative to the other. , By generating this interrelation the 
two sentences in. (5) can be understood as an integrated whole, i. e. as a text. 
The motivation for generating such interrelationships, whenever SBKBs provide 
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fertile ground for it, lies in our knowledge that "Icinguage does'n`ot*occur in 
stray words or sentences, but in`cdnnected discourse" (Harris, 1952,1964, 
p. 357), `and; 'therefore, in our orientation to word's `comprehending language 
en bloc. ' 
The listener will either search for an antecedent in the preceding linguistic 
context ('anaphora', Halliday and Mason, 1976), or in the situation ('exophoric 
reference' or 'exophora', ibid. ). If no such antecedent is derivable, then 
he expects that the speaker will provide him with'one in what is tofollow, as 
in (6), ('cataphora', ibid. ), I 
(6) David said that George killed him. Harry'was Tying 
in a pool of blood. 
The second sentence of (6) solves the listener's or reader's problem. 
Clearly, the listener or reader will try to locate or 'compute', as the 
psychologists would say, the antecedent, relations. in, the. immediate., vicinity of 
the lexical item that needs to be comprehended. In the absence of a complete 
text such relations may have to be computed in the context of the sentence. 
Springston's predictions are correct as for as the comprehension of isolated 
sentences is concerned. 
4 
But if a sentence is part of a broader linguistic 
or'situational context, this need not be the case, and Springston's predictions 
fail to capture the comprehension processes that are put to work. ' Arguably, 
a (linguistic) context has priority regarding the determination of what is under- 
stood. Results of experiments confirm the listener's or reader's urge to 
"comprehend at all costs" what is heard or read, and we should not lose sight 
of the fact that the optimum environment for comprehending what is said or 
read is the entire linguistic and/or situative context. We cannot test 
hypotheses about comprehension processes, as Springston's with such isolated 
sentences. 
5 
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In cases in which there is no readily detectable interrelation between 
sentences, subjects tend to take a longer time in trying to understand what 
they read as a text. Consider an example in Wilks, 1976, involving a 
scene from an unfamiliar event, a puberty rite, in which we cannot rely on 
any assumptions based on SBKBs, in order to understand what is said as a 
connected discourse. Yet, we are compelled to draw inferences, not 
warranted by our, general knowledge, but by what is said or read, in order 
to understand the connection between the two sentences in (7), 
(7) Little Komarthi's mother accidentally looked away,., 
dropped her, shoga, 
touched his arm, 
during the puberty rite. The , crowd drew back in horror. 
Wilks disregards our propensity to understand adjacent sentences as connected 
discourse when he writes that . `r '"'., ; -ý: 4, 
whatever knowledge was required to understand the story 
... was provided by general knowledge, in the form of inference rules - what I called the 'Martian's rule', 
which he formulates as follows: ti eh 
Zf umans display alarm, -Löther human performed bad action 
We may like to call such aan inference rule the 'Martian's rule' but, certainly, 
it is not drawn from, but, simply, is not incon pcitible with, oür general knowledge, 
as its name indicates after all. The generation of such rules is'motivated by 
your inclination to hear sentences as a story, i. e. each sentence cohering with the 
previous one. Whether this 'Martian's rule' will be 'stored' together with" 
other bodies of our background knowledge and, therefore, be legitimately 
called part of our background knowledge on future occasions, is another matter. 
11 1 It becomes clear, however, that this inference rule is not part of our. , 
general knowledge, but is rather not incompatible with it, if the example were 
made to read as follows: 
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(8) Little Tom's mother accidentally looked awa. 
dropped hery. shoga. 
touched his arm. 
The crowd drew back in horror. 
Here no'situational context is assumed and the expression 'during the puberty 
rite' is' left out. In (8) we would be at a, loss. to generate any interrelation 
between the two sentences so that we understand them as a text. --, It is obvious, 
therefore, that the inference rule in (7) is drawn via our lack of knowledge that 
would forma body of knowledge, i. e. a 'script' (see p. 226). This script is 
called up'by means of the expression puberty rite, which constitutes a familiar 
header of a script. The familiarity, however, ends there. It is exhausted 
by the header. - The phrase 
'during the puberty rite' introduces a script whose 
episodic structure is not known, as the contents of such a script are not part of 
our SBKBs. This phrase would be called a Locale Header (Schank and Abelson, 
1977, p. 49), and is familiar to us merely in the form of a script header. Such 
headers serve to introduce scripts, i. e. to call up, or activate, units of 7 
SBKBs. 
In this connection, Bransford and Johnson's, 1973, p. 412, results can be 
noted, of studies indicating subjects' tendency to incorporate 'odd' or 'irrelevant' 
- in relation to the title - sentences into the passage, by devising some sort of 
'rationale' for them. In Wilk's example, a body of knowledge, a script, is 
introduced, whose contents or subparts are unfamiliar, but, whose header is 
suggestive to us of the existence of a procedure familiar to other cultures. It 
is this fact that motivates the generation of the 'Martian's rule'. In the same 
vein (9), 
(9) He went into a Wimpy to have a sauna bath, 
is rejected as nonsensical by speakers of the language for whom the word 'Wimpy' 
calls up a specific unit of SBKBs, i. e. the restaurant script (cf. Schank and 
r'j. 
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Abelson, 1977,: 3.2). 
,= 
Some speakers will accept it on the condition that 
'sauna bath' is a name of a dish, and this 'rationale' or inference, call it what 
you will, is, again, based on our knowledge that restaurants tend to adopt 
exotic or strange names for their dishes. 
Our tendency to understand sequentially placed sentences as a text iv, 
distinctly manifested incases concerning the selection of antecedents for 
pronouns. Language users are well aware that, typically, in any text, 
"every sentence contains at least one anaphoric tie "connecting it with what 
has gone before" (HaI I iday and Hasan, 1976; p. 293). Subjects, therefore, 
may select a candidate fora pronoun in a preceding sentence, even if they 
"can't quite make sense" of the text thus generated, i. e. when an interrelation 
is not constructible, and despite the fact that a non-eliminable antecedent, 
a la 
Springston, is available in the same sentence as the pronoun. "' 
Consider (10), 
(10)' His father was a greengrocer. John said that his 
brother insulted him. 
Out Of 39 subjects, 12 opted for his father as the intended antecedent for him; 
22 for John and 1 for either. 4 selected 'his brother'. When presented 
with (11), 
(11) His father had a heart attack. John said his 
brother insulted him, 
66t of'39 subjects, 19 selected his father as the antecedent for him, 14 john, and 
3 said that it could be either. 3 subjects selected 'his brother'. ` Subjects 
generate a relation between the'act of 'insulting' and 'having a heart attack', 
based again on SBKBs. : They, therefore, select his father as the antecedent 
for him and, thus, understand (11) as a"discourse. The results of (11), however, 
are slightly different from those of (5). The, significant number of subjects who 
selected John as the'antecedent for him is explicable on the supposition that another 
part of our general knowledge is also called up; this is our knowledge of the 
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'family' frame (see p. 226) and, hence, our knowledge of interrelationships 
between its-members, whereas in (5) such an invocation of items of SBKBs is 
nöt activated. That is, his father can refer to John's father. and, conse- 
,aß. 3a ., F "' r 
quently, to his brother's father, as well. According to Sacks, 1972, the 
terms 'his father', 'John' and 'his brother', can be heard or read as referring 
to persons who are 'coincumbents' of the some categorization device, ' 'family'. 
The further item of our SBKBs invoked in this case, concerns the various inter- 
dependencies assumed to hold amongst such 'coincumbents', as was made explicit 
in some subjects' explanatory remarks accompanying their selection of John rather 
than of his father. The conclusion to be drawn is that we can still select 
John for the antecedent in (11), "and understand the two sentences as'related to 
each other, i. e. as text. 
Minsky, 1975, considers a relevant problem raised in Chamiak, 1974, which 
constitutes another counterexample to Springston's hypothesis, confirming the 
significance of"SBKBs in selecting antecedents for pronouns, and their precedence 
over syntactic and semantic rules. In a party situation 'a friend tells Jane, who 
wants to buy a present for Jack's birthday: 
He already has a kite. 
He will make you take it back. 
According to Springston's strategy the search for the antecedent for it starts in the 
same sentence and goes backwards. The first syntactically and semantically 
non-eliminable antecedent is the lexical item kite in. the first sentence. Yet, 
we alI know that it does not refer to the old kite. As Minsky points out, 
To determine the reference, of the pronoun it requires 
understanding a lot about an assumed scenario. Clearly, 
it refers to the proposed new kite. How does one know 
Mis? 
... 
Generally, pronouns refer to recently 
mentioned things, but as this example shows, the referent 
depends on more than the local syntax. `6 
(p. 241) 
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On more than the semantic structure, too, it should be added. 
In concluding, although'Springston's hypothesis may not be" totally ruled 
out, it is clear that, upon finding a syntactically and semantically acceptable 
antecedent in the same sentence, the search will not necessarily be terminated 
there. As Ziff, 1972a,: pointed out, 
Syntactic structure constitutes a vector serving to determine 
what is said but this vector can be modified by the action of 
other vectors. In particular, there are discourse factors, 
vectors activated in discourse, that can serve radically to 
alter the reading of sentences. 
(p. 33) 
The explanation lies in the fact that we do not understand language in isolated 
sentences but, rather, en bloch provided that a relation that will unite sentences 
or, utterances in one topical discourse piece is constructible. 
It could also be noted in passing that, contra Springston's results, if subjects 
are given a small, clue, when preser)ted with a sentence, in which only one an 
for the pronoun can be-located, they may select either this, or an. -.,,, .i 
exophoric one, as a small study indicated. 38 subjects were presented with 
the sentence, 
X-: I- Y-?. 
(12) John said that Bill shot him, 
preceded by the question, 
What does him refer to: X? Y? Z? .-0. , -e, 
Given this clue, 3 subjects'säid that it could refer either to X or Z, 8 selected 
only Z and the remaining 25 selected X. - (2 subjects selected Y. ). - At-this 
point it is worth quoting Winograd, 1972, p. 33: - - --- :. -= 
If we say 'The city councilmen refused the demonstrators 
--a permit because they feared violence', the pronoun: 'they' 
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will have a different interpretation than if we said 'The 
city councilmen refused the demonstrators a permit , 
because they advocated revolution. ' We understand 
this because of our sophisticated knowledge of council- 
men, demonstrators, and politics - no set of syntactic 
or semantic rules could interpret this pronoun reference 
without using knowledge of the world. Of course a 
semantic theory does not include a theory of political 
power groups, but it must explain the way in which this 
kind of knowledge can interact with linguistic knowledge 
in interpreting a sentence. 
The question that arises, however, is whether such background knowledge 
(SBKBs) or parts thereof, +can be represented in a structured way, and whether 
they are'theoretically for'malizable. In a similar example, 
(13) The soldiers fired at the women and I saw several 
of them fall, 
Wicks, 1975, proposes that in order to understand the reference of themAwe need 
aCommon-Sense (CS) inference rule. These rules are called in, he says, only 
when his proposed formal rules of, what he calls, Preference Semantics (PS), 
cannot resolve anaphoras as in (13) above. The CS inference rule invoked 
here will be expressed as follows: 
X(((NOTPLEASE(LIFE STATE), OBJE)SENSE)-X(NOTUP MOVE) 
or, simpliciter, as 'xfiurj7 - x5alj7. 
CS inference rules are no more than part of our "knowledge of the real world" 
(ibid.,. p. 343), according to Wilks. 
It could be argued, however, that the reference of them is determined by the 
most proximate noun phrase, and, in the case at issue, by the noun phrase, the 
women, which can be selected both on syntactic and semantic grounds. But 
Wilk's example could be (14): 
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(14) There were women present. The soldiers fired 
and I saw several of them fall to the ground, 
in which the soldiers are neither said to fire at the women, 'nor is the lexical 
item women most proximate to' the pronoun. Indeed, it'could be that the 
soldiers fired in the air and the women fell on the ground for protection; such 
an understanding is compatible with (14). In this case Wilk's CS inference 
rule, as formulated above, would not hold, since the causal relationship between 
being hurt and falling would not appear to hold. Yet, the majority of subjects 
selected women as the antecedent for them in (14). , It seems, therefore, that 
such inference rules are not so easilyxamenable to formalization. 
Such, items of knowledge, (SBKB), have been called 'presuppositional' (cf. 
the Lakoffs). 
7 However we can hardly call 'presuppositional' items of SBKBs 
that provide us with the inferences that can relate someone's having a heart 
attack with somebody else's insulting him, since such interrelations are by no 
means systematic. 
SBKBs have been characterized in Chomsky, 1975, p. 30, as "a vast back- 
ground of unspecified assumptions, beliefs, attitudes and conventions". Although 
he does not differentiate between the two classes of contextual knowledge disting- 
uished here, so that we cannot justifiably identify SBKBs with what, Chomsky may 
mean by such background knowledge, he does not, nevertheless, seem to include 
previous linguistic context in such background assumptions. The significance of 
such knowledge ivnoted, when he argues that background knowledge and beliefs - 
roughly what are here called SBKBs - interact with grammar to determine how 
sentences are interpreted. Thus, he claims that the specific interpretation of, 
for example, (15), 
(15) John's friends appealed to their wives to hate one another, 
is not solely determined by our knowledge of grammar, but by our factual knowledge 
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of the world. - As Chomsky, 1975, p. 141, puts it,, wA 
The 1-1 correlation between friends and wives derives in 
part from factual assumptions about monogamy, which also 
eliminate interpretation of 'one another' of the sort that 
are possible (indeed, I believe, favoured) when 'their 
wives' is replaced by 'their children'. 
Turning now to? the significance of CMCAs'in'communication; it is clear 
that such current contextual knowledge can resolve, what has been called, 
syntactic ambiguity. For example, (16), 
(16) Visiting relatives can be a nuisance, 
cannot be ambiguous in the presence of CMCAs. As Chomskyy, 1965, p. 21, 
points. out, 
If a sentence such as 'Flying planes can be dangerous' is 
-presented 
in an appropriately constructed context, the 
Iistener'will interpret it immediately in a unique way, 
and will fail to detect the ambiguity. 
CMCAs are also the key to resolving semantic ambiguity. For example, 
consider Katz and Fodor's, 
8 1963, example, 
' (17) The "stuff is light, 
in which 'light' may mean either light in colour or light in weight, if (17) is 
considered in abstraction from its 
linguistic and/or situational context. However, 
this can hardly be the case as language is used in speech situations and not in 
isolation. As Raskin, 1977, p. 222, pointed out, 
Katz and Fodor's sentence in isolation does not have a 
meaning for the simple reason that no sentence exists 
in isolation. 9 
Moreover, as argued in Olson, 1970, linguistic elaboration to disambiguate 
10 
(17) is not needed. in linguistic situations, because, 
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"a perceived context knowledge of the referenj7 may 
have precisely the same effect. -- 
(p. 260) 
Lehnert, 1980, p. 80, writes, 
People are able to 'effortlessly' arrive at the proper sense' 
of words which are potentially ambiguous. In fact, , improper word sense interpretations are never even 
considered. ... previous context provides suitable 
interpretive constraints. 
Further, Fi I lmore, 1977, notes that "it is misleading to separate a word from 
its context". However, it seems gratuitous to talk about the power of 
CMCAs for disambiguating utterances, since, as so succinctly put by Scheglöff, 
1976, 
The theoretically depictable ambiguities are derived by 
procedures that are not relevant to naturally occurring 
interaction, and therefore in natural contexts the .. -., . 
ambiguities are not there to disambiguate. 
Finally, a figure in Winston, 1975, can be taken as a graphic representation 
of the significance of context (CMCAs) in understanding. The importance of the 
role played by CMCAs can be schematized graphically in figure 10: 
": 
Figure 10 
f 
While object B seems to be a brick, object D seems to be a wedge. As Winston 
notes, 
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-`This is curious because B and D show exactly the same 
arrangement of lines and faces ... But of course 
context is the explanation. 
(p. 205) 
In a similar vein, not only can our understanding of utterances and whole 
passages be determined by specific CMCAs - often by way of activating 
different units of SBKBs - but, also, the inferences drawn from them will 
be different, according to the different CMCAs, in the context of which they 
are uttered (cf. Bransford and Johnson's, 1975, p. 415, 'stockbroker/unem- 
ployed man' passage). 
7.4 Experiments pointing to the particular nature of CMCAs as against the 
universality of SBKBs 
It has been noted that SBKBs can be inferred, provided that they are 
sufficiently activated during the ongoing speech activity and they do not 
clash - are not incompatible - with other items of SBKBs. Therefore, 
upon hearing (18), 
(18) He is a communist but he is not aggressive, 
in the absence of any particular CMCAs, the hearer will understand it via 
inferring that the speaker's SBKBs include an item such as 'Communists are 
generally aggressive'. 
I However, CMCAs can also 
be inferred, though this is not so common. 
Consider an example quoted in Bransford and Johnson, 1973, p. 389: 
(19) The floor' was dirty because Sally used the mop, 
which can be understood, 6y way of inferring a particular circumstance pertaining 
to the speech act in (19), i. e. that the mop was dirty. As Bransford and 
Johnson note, (19) is not 'self-contained' as it would be if 'so' were substituted 
for 'because' in it. 
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It is customary, however, in our speech, to leave out detailed conditions 
belonging to our SBKBs, just because they are, ''or can be, assumed to be generally 
held, and/or because they are easily inferred. Moreover a detailed' 
specification of everything we mean would impair rather than facilitate- 
communication, as noted in Ziff, 1972, p. 64: 
Discourse would tend to break down under the strain of 
explicitness. It is not merely that the resulting 
prolixity would be aesthetically unbearable: there 
would be a general failure of communication. 
On the other hand, CMCAs, being always connected with specific situations, 
and, therefore, constituting antecedent conditions for the comprehension of the 
speech act in question, are either linguistically, or situationally, specified prior 
to what is. intentionally conveyed in the speech act. Indeed, in this respect, 
CMCAs can be identified with what is presumed to be given in a speech situation. 
For example, the speaker'of (19) would either assume that his audience is aware 
of the fact that the mop was dirty, or, else, he would be more likely to utter 
(20), 
(20) The floor was dirty because Sally used a dirty mop. 
11 
Experiments indicating that detailed specification of CMCAs is often a 
prerequisite for understanding new information, when this hinges upon such ante- 
cedent conditions, have been reported in Bransford and Johnson, 1972,1973. 
Subjects were presented with a passage (balloon passage) 
12 
that made little sense 
without it being preceded by other previous information, since it discussed 
events that could happen, given some sort of a particular situation as a conceptual 
base. However, the situation was not described in the passage. The subjects' 
ratings of comprehension were very 
low as compared to their comprehension ratings, 
when they were presented beforehand with a picture illustrating the specific 
situation on which the passage was based. It must be pointed out that com- 
prehension in this case is expected to improve by advance presentation of either 
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detailed picture, illustrating the specific situation or a detailed linguistic 
description of it. This prerequisite can be attributed to the fact that the 
passage was based on particular CMCAs, what Bransford and Johnson call 
'novel contexts', as against SBKBs, what they call ' familiar contexts'. With 
regard to the 'balloon' passage, which, as noted, is based on CMCAs, a title, 
given in advance, did not facilitate understanding. Bransford and Johnson, 
1975, p. 406, conclude, 
Presumably, information about the specific structure of-the 
serenade e topic of the 'balloon' passag] ... is 
" necessary for understanding the balloon passage. , Know-. 
ledge of a relevant topic alone was not sufficient to 
increase comprehension and recall scores. 
This can be attributed to the supposition that in the balloon experiment, 
.., it was very unlikely that the appropriate prerequisite r-. 
context was (in all its details) part of the pre-experimental 
knowledge of the stbject 7. 
,, ,Y 
(Bransford and Johnson, 1972, P-721), . 
By contrast, ' in the well-known 'washing clothes' passage, (Bransford and 
Johnson, 1973,1972)' - an equally incomprehensible passage about the'" 
familiar procedure of washing clothes in a laundry -` which has been so 
constructed that, unless the topic, 'washing clothes', is given in advance, 
comprehension is almost impossible, the mere mention of-the topic, ahead of,,,,, 
time, suffices for satisfactory comprehension. 
The reason why theý'balloon' passage needs detailed specification'of ` 
antecedent conditions in order for it to be comprehended, whilst, regarding 
the 'washing clothes' passage', it suffices that we be given the title' beforehand, 
sums up the difference between CMCAs and SBKBs. The former are derived 
from the previous linguistic context and particular antecedent conditions 
(circumstances) pertaining to the specific speech situation, characterizing it,, 
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f and, therefore, constituting it.. ., The 
latter, on. the other hand, . can be,,,, 
likened to itemized, stored knowledge, which is shared by the majority of a 
speech community. . In order that such a unit of knowledge be called up, 
it 
. suff 
i ces that we be presented with a cue word or phrase like the phrase,, 
.. 'washing clothes' 
in this example. - Such a clue can 
be called a, 'topic', 
, 
because. lt, is pivotal for the invocation of a 'stored' unit of knowledge. 
Wilki-, 1976, argues that the application of frames (see p. 227) to natural 
language might settle the problem, of 'topic', and, hence, disambiguate word 
senses via the knowledge of the specific area of discourse in question. 
.,:. However, the topic 
is important not only because it can disambiguate 
word senses or because it "enables the Iistener to compute the'intended ante- 
cedents of each sentence in the paragraph" (Clark and Haviland, op. ci t. , 
p. 33), but also because it enables us to "generate (or reconstruct) ideas that 
are consistent with the topic, and, coincidentally, with the passage" (Bransford 
and Johnson, 1973, p. 402). In other words, to speak in Schank and Abelson's, 
op. cit. , 
language, when, it forms a script header, a topic can activate, or "put 
on the alert", so to speak, all subpasts and scenes of the relevant script. This 
can hardly be the case with particular CMCAs, since such knowledge or 
assumptions are situation-specific and not general and stereotyped., " Bransford 
. and Johnson, 
1972,1973, however, do not differentiate between these two,,!, - 
-classes-of context, 
but refer to both of them as 'knowledge structures'. 
Wörkers in Artificial Intelligence have attempted to describe o'ur background 
knowledge as organized around stereotyped situations and activities. Schank 
and Abelson, 1977, proposed the concept of script for accounting in a generalized 
way for the specific knowledge systems that are brought to bear'on"the interpretation 
13 
of language. 'The motivation for their approach is their assumption that this 
knowledge is highly structured. Scripts are usually big, congruous, homo- 
geneous classes of specific knowledge that has been acquired through the repetition 
of similar event sequences, such as riding a bus, or eating at a restaurant, Or visiting 
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the doctor. Such standard sequences are recognized by the episodic memory 
of humans, and serve to "fill in the blanks" in understanding. The concept 
of script is supposed to reflect the economic . storage of similar episodes, which 
are recognized by components of memory in terms of a standardized, generalized 
episode. A trip, for instance, is stored in memory as a standard event sequence 
of the conceptualizations of what happened on the trip. 
Schank and Abelson's theory seems to be an elaboration of Minsky's 1975, 
'frame' theory. According to Minsky, 1975, our background knowledge is 
individuated into stereotypically structured situations, called 'frames'. Frames 
equip us with the knowledge of not only how to use them, but also what to expect 
and what to do if our expectations are not confirmed. He defines frames as 
follows, 
We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations. 
The 'top levels' of a frame are fixed, and represent things 
that are always true about the supposed situation. The 
lower levels have many terminals - 'slots' that must be 
filled by specific instances or data. 
(p. 212) 
However, frames, unlike scripts, are not designed to represent primarily 
episodic knowledge, although they can do that, too (scenarios). Frames are 
constructed to represent static 
knowledge as, for example, what to expect from 
a room since "our 'expectations' usually interact smoothly with perceptions" 
(ibid., p. 221). Minsky notes that "just before you enter a room, you usually 
know enough to 'expect' a room rather than, say, a landscape. You can 
usually tell just by the character of the 
door. And you can often select in 
advance a frame for the new room. 
" The concept of 'frame' could be used 
to explain the oddity of such sentences as 'They both climbed up the tree and 
rang the bell. ' However, 
both scripts and frames are similar conceptual 
schemes in that they both represent 
knowledge stored in memory and acquired 
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through the repetition of event sequences, or through the observation and 
accumulation of similar "data". 
14 
Indeed, Lehnert, 1980, interpreting 
Minsky's idea of frame as "a strategy for expectation-driven information 
processing" (p. 85) views scripts as one type of frame. 
ka '_ 
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8. A CASE STUDY: CMCAs and SBKBs AT WORK 
In this chapter we will see how the distinction between the two classes 
of contextual knowledge can be brought to bear, on a more stringent delimitation 
of the class of phenomena that have been called instances of implication. 
Arguably, this distinction will-be of some utility in differentiating between 
various cases of what is purportedly said "by implication", as has been 
discussed in the literature. 
As a first step, it will be argued that cases of 'implication', the under- 
of which 
. depends on the evoca 
. tion of SBKBs - with or without the standing 
aid of CMCAs - should not be lumped together, as instances of the same 
linguistic phenomenon, with cases of so-called implicated meanings; in the 
latter case understanding implicated meanings hinges on particular CMCAs, to 
the exclusion of the regular SBKBs, which would, otherwise, be relevant to 
the understanding of the speech act at issue. 
8.1 On Ziff's example of implication 
Ziff, 1972a, thinks that what is said by (1B), 
(1 B). 
_ 
I 
, 
have work to do, 
when this is uttered as a reply to an invitation or a proposal to play tennis, is 
said 'by implication', and should be put-on a par with cases in'which (1B) is 
meant to be understood, not as 'I can! t', but as 'Yes, I'll be delighted to play 
tennis. ' 'According to Ziff, what is said in both cases, is said by implication, 
and depends on our knowledge'of the speaker. He writes, , 
If the speaker is an ordinary sort then perhaps he was 
saying by implication that he"couldn't play. But he 
needn't be an ordinary, sort.., f., 
Perhaps, he's a queer 
sort who plays and is delighted to play only when he has 
work to do. If I know this about him and he knows I 
230 
know it, then by implication he has managed to say that 
he would be delighted to play. Or what if he had 
replied 'It is snowing in Tibet':? Then possibly again he 
has managed to say that he would be delighted to play, 
but that would depend on him and on my knowledge of his 
quirks and his knowledge of my knowledge and so forth. 
Any fact known to us may be a factor serving to determine 
what is said by implication, but such factors cannot be 
effectively enumerated. 
(ibid., pp. 26-27) 
Indeed, such factors cannot be enumerated, but, at least, distinguishing between 
these two classes of contextual knowledge would enable us to account for what is 
said by (1B), when the predictable invocation of SBKBs is not thwarted by 
particular CMCAs, as in the latter case in which (1B) is intended to be under- 
stood as 'I would be delighted to play. ' That is, when particular knowledge 
of the speaker's peculiar habits of ignoring conventional uses of expressions in a 
systematic way need not be drawn upon. Moreover, cases in which such 
particular CMCAs, that do not motivate the invocation of SBKBs, but, rather, 
come into conflict with them in a systematically predictable way, come very 
near to constituting a private language, some sort of code, obtaining between 
the speaker and the hearer. Communication, in this instance, is not achieved, 
either "by force of precedent" or "by force of salience" (Lewis, 1969). And, 
of course it is not achieved by "tacit convention" either. -= It is determined by 
special stipulation, and the use of the utterance 'I have work to do' to mean 'I'll 
be delighted to play tennis' will be a nonce use. It is, therefore, worth 
making the distinction and concentrating on cases in which understanding what is 
said, whether by implication - in Ziff's sense - or not, does not depend on 
our knowledge of the speaker's whimsical ways of speaking, if any headway is to 
be made in gaining an insight into 
how speech functions. 
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8.1.1 Structural criteria aeelied 
Let us, then, examine Ziff's, 
example, 
and see how we can account for 
the speech act that (1B) performs, i. e. when it is used and understood as aII 
members of a linguistic community would use it and understand it in this 
instance; that is, as meaning 'No, I can't. I have work- to do' and not 
as 'Yes, I'll be delighted to play_tennis. ' Consider: 
(1) A: 
_ 
Let's, ' lay tennis. 
T 
B. I have, work to do. 
(or: Shall we play tennis? ) 
T '` Y 
(2) A. Let's play tennis. (or: ý Shall-we play tennis? ) 
° B. No, 'I'can't. 
{ B1 I have'work 'to do. 
B2 No,, 
al can't. 
I have work to do. 
The first thing that comes to notice is that (1) is a sequence, a dyadic interaction, 
if you will, which consists of two closely connected, utterances. These two 
utterances constitute an adjacency pair in virtue of their tiedness1 (Sacks, 1967, 
(1976)), or connectedness; (1)A is a proposal and as such it should be responded 
to, either by acceptance. or rejection. Adjacency pairs have been said to have 
the following characteristics: 
(1) two utterance length, 
(2) adjacent positioning of component utterances, 
(3) different speakers producing each utterance. 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) 
The construct of adjacency pairs, initially introduced by Schegloff, 1967, and 
hinted at in Sacks, 1967 (1976), was developed by Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, 
and is described there as follows: 
The component utterances of such sequences have an achieved 
relatedness beyond that which may otherwise obtain between 
k 
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adjacent utterances. That relatedness is partially the 
product of the operation of a typology in the speakers' 
production of the sequences. The typology operates 
in two ways: it partitions utterance types into 'first 
pair parts' (i. e. first parts of pairs) and second, pdir parts; 
and it affiliates a first pair part and a second pair part to 
form a 'pair type'. 'Question-answer', 'greeting- 
: greeting', 'offer-acceptance/refusal' are instances of pair 
types. A given sequence will thus be composed of an 
utterance that is a first pair part produced by one speaker 
directly followed by the production by a different speaker 
of an utterance which is (a) a second pair part, and (b) is 
from the some pair type as the first utterance in the sequence 
is a member of. Adjacency pair sequences, then, 
exhibit the further features (4) relative ordering of parts 
(i. e. first pair parts precede second pair parts), and (5) 
discriminative relations (i. e. the pair type of which a first 
pair part is a- member is relevant to the selection among 
second pair parts). 
(1974, p. 238) 
The main feature, therefore, of an adjacency pair is the connectedness between 
the two utterances that constitute it. Indeed, it is mainly in virtue of this 
characteristic that an adjacency pair can be singled out. That is, given*a 
first pair part, the provision of a second pair part is made 'conditionally relevant' 
(Schegloff, 1972),, in the same way, in which B, in (3), is heard as 'Yes, I'm 
going to the party', , 
(3) A. Are you going to the party tonight? 
B. Yes, 
and not as 'Yes, it is raining'. However, 'while in cases of elliptical 
responses Our knowledge of English syntax in conjunction with a rule of discourse2 
can provide an answer to 
how we hear (3)B as 'Yes, I'm going to the party', and 
not as 'Yes, it is raining', the situation becomes more problematic when other 
activities than a straightforward question-answer'are involved in an 
adjacency 
pair. r. 
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(1), for example, is an adjäcency pair whose first pair part constitutes a 
proposal, which has to be either rejected or accepted, in. its second pair part. 
Such an acceptance or rejection is made conditionally relevant on the occurrence 
of. the first pair part. 
4 
That is not to say, however, that a rejection or an 
acceptance cannot be preceded by comments of appreciation, as in fragment 9, 
for example, quoted in Heritage, 1978, and taken from Schegloff, 1972, p. 98; 
Fragment 9- 
B: Uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little white this 
morning, I'll give you a cup of coffee. - 
A: Hehh: Well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think 
I can make it this morning, hh uhm I'm running an ad in, " 
the paper and - and ah I have to stay near the phone, 
or have an 'insertion sequence' between a first and a second pair part (Schegloff, 
1972), as in the fragment below: - 
Fragment 10 
A: Are you coming tonight? 
' ý°" B: Can I bring a guest? 
A. Sure. 
B: I'II be there. 
(Schegloff, 1978, 'p. 78) 
However, 
. what, 
the speaker of the first pair part is looking for in the addressee's 
next utterance (response) (in, the second pair part) - though this maybe 
deferred - is the satisfaction of this rule of discourse: That the addressee 
will ultimately provide a response 
4 
that will satisfy the speaker's 'query'. 
'Query' is here to be understood, in a very broad sense, as an utterance which 
needs to be responded to, either linguistically or behaviourally. As Schegloff, 
1976, pointed out, 
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Adjacency pairs are especially strong constraints, aLfirst 
pair part making relevant a 
. 
particular action, or' a 
restricted set of actions, to be done next. 
The speaker of a first pair part expressing a 'query' creates a 'slot' (Schenkein, 
1972), which has to be filled in by the next speaker's' utterance, or behavioural 
response, a filler. 
However,, the 'satisfaction' cannot consist in a. pure comment of appreciation 
111 51 .1 
in cases in which a 'query' is addressed to the hearer.. For example, whereas a 
rejection or acceptance becomes necessarily relevant to the proposal 'Let's play 
tennis', a rather 'unspecific proposal or`invitation like 'Why don't you come to 
my place some time? ', can be, either passed by, or satisfactorily responded to 
with armere comment of appreciation, as, for example, in 'That's very sweet of 
you', the response thus matching the instigating utterance's lack of specificity, 
immediacy and commitment. This question is dealt with at length in Heritage, 
1980. He concludes that this question "cannot be heard as 'real' ... 
Any 
attempt to deal 'with the utterance Ias a real question will imply unwillingness to 
come, a refusal of the invitation and to disregard the literal meaning of. the 
question entirely.: ' Therefore, ' Schegloff and Sacks', o . cit. , proposal that 
-the formulation of an utterance as a questionis sufficient inducement for the 
employment by the second party of "the chance to talk to produce what-is 
, appreciable as an answer" 
(p. 239), does not seem to be a sufficient condition. 
Because if a perfunctory offer or invitation is either not replied to, 
6 
or is 
responded to with an airy, comment of appreciation, which does not constitute, 
by any measure,, either a rejection or an acceptance, the conditions for the 
presence of an adjacency pair do not seem to 
be satisfied. As Schegloff and 
Sacks, o. cit., pointed out, . 
Whenever :.. there is reason to have, the appreciation of 
some implicativeness made attendable, 'next utterance' is 
'ý ' the proper place to do that, and'a two utterance sequence 
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can be'employed as a means for doing and checking some 
intendedly sequentially implicative occurrence in a way 
that a one utterance sequence can not. 
(ibid., Imo. 240) 
And, of course, they do not have in mind interrogative forms constituting 
illocutionary acts of asking questions only, when they talk of forming utterances 
up as questions. A more stringent criterion, therefore, like the notion of 
'query' which will be defined in terms of the notion of immediacy looks more 
promising as constituting a sufficient condition for engendering' adjacency pairs. 
To return, however, to (1 B) , we see that it is not a straightforward 
acceptance or rejection of the proposal (1A). Apparently, this fact constitutes 
Ziff's motivation for claiming that what is said in (1B), to the extent that this is 
an answer to (IA) , is said 'by 
implication'. But, if we allow the'term 
'implication' to`qualify the method of how what is said in (1B) is said, then it 
would seem but a small step to concluding that, in this loose sense of the word 
'implication', the bulk of communication takes place 'by implication'. 
Rather than be content with such a conclusion, we should try to understand 
why the utterance of (2B) is not really deemed necessary for the felicitous convey 
ing of a rejection of a proposal, in view of the utterance (113) , and, also, why 
the latter functions in exactly the some way as (2B) would. " In other words, 
why is it that 'No, I can't' is understood 'by implication', in Ziff's terminology, 
in (1B) when this is uttered in response to (l A) ? 
It is clear that most language analysts would here appeal to Grice's' co- 
operative principle in trying to account for the cohesion of the second pair 
parts to the first. However, it is claimed here that sequencing rules, as 
developed, by ethnomethodologists, can be subsumed under the domain of the 
maxim of Relevance, though this maxim should embrace many more issues than 
just sequencing rules (cf. Dascal, 1977, Holdcroft, 1980). As these rules 
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have been better explicated and understood than has the overall maxim of 
Relevance, we would rather rely on the findings of ethnomethodologists in 
what follows. 
Ethnomethodologists have posited structural criteria in conversational 
analysis for the identification of the organization of conversation. They 
analyse conversation, therefore, in terms of the sequential placement of 
utterances. As pointed out in Schegloff, 1972, p. 77, 
The very recognition of an utterance as 'an 'answer' may 
turn on its placement, its sequential relationship to 'a 
question', there being no independent linguistic or logical 
criteria for distinguishing the status of an utterance as an 
assertion from its status as an 'answer'. 
Not that this necessarily helps with the question at issue - any more than it 
explains why 'Margaret Thatcher will address the Conference (this afternoon)', 
is thought to be a satisfactory response to the proposal to play tennis, given 
certain circumstances, when it is wel I known that the conference takes place in 
Blackpool, while the talk-exchange takes place in Coventry. 
On the other hand, we cannot invoke any syntactic or semantic, or even 
some pragmatical features (our knowledge, for instance, of what is an enumerated 
account of various occupations the speaker maybe engaged in) that might help us 
to determine which next utterances would qualify as 'responsive' to A. For 
example, the utterance (i) 'I have to take out the garbage' is related to (113) in 
form (syntactically) and content - they both specify activities the speaker has 
to do. Yet, it cannot perform the act of acceptance or rejection? (cf. Searle, 
1975). Not only will the proposal or invitation remain unanswered if there is 
no utterance forthcoming, that can be heard as 'responsive to' it, but, moreover, 
speaker A will notice the non-occurrence of an answer as an event (cf. Lyons, 
1968, p. 415 "silence is 'marked' and may serve as a positive communicative 
function", Goffman, 1971, p. 109 "Social nature abhors an empty slot", Schegloff, 
1972, Speier, 1972, Sacks, 1972, Kosher, 1976). 
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The existence of the operation of a typology that results in the relatedness 
of the adjacency pair parts is, mainly, to be found in our expectations, 
emanating from our knowledge of how discourse functions, or, rather, of what is 
the sequence of social acts, i. e. that a particular first pair part must, eventually, 
be responded to, by the corresponding second pair part. That is, we know, and, 
hence, we expect, that if a question is asked, a proposal or an invitation made, 
an answer8 or an acceptance, or a rejection, are in order, respectively. How- 
ever this knowledge does not help us to determine which utterance can be under- 
stood as an appropriate second pair part and which can not, since structural 
criteria alone, though significant, are not decisive in this respect. The claim 
of ethnomethodologists that "there are inferences ... from the structure of a 
conversation to the role that any one utterance plays within it", as neatly put by 
Levinson, 1978a, can be only partly true. In other words, our knowledge 
that a particular speech act is in order, does not equip us with the ability to 
discern whether the next utterance constitutes the speech act that was, indeed, 
expected (cf. Searle, 1975, p. 63, step 3 of his inference scheme). Therefore, 
the question that arises, is how we know that (1 )B, 'I have work to do', is "from 
the some pair type as the first utterance in the sequence i. e. 'Shall we play 
tennis?, J is a member of". And, as we have seen, sequential placement 
alone cannot provide the whole answer. 
In fact, what we are dealing with here, is step 6 of Searle's, 1975, 
inferential strategy, offered in the analysis of a similar "case of the general 
phenomenon of indirection". 
STEP 6: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a 
large amount of time relative to a single evening, 
and I know that going to the movies normally takes 
a large amount of time relative to a single evening 
(factual background information). 
(p. 63) 
However, no more consideration is given to the question of how or whether factual 
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background knowledge is structured, what it consists of or how it is activated. 
Instead, it is taken for granted that it plays a significant role in ways that are 
inexplicable. 
Now, as has been pointed out in the literature, it is quite common for 
explanations or reasons to follow rejections or disconfirmations, as this is 
usually dictated by social cooperation or a sociable disposition towards the 
first pair part speaker. Consider, for instance, how rude a rejection of an 
invitation or an offer can sound, if it is not accompanied by some comment of 
appreciation or some explanatory account (see, e. g. Heritage, 1980, p. 23). 
These explanations have been termed "post-expansions", as a second pair part 
(a rejection or a disconfirmation) is qualified by the provision of such an 
explanatory account. These expansions, as- has been pointed out in 
Heritage, 1978, 
are frequently addressed to the felicity conditions appropriate 
to the rejected activity. On the whole, it can be 
suggested that the citing of such felicity conditions in post- 
expanded rejections exhibits recipient design. That is, it 
exhibits attention to time, place, circumstance, social 
relationships, and so on, and, in so doing, this marks- them 
out and reconstitutes them. 
This argument, admittedly, goes some way towards explaining why B could not 
have replied with (1) ('I have to take out the garbage') to A's invitation or 
proposal, and believed that what was thereby conveyed could have been taken 
as sufficient grounds for his not having the time to play tennis, i. e. for not 
satisfying a felicity condition (Heritage, 1978). However, unless we can 
envisage the possibility of a typology of sentences that can act as establishing 
or rejecting felicity conditions, and unless felicity conditions of speech acts 
can be defined and enumerated, an alternative way of seeking a solution has 
to be explored. 
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8.1.2 The----- Lre_ esva cy_of abo'sproposa l 
--- -- - ----- 
Laboe, 1972a, b, argues that features of "shared knowledge", which 
are not part of any linguistic rule, determine the connection between 'what 
is said' and 'what is done', i. e. between linguistic forms and the speech-acts 
that these linguistic forms are used to perform. Considering a similar talk- 
exchange, i. e. (4), 
(4) A: Are you going to work tomorrow? 
B: I'm on jury duty, 
he formulates the following rule of discourse: 
If A makes a request for information 
9 
Q-S, , and B makes 
a statement S2 in response that cannot be expanded by 
rules of ellipsis to the form XS, Y, then S2 is heard as an 
assertion that there exists a proposition P known to both A 
and B: 
If Sa, then (E)SA 
where (E) is an existential operator, and from this proposition 
there is inferred an answer to A's request: (E)S1. 
(1972b, p. 122) 
The following figure represents the two types of discourse rules: "rules 
of interpretation UD (with their inverse rules of production DU) and sequencing 
rules DD which connect actions" (ibid., p. 123). 
1 0 
D (D2) D3 (D4) 
speaker A 
{I1 
U2 U3 4 
speaker B 
(Dý ) -3 D2 (D3) --ý D4 
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As Labov points out, 
Any statement S 2will not 
do in these sequences. If B 
had replied 'De Gaulle just lost the election', A would 
reasonably complain 'What has that to do with your going 
to work tomorrow? ' The rule tells A to search for a 
proposition P that will make the connection; if he fails 
to find it, he will reject B's response. But the operation 
of the rule is invariant. A must inspect S2 as a possible 
element in a proposition 'if S2 than (E)SA' before he can 
react. 
(1972b, p. 123) 
Therefore, Labov seems to claim that we search for a proposition p, that 
is, presumably, stored as part of our knowledge, -and, upon locating such a 
proposition, we can embark on inferring the speaker's 'answer' to our query. 
However, an old question has to be asked, namely, given that some 
'answers' have to be inferred, how is the truth of such hypotheticals required 
by the corresponding inferences? Ryle, 1971 , argues that the point of learning 
, if p, then q' statements, is to be found in our subsequent readiness and ability to 
infer from p tog. An hypothetical statement can be likened to an inference 
precept in that it licenses the corresponding inference. Having learned 'if 2, 
then q', we are authorised to argue '2, so g', provided that 2 is given, or else 
'not q so not p'. 
Knowing 'if 2, then g' is, then, rather like being in possession 
of a railway ticket. It is having a license or warrant to 
make a journey from London to Oxford. (Knowing a variable 
hypothetical or "law" is like having a season ticket. ) As a 
person can have a ticket without actually travelling with it and 
without ever being in London or getting to Oxford, so a person 
can have an inference warrant without actually making any 
inferences and even without ever acquiring the premises from 
which to make them. 
(ibid., p. 308) 
However, it seems rather implausible to assume that our stored knowledge 
includes myriads of such stereotyped hypothetical statements, as the ones 
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described by Labov and Ryle, that may warrant an inferential process which 
will facilitate communication. As Minsky, 1975, p. 211, writes, 
The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and 
"perception" ought to be larger and more structured, 
and their factual and procedural contents must be more 
intimately connected in order to explain the apparent 
power and speed of mental activities. 
We cannot, in other words, claim that part of our stored knowledge consists of 
such hypothetical statements as in (5), 
(5) If one has work to do, one can't play tennis 
go to the theatre 
go out for a walk 
and ad infinitum 
at the same time. 
Moreover, we add the qualification 'at the some. time', though we are 
aware that this is what the hearer understands without the speaker specifying it. 
That is, when the speaker says, 'I am on jury duty', as a response to the question 
'Are you going to work tomorrow? ', he is interpreted as having said that he is on 
jury duty tomorrow and not this afternoon or the day after tomorrow. It is in 
virtue of this understanding that the utterance 'I am on jury duty' is regarded as 
relevant to its first pair part; or, is it the other way round? Is it so under- 
stood just because this is presented by the conversational rule that the next 
utterance be relevant to the first utterance? This issue is reminiscent of the 
two sides of the same coin. The fact is that it is still not clear what principles 
are at work here (cf. Ziff, 1972a, ch. VIII . 
To return to Labov's claim, such hypothetical statements rather seem to be 
instantly constructed by virtue of our SBKBs which afford us the ability, for 
example, to compare various activities and detect compatibilities and incompat- 
ibilities along different dimensions. For instance, parts of our SBKBs related 
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to the temporal structure of activities give us the knowledge that taking out 
the garbage takes only two minutes and, therefore, cannot be a bar to playing 
tennis; while being on jury duty, or having work to do, takes a considerable 
amount of time, enough to prevent one from working in one's office, or from 
playing tennis at the same time. 'Working in the office' and 'being on jury 
duty' denote activities that are comparable along the temporal parameter in that 
they cannot both occur in the same time span by the some agent. What is 
stored, therefore, as part of our SBKBs, cannot be such hypotheticals as 
indicated by Labov, because even an immense array of such statements would 
not suffice to exhaust all the possible hypothetical statements that might, on 
given occasions, afford us the means to understand what we hear as relating to 
the current stage (point) of the conversation. In other words, these hypo- 
theticals would be better seen as the product of the "infinite use of finite 
means"; it is these finite means that should be seen as part of our SBKBs and 
whose structure should be analysed and clarified. Indeed, the need for 
structuring background knowledge and assumptions, and for incorporating them 
in a theoretical account of language has been long recognised in the linguistics 
literature (cf. Hamblin, 1971, Stalnaker, 1972, Lewis, 1972, Thomason, 1973, 
1974, Dijk, 1977, Gazdar, 1978, Motsch, 1980). 
8.1.3 'Scrpts' on loan 
Let us, then, borrow the concept of 'script' from artificial intelligence 
and try to account for our understanding of the utterance 'I have work to do' 
as performing the act of rejection, in the case at issue. It can be argued 
that, upon hearing the utterance 'I have work to do', and understanding its 
semantic structure, the relevant script is activated, which, in this case, might 
bear the header 'working' (SCRIPT NAME). The activation of the script 
affords the hearer the means to generate and elaborate connections that are 
implied rather than stated. (For experiments confirming this see Bower et 
aI, 1979. )-. This script represents or describes a 'chunk' of knowledge, 
243 
which has a more or less stereotyped, but general structure. This 'chunk' 
is part of our SBKBs and is shared by all members of our cultural community. 
However, its structure is rather unspecified with regard to the various scenes 
and subparts that such a script would include. In this sense, the script, 
labelled 'working', may be argued to be a 'hyperscript', which will have a 
genus to species relationship to other, more specific, and highly structured 
scripts, such as 'working in an office', 'working in the garden', etc. 
II 
The 
script 'working' will, however, be specified along the temporal discussion, in 
that the procedural structure of the activity or activities, specified in it, must 
involve the concept of time as a concomitant factor for its or their represent- 
ation in a script, and, therefore, for the correct conceptualization of the 
script. The conceptualization of the script 'working' involves the concept- 
ualization of the incorporation of a considerable time span, as a necessary 
condition for its characterization. 
The script for playing tennis has also been activated by the previous 
utterance, (1A) , and is already in operation. This script is 
highly structured 
and one of its specifications must be related to the duration of the activity thus 
represented. 
On the other hand, equipped with our knowledge of the sequential rules 
of conversation - as has been argued in the writings in ethnomethodology - 
we, as speakers and hearers, are oriented towards interpreting the next utterance, 
as satisfying the conversational needs set by the co-conversationalist's preceding 
utterance. We, therefore, understand that the speaker of (1 B) has work to 
do during the same period of time as the one proposed for playing tennis - 
though this has not been specified by him. Consequently, we are induced 
to compare the two activities along the temporal discussion - this being the 
obvious relational point between the two scripts - and, thereby, detect their 
incompatibilities. Thus, we understand B as constituting the speech act of 
rejecting what was proposed in the previous utterance, i. e. as meaning 'No, I 
can't. I have work to do. ' 
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The concept of script, therefore, seems to provide a method of structuring 
part of our background knowledge in an acceptable way, i. e. in a way that 
reflects, more or less precisely, the organization of such knowledge in our 
memory or minds. If, however, scripts seem capable of representing all 
our background knowledge, why not dispense with such labels as SBKBs? 
It must be noted that scripts are designed to represent our specific episodic 
knowledge, but they cannot handle our general knowledge. Until more work 
has been done on the representation of the structure of our knowledge systems, 
we will have to rely on such unspecified classes, called 'background knowledge' 
or 'general beliefs' or MCBs (Bach and Harnish, op. cit. ), or 'factual background 
information' (Searle, 1975), or what have you, whose contents and structure are 
as obscure as they are powerful in determining our understanding of speech and 
language. For example, how is our knowledge that taking out the garbage 
does not take longer than a minute, to be represented? How do we know that 
the utterance, 
(6) I have to tie my shoelaces, 
as a response to (7) 
(7) Let's go to the movies tonight, 
(Searle, 1975), 
cannot constitute the act of acceptance or rejection, and is not relevant in any 
other way, either. That is, it cannot be an inserted question ('Can you get 
me a baby-sitter? '), or a comment of appreciation. How do we know that 
(6) is irrelevant, 'non-responsive' to the conversational needs set by the 
preceding utterance (by the speech act of the preceding utterance). How 
do we know that the speaker of (6) violates the cooperative principle - in 
Grice's language - without thereby intending the generation of an implicature? 
How do we know that (6) breaches all conversational principles? 
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It has been shown that (1B), i. e. 'I have work to do', activates a 
script, or, even, a hyperscript, whose temporal structure can be compared to 
that of another script already in operation. We can, thus, understand the 
response as intending to juxtapose the temporal structures of the two scripts. 
12 
This, however, cannot be the case with a response such as (6) or (i) 'I have to 
take out the garbage'. Is another script invoked via such a response, and, 
if so, what could its structure be? Could we have scripts for just tying 
shoelaces and taking out the garbage? If we conclude that these activities 
can constitute autonomous scripts, then the utility of the concept will go out of 
the window. We would be faced with the same problem if we counted the 
existence of such individual statements, with no general content, as part of our 
SBKBs, as we faced with the hypothetical statements advocated by Labov and 
Ryle. In other words, the notion of script would be trivialized, since it 
would not be deployed in label ling, and, thereby, structuring big 'chunks' of 
knowledge. 
One way out of this impasse might be the supposition that such activities 
as 'tying shoelaces' or 'taking out the garbage' could be represented as the 
conceptualizations of scenes, or subparts of scripts; that is, they could 
constitute subparts of the scripts 'getting dressed' and 'doing housework', 
respectively. In other words, we search our background knowledge for a 
script furnishing points of reference on which the relevance of the response to 
the previous utterance, could be anchored. Such points are readily available, 
by the script 'working' or 'doing housework', but not by their subparts, such as 
'taking out the garbage', or 'having to take out my writing paper'. 
However, even on this hypothesis, (6) cannot be rejected as inappropriate 
on the grounds that it references a subpart of a script, rather than the script 
itself, since the invocation of the whole script via the utterance 'I have to get 
dressed', would still not count as a rejection or acceptance of the speech act 
performed in the previous utterance. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
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inability of (6) to meet the conversational demands set by the previous utterance, 
lies in the fact that it only references a subpart of a script and is, thus, unlikely 
to have a temporal structure comparable to that of another script as that of 
'going to the movies'. As Schank and Abelson, 1977, pointed out, 
There is a very long theoretical stride ... from the idea 
that highly structured knowledge dominates the under- 
standing process, to the specification of the details of the 
most appropriate structures. It does not take one very 
far to say that schemas are important: one must know the 
content of the schemas. 
Moreover, such specifications, relating to the temporal structure of scripts, 
have not been described in the literature on scripts. Apparently, they have 
to be inferred from a conglomeration of other specifications of subparts of scripts. 
It may be argued that such significant conditions should be directly included in 
the specification of the structure of scripts, rather than have to be inferred - 
after all scripts are supposed to mirror our entire knowledge - since they 
constitute a significant part of the conceptualization of the corresponding script. 
However, it may be that such concomitants are necessary conditions for the 
existence of any homogeneously specifiable chunk of episodic knowledge, that 
can be called a script. But this amounts to 
little more than mere speculation. 
Besides, according to Schank and Abelson, 1977, who developed the 
apparatus of 'script', the time parameter cannot be a necessary condition for the 
characterization of scripts, since they have constructed scripts such as the 
instrumental or the personal scripts. It can be argued, however, that the 
temporal concomitant is a necessary condition for the characterization of 
situational scripts. But even on this assumption, it is not clear whether the 
utterance , 
'I have work to do' will necessarily call up a situational script. 
One problem might be the fact that in such a script there is no more than one 
player involved, whilst in situational scripts there is,. usually more than one 
player involved. Another problem is posed by examples such as, 
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(8) I have work to do for an exam. 
Is a situational script called up by (8)? Or is it an instrumental script that 
is invoked by it? However it may be, it seems rather implausible to assume 
that scripts, at their present stage of development, can provide the means for 
accounting in a systematically structured way for our knowledge system relating 
to matters of time. 
It may be that such knowledge that affords us the means to compare 
activities along the time dimension, or, in general, to find the relational 
grounds between them is part of our general knowledge of coordinating inter- 
relations rather than part of our specific knowledge that has been claimed to 
be organizable in scripts. . 
Therefore, although it would seem that the con- 
struction of the apparatus of the script is a step in the right direction towards 
the representation of the organization of stored knowledge, we still need a 
more general class that will encompass such general knowledge that is not, as - 
yet, specifiable in any systematized, generalized way. 
Schank and Abelson, ' op. cit. , recognized the need for means, other than 
scripts, to connect pieces of information; they write, 
For any two conceptions that are related by their occurrence 
in a story, we must be able to trace a path between them. 
This path must be based on general information about the 
connectivity of events when specific information about the 
connectivity (i. e. a script) is not available. 
(P. 70) 
To account for such cases, they introduced the notion of the plan, which is, 
The repository for general information that will connect 
events that cannot be connected by use of an available 
script or by standard causal chain expansion. 
(P. 70) 
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An alternative route, in the case at issue, would, therefore, be to view the 
relation between the two utterances as emanating from the fact that they are 
setting up diverse, and, thus, incompatible goals. 
13 
However, the 
incompatibility of the plans in question, again, hinges on the temporal structure 
of the activities introduced by the plans. This becomes evident in utterances 
like (6) ('I have to tie my shoelaces'), or like 'I have to take out the garbage. ' 
The reason for this is that if 'I have work to do' is defined as a plan and not as 
a script-header, or as the Main Conceptualization (MAINCON) of the relevant 
script, then, arguably, it activates the relevant script, since scripts originate 
in plans. Once plans can introduce scripts, interactive points between active 
scripts relating to the temporal structures can be readily found. Similarly, 
the utterance 'I am hungry' is goal directed, and as such it activates the eating 
script, whose execution is incompatible with the simultaneous execution by the 
some agent of the tennis script. Thus, it can be explained by the utterance 
'I am hungry', as a response to 'Let's play tennis', is not only relevant, but can 
also constitute a rejection as well as generate a next speaker's utterance 
referring directly to the main parts of the eating script as in (ii), 
(ii) You can have dinner later. 
We'll have a nice meal at a Wimpy later. 
Dinner is not ready yet. 
and so on. However that may be, it need not be claimed that the incompat- 
ibility, spelt out in the phrase 'No, I can't', is implied (Ziff) or 'implicated' 
in any way that would ascribe a specific intentional status to the speaker. 
Arguably, it is superseded by a more informative response (utterance), and, in 
this sense, it can be claimed to be inferred. 
Moreover, it must be objected that (1B) ('I have work to do') is meant to 
be understood merely as a rejection of the proposal, i. e. as 'No, I can't', as 
Ziff and Labov claim; and to say that an utterance constitutes a direct 
illocutionary act of rejection whilst another performs an indirect act of rejection, 
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is not to account for all the differences between them, at our present stage of 
knowledge. Rather, (1 B) is intended to be understood as a rejection-cum- 
explanation, i. e. as 'No, I can't because I have work to do', which is not 
the same as saying 'No, I can't'. Note that the utterance (1B), that 
performs the speech act of rejection, contributes to the ongoing conversation 
to a greater degree than a flat rejection like 'No, I can't' would. Leaving 
aside matters of appropriacy, rudeness and so on, emanating from a flat 
rejection, that might engender dire social consequences for the co-conversat- 
ionalists, 
14 
the utterance 'I have work to do' is potentially consequential for 
the direction of the ongoing conversation. It can provide the ground for 
the next topic of the conversation, often via the introduction of a new script 
(cf. e. g. 4). In other words, the first utterance (1A) can be seen as 
introducing Topic A. However, whilst (1B) can address Topic A, introduced 
by (1A), as well as introduce Topic B, in exactly the some way as 2(B)2, can, 
(2B) can only address Topic A. As Weiner and Goodenough, 1977, p. 223, 
note: 
The initial statement of Topic B may be understood in one 
way if heard as part of Topic A, and in another way if 
heard as part of Topic B. 
8.2 Conclusion 
What is brought out, however, in this discussion, is that our SBKBs, in 
one form or another, have an important role to play in communication. It 
must be stressed, though, that items of SBKBs are activated via CMCAs, which, 
as has been noted, include previous linguistic context, as well. 
15 
CMCAs 
are pivotal for the understanding of what speech act the next utterance is 
intended to perform. However, previous linguistic context is central to the 
understanding of the next speech act, but not only because of our knowledge of 
the sequential nature of speech acts. That is, our knowledge that an accept- 
ance or a rejection is in order, when a proposal has been issued, for instance, 
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does not, in itself, equip us with all the requisite means for discerning which 
next utterance can perform the expected act. It merely orients us towards 
this expectancy. It is items of SBKBs that are invoked via CMCAs which, 
in the end, help to determine which next utterance can appropriately perform 
the expected act. 
On the assumption that scripts can represent homogeneous chunks of 
knowledge, the utterance 'I have work to do' will call up such a chunk; one 
of its specifications - which are assumed to be part of our stored knowledge 
and need not be explicitly mentioned to be called up, but are evoked via the 
activation of the main conceptualization (MAINCON) of the script - might 
provide the ground for relating this script to the one already activated by the 
initiating utterance. But, as noted in Bower et al, 1979, there is no 
indication in script theory of how simultaneous execution (enactment) of 
several scripts is to be handled. Neither is there a way of accounting for 
our ability to discern interactive points between instantiations of scripts. As 
Bower et al noted, 
What is harder to model are interactions between the goals 16 
and resource-allocations among several simultaneous scripts. 
However that may be, the reference points that might provide the relational 
grounds between the two utterances - i. e. the interactive points between the 
envisaged enactment of the two scripts evoked - and, consequently, between 
the two acts performed, are activated via CMCAs, and, in the case at issue, 
via the preceding utterance, which called up a specific script. 
An attempt has been made, in the foregoing discussion, to view such means 
that enable us to detect the relevancies between utterances and, hence, acts, as 
part of structured chunks of knowledge. The purpose of this discussion has 
been to expose the implausibility of such claims as Ziff's, 
17 
that what is said by 
(1B), for example, when this is uttered in response to (l A), is said 'by 
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implication'. Such a claim, by necessity, equates utterances such as (1B) 
and (2B), on the one hand, as if they had an identical role to play in the 
conduct of conversation, and, on the other, it differentiates between utterances 
such as (28) 1 and (2B)2 - assuming that they are alI uttered in response to 
(l A). It has been shown that understanding (IB) as performing the act of 
rejection in relation to the proposal in (1A) is a function of our knowledge of 
conversational organization (sequential rules), and our general background 
knowledge (SBKBs). If it is established that such background knowledge is 
highly structured and shared by all members of a linguistic community, then 
the implausibility will become apparent, of elevating instances in which such 
knowledge schemes are put to use (invoked) to interpret language in context 
(linguistic or situational) to the status of implicated meanings or implicatures. 
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9. GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 
A type of generalized, conversational implicature, as described by 
Grice, attaches to the use of definite and indefinite articles. For example, 
anyone who utters (1), 
(1) X is meeting a woman tonight, 
would normally implicate that the woman X was meeting, was not X's wife, 
mother, sister, or even a platonic friend. Another example would be the 
following: 
(2) I went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise 
inside the front door, 
whereby it is implicated that it was not my house I was referring to. Grice 
writes, 
I could produce similar linguistic phenomena involving 
the expressions 'a garden', 'a car', 'a college' and so 
on. Sometimes, however, there would normally be 
no such implicature ('I have been sitting in a car all 
morning'), and sometimes a reverse implicature ('I broke 
a finger yesterday'). 
(1975, p. 56) 
He, then, goes on to explain the generation of this kind of conversational 
implicature as follows: 
When someone by using the form of expression 'an X' 
implicates that the X does not belong to or is not 
otherwise closely connected with some identifiable 
person, the implicature is present because the speaker 
has failed to be specific in a way in which he might 
have been expected to be specific, with the consequence 
that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position, 
and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, 
to fulfil the first maxim of Quantity. 
(ibid. , p. 57) 
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So conversational implicature has yet another part to play in explaining 
yet another set of linguistic phenomena. In short, the notion of conversational 
implicature is used as a device that is summoned to account - according to 
Grice - for a vast variety of extra-logical meaning aspects in a theory of 
language. This would be quite a plausible solution if it were able to 
explain them adequately. Instead, it does not seem to go very for. Dis- 
guised as conversational implicatures the most intriguing aspects of language 
use are left untreated and unaccounted for. Besides, it is unreasonable to 
claim that items which exhibit variegated linguistic behaviour can lend them- 
selves to a uniform treatment. As has been argued, such an account would 
explain very little, if anything at all, though it would rescue a rather un- 
interesting corpus of facts that could be called logical semantics. 
In the case in point, Grice does not pay due attention to the fact that 
quite distinct rules govern the use of the definite and indefinite articles, but 
wants, instead, to claim that their use can be explained in terms of implicatures. 
However, as he himself acknowledges, it is often the case that conversational 
implicature proves unable to account for the use of the articles. An adequate 
theory of the use of the definite and indefinite article should cater for all 
instances of their use. 
Consider, however, some uses of the article that cannot be accounted for 
in terms of conversational implicature: 
(3) I own a house, all right, but the roof needs mending, 
a window needs replacing, and the master bedroom 
and a small bedroom need redecorating. 
(4) I have a sister who lives in a bungalow and has a cat. 
#(5) 
She brought me a book. 
(6) She was wearing a pretty nightie. 
(7) The cat is John's favourite pet. 
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(8) 1 live in a house. 
The use of the articles in (3) to (8) can hardly be explained along the 
lines suggested by Grice. Surely, the house in (3) belongs to me since 
own it, as do the windows, roof and bedrooms to the house. Grice might 
want to claim that the connection between the speaker and the house is expressed 
by the verb 'own'. But then further rules should be added to cater for such 
instances; at any rate, why use a and not the, since the implicature attaching 
to the former is that there is no relation between the house and the speaker. 
Besides, why do we say 'the roof', but 'a window', 'the master bedroom', but 
to small bedroom', when it is clear that they are all associated with the same 
house. Grice's account cannot predict or explain their use. 
Of course, it could be counterargued, Grice talks about the possible 
connection of 'an X', or 'the X' with a person only, and not about relationships 
between objects. But this is another deficiency of his theory, since another 
account would have to be provided to explicate the distribution of the article 
in relation to inanimate entities or objects. 
In (7) the referring expression 'the cat' does not denote a particular cat 
associated with John, since it is here used generically. In (5) it cannot be 
plausibly argued that the implicature attaching to a is that the book is not hers, 
or the speaker's for that matter, or that, at least, the speaker is not in a position 
to know. In (6) it is most natural to assume that the nightie she was wearing 
was not borrowed, and in (8) that the house is the speaker's ('I live in a house, 
not in a bungalow'). In any event, the speaker would know whether the 
house was his or not, and, according to'M. Quant', he was presumed to give 
this piece of information. But, it is clear, that 'M. Quant' does not function 
irrespective of other parameters, as the case appears to be in Grice's account. 
In short, leaving it to a CP, or some vague maxim thereof, to specify the 
conditions under which appropriate reference is to be made is to throw too much 
out of the window. 
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Hawkins, 1978, in an insightful and thorough investigation of the use of 
articles writes: 
The assertion of set membership ('There is a Prime Minister 
of England', etc. ) is normally appropriate when the hearer 
does not have knowledge of it, or when the knowledge 
which he does have is being deliberately ignored ('I have 
a head', etc. ). Hence by already presupposing shared 
knowledge of set membership, the definite article instructs 
the hearer to locate the referent within a set whose members 
are already known to him. And this then prevents an 
interpretation from being assigned with have and be in which 
no presupposition of locatability is made, and in wFiich the 
members of some set are being defined into existence for the 
hearer. 
(p. 223) 
He concludes defining a group of 'set-existential' verbs as follows: 
... an indefinite 
descriptions referring inclusively is ... 
possible with ... verbs which function semantically to 
define existence within a set. I shall refer to all such 
verbs (including have and be) as 'set-existential' verbs. 
(ibid., p. 223) 
(4), therefore, could be accounted for, as suggested by Hawkins. Whether 
we could include. in the group of 'set-existential' verbs, verbs 
like 'live' and 
'wear' is a question that will have to be asked. However, this account can 
give a satisfactory explanation for the use of the indefinite article in relation 
to verbs like 'have' and 'be', when it is clear that the items thus denoted are 
closely related to persons therein referred to. 
This aspect - amongst 
others - of the use of the indefinite article is left unexplicated in Grice's 
theory. Moreover, the above explanation is not an ad hoc account to suit 
the data. It is well integrated within a more or less well defined and compre- 
hensive theory of the use of the definite and indefinite article. 
256 
Hawkins develops a theory of definite and indefinite descriptions in 
terms of two notions, 'inclusiveness' and 'exclusiveness'. The familiar 
'uniqueness-condition' of definite descriptions is considered to be a mani- 
festation of a more general regularity, which Hawkins calls 'inclusiveness 
within pragmatically defined parameters'. The fundamental distinction 
between the and a, in Hawkins' view, is that the former refers inclusively 
to all the objects that are relevant in a pragmatically delimited set, 
whilst 
the latter refers 'exclusively', i. e. there are supposed to exist more objects 
within the some set which are excluded in the reference at issue. 
3 
Therefore, Hawkins' theory is able to explain the use of the articles in 
(3). We talk of 'the roof' and not of 'a roof', because it is to be understood 
'inclusively' - there is only one roof to the house - while we talk of 'a 
window', because we thereby 'exclude' the rest of the windows belonging to 
the same set, i. e. the house referred to, and so on. Within the framework 
of these two notions, 'exclusiveness' and 'inclusiveness', Hawkins can explicate 
indefinite and definite article facts, which Grice's implicatures are unable to 
handle. 
Consider Grice's example of inalienable possession, 
4 
which, however, 
is referred to the indefinite article; 
(8) I broke a finger yesterday; 
the implicature here would be the reverse of what Grice predicted. Hawkins 
notes some similar examples. For example, with regard to (9), 
(9) Bill lost a finger in the war, 
he writes; "Human beings have ten fingers" (p. 180), a fact which makes (9) 
possible; but we cannot say 'Fred broke a head', meaning thereby that it was 
his own head he broke, for the simple reason that there is only one head to the 
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human body, and, therefore, we cannot refer to it 'exclusively' but only 
'inclusively'. 
To return to Grice's example (1) of conversational implicature, one 
could say that it is rather bizarre. Why understand 'by implicature' that 
the woman to be met is not X's wife, sister or mother? If the speaker wanted 
to say that X was meeting his wife or mother, he would say so. What is the 
difference between Grice's claim, then, that this understanding comes byway 
of implicature and a similar claim that in (10) below, 
(10) Jane went out with a friend, 
there is a conversational implicature attaching to the expression 'a friend' to the 
effect that the person Jane went out with was not her brother, father, husband, 
or even her close friend, Robin, who, in fact, the speaker might know was the 
person Jane went out with. By the same token, it can be reasonably argued, 
that when we say 'a table' by implicature we mean something else than 'a chair', 
'a door', 'the desk' or, indeed, anything at all. But this view leads to an 
intolerable trivialization of any explanatory concept, to the extent that it ceases 
to be a valuable 'working concept'. In other words, it results in a reduction- 
istic approach to language. 
As for the problem that Grice seems to face regarding such examples as 
(11), 
(11) I have been sitting in a car al I morning, 
in which no generalized, conversational implicature attaches to the use of the 
indefinite article imparting that it is not my car that is here referred to, it simply 
does not arise, given a sufficiently understood grammar, semantics and pragmatics 
of definite and indefinite reference in conjunction with an understanding of the 
function of conversational maxims. The reference of the expression 'a car' is 
left 'non-committal or vague'. Hawkins claims that indefinites can have a 
specific as well as a non-specific reading: 
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The identity of this referent will generally be arbitrary for 
the hearer unless identifiability can be guaranteed despite 
the indefiniteness of the reference. 
(Hawkins, op. cit., p. 212) 
The speaker's judgment in this case is apparently that it does not matter to the 
hearer whether it was his car or someone else's he was sitting in, this point being 
considered inconsequential and irrelevant to the purpose of his utterance. It 
is-, here considered to be sufficient for the hearer to understand by the expression 
'a car' any car at all. This is an instance indicative of the need for some form 
of hierarchy in the ordering of the maxims. For example, W. Quant' is not 
operative irrespective of 'MR' in this case, at least. 
It is quite clear that our understanding of definite and indefinite reference 
is not geared to the speaker's obscure implicatures. The speaker's use of 
referring expressions is governed by specific rules, which relate, not only to the 
syntax and semantics of the sentences, but also to our perceptual and cognitive 
understanding of the world, or more specifically, to cognitive schemes by which 
this understanding is represented. Dismissing the significance of these facts 
in terms of individual speaker's implicatures is tantamount, as has been claimed, 
to relinquishing the task facing the language analyst of giving a systematic 
account. 
Not only is Grice's account of generalized, conversational irnplicature 
incapable of accounting for all uses of 'an X' and 'the X' expressions (cf. his 
Urbana lectures) but, also, it fails to capture the generality underlying such uses 
which reflects our perception and understanding of the world. Why do we 
understand 'the Mummy' in 
(12) The baby cried. The mummy picked it up, 
as referring to the baby's mummy (Sacks, 1972)? How could conversational 
implicatures account for this understanding? 
5 
Why do we understand the 
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denoting expressions in (3), as referring to objects belonging to that particular, 
house, therein mentioned, and not to any other? How do we come to under- 
stand the expression 'the captain' in (13) as referring to the particular captain 
of the cruise mentioned in the first clause? 
(13) Last summer we went on a cruise. The captain 
was a very pleasant fellow. 
Grice's account cannot furnish the answers. 
Hawkins, 1978, in his insightful study of the article, accounts for 
these linguistic facts in terms of what he calls an 'associative relationship' 
holding between the underlined nounphrases in (13) and in (3). He distinguishes 
between two situational uses of the definite article, the immediate situation use, 
in which the hearer is instructed to 'locate' the referent in the immediate 
situation as in (14) and (15), 
(14) Don't go in there, chum. The dog will bite you. 
(15) Pass me the bucket, please, 
and the larger situation use, as when we talk of The Prime Minister. In (13), 
therefore, cruise will trigger off the associative term captain and in (3) house 
will trigger off associative terms like window and bedroom. "Immediate 
situation uses of the seem to differ, therefore", he writes, "from larger situation 
uses which do require either some general knowledge or a specific knowledge of 
the existence of certain objects in various situations" (ibid., p. 121). 
Although Hawkins is aware of the generality of specific and general 
knowledge since referents are to be located "within one of a number of sets of 
objects which are pragmatically defined on the basis of different types of shared 
speaker-hearer knowledge and the situation of utterance" (ibid., p. 17), he does 
not seem to fully appreciate the power of knowledge stereotypes. For example, 
failing to capture the stereotype underlying the utterance of (14), he classifies it 
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together with (15) as regards the use of the underlined expressions, and accounts 
for both of them in the same terms. As a result, he differentiates between 
immediate situation uses and larger situation uses acknowledging the presence of 
general knowledge or specific knowledge constraints of references in the latter 
category only. 
In relation to (14) he writes "when reference is being made using the to 
an object within the immediate situation of utterance there need be no prior 
knowledge on the hearer's part of the existence of that object. This is the 
case in (14). Not only does the dog in (14) not have to be visible, but the 
hearer need have no prior knowledge about it either" (ibid. , p. 104, numbers 
adapted). However, a simple consideration of similar examples to (14), 
in which 'the dog' is replaced by other expressions denoting other animals, will 
prove his argument ill-founded. 
(16) Don't go in there, chum. (The wolf ) will bite you. 
(The mouse) 
(The ion ) 
(Tesnae) 
Clearly, unless there is a 'visibility condition', as in (15), a clarificatory wh- 
question, or a yes-no question, is in line 
here, a characteristic of unsuccessful 
reference, whilst, as argued by Hawkins, this is not the case in (14). Yet, 
both (14) and (16) share the characteristic that the hearer does not know which 
specific entity is being referred to by the underlined expressions, nor are these 
entities to be seen. In view of the fact that no prior knowledge is possessed 
by the hearer of the existence of the referents in (16), (14) and (17), 
(17) Don't go in there chum. The butler will throw you out, 
why are only (14) and (17) successful in their references, while 
(16) will prompt 
clarificatory questions 
if the referent is not visible? (14) and (17) are readily 
understood because we 
have prior knowledge of households keeping dogs to keep 
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off strangers and households with butlers to receive callers. Although we do 
not possess specific prior knowledge (CMCAs) in these cases regarding the 
specific dog and butler referred to in (14) and (17), yet, they can both be 
channelled into the relevant stereotypes (SBKBs) of which we do have prior 
knowledge -a point Hawkins fails to grasp. We possess no such stereotypes 
in relation to (16) or (15), and that is why either a visibility condition, or prior 
knowledge of the existence of the referents (i. e. special content, CMCAs) is 
needed for the reference to be successful. 
Stereotypes (SBKBs), or frames, as they have been called can be likened 
to knowledge trees having a variety of nodes with dummies at their ends, which, 
however, are filled in in linguistic situations with items from admissible cate- 
gories. So we cannot say, or understand (18), 
(18) They climbed up the tree and rang the bell, 
while we can (19), or (20), 
(19) They walked up the stairs and rang the bell. 
(20) They climbed up the tree and ate the fruit. 
We have prior knowledge stereotypes that will receive (19) and (20), but not 
(18). 
His failure to capture such knowledge stereotypes leads Hawkins to wonder 
what "the parameters defining the set of possible associates" are in (21). 
(21) The man drove past our house in a car. The dog 
was barking furiously. 
Understandably, he is unable to find any associative links between a car and the 
dog. The expression a car can trigger off a number of associated objects, for 
example, the steering wheels, the gears, the hood, the boot, the clutch, etc., 
but certainly not the dog, although, he notes, we are familiar with situations 
where dogs travel in cars. Thus he fails to pick up the expression our house 
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which actually triggers off an associative relation between the concepts the 
house and the dog. Consider (22), 
(22) The man drove past the tree. The dog was 
barking furiously, 
in which CMCAs are needed to provide special context as in (15) and (16). 
To use the terminology from Artificial Intelligence, two scripts or frames are 
triggered off (activated) simultaneously in the some sequence in (21). 
In his Urbana lectures, Grice claims that existential presupposition6 
can be represented as conversational implicature by regarding the first two 
clauses of the Russellian expansion of a definite description as having common 
ground status, and not as being controversial or likely to be challenged. For 
instance, he says, when you say, 
(23) My aunt's cousin went to the concert, 
when you know that the hearer is not aware of the existence of your cunt, let 
alone of her cousin, the supposition is not that their existence is common ground, 
but rather that it is uncontroversial "in the sense that it is something which you 
would expect the hearer to take from you" (Urbana lecture IV). However, 
Grice does not question the grounds of such a supposition on which an utterance 
such as (23) can be accepted (received) unquestionably, i. e. is felicitous as 
regards its definite description my aunt's cousin; that is on the assumption that 
the speaker has an auntie and the auntie has a cousin, on what grounds does the 
hearer take his (the speaker's) word for it? (23) will not, as Grice rightly 
notes, invoke any clarificatory question, unless the hearer actually believed the 
opposite. But how can conversational implicature account for the definite 
description in (24), uttered during a discussion about peanuts? 
(24) My snake likes peanuts, too. 
Not only will (24) invoke a wh- or a em-no question, if the hearer is not aware 
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that I keep a snake as a pet, but it will also thereby effect a shift of the topic 
of conversation. Why is it that in (24) the existential condition of the 
definite description 'my snake' cannot be taken as common ground, i. e. as 
implicated, neither can the hearer take the speaker's word for it, so to speak, 
whilst in (25) he can? 
(25) My dog likes peanuts, too. 
These are facts that Grice would have to address. 
This discussion of Grice's generalized, conversational implicature, 
has served inter alia to point out once more the significance of stereotypes of 
knowledge in language use and language understanding. As has been seen, 
background knowledge has been represented in the form of scripts and frames 
by workers in Artificial Intelligence. Sacks, 1972, formulated some part of 
our knowledge schemes in terms of categorization devices. (Also cf. Schegloff, 
1967, p. 156) The similarities of these two methods are obvious. More 
work could be done and must be done in this area, but until the time comes when 
a better working concept is formulated, we had better make use of what we have 
in hand. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
In the first part of this thesis we focused on linguistic items that, 
according to Grice, give rise to conventional implicatures. The 
linguistic behaviour of 'therefore' and 'but', the paradigms of conventional 
implicatures, were examined in detail. It was found that there is a 
significant degree of divergence between the behaviour of these two items. 
This led us to the conclusion that they cannot be characterized as instances 
of the some linguistic phenomenon, as Grice claims. It was suggested 
that the inclusion of all aspects of meaning of 'therefore' within a semantic 
theory would not raise as many issues as an inclusion of all the meaning 
aspects of 'but' would. 
As concerns 'but', it was found that its conventional implicata are 
variable and idiosyncratic, rather than invariable as predicted by their 
conventional character. Whether we would opt to handle non-truth- 
functional meaning aspects of 'but' in terms of a pragmatic account in the 
guise of conventional implicatures, or account for them within a broadly 
defined semantic theory, or a unitary theory of language, is very much an 
open issue. However, we feel compelled to point out the factors that 
are conducive to the supposition that the class of conventional implicatures 
is misbegotten, and that what has been called conventional implicature is 
really part of the meaning proper of the lexical items involved: 
Features of conventional implicatures 
(1) Conventional implicatures are not dependent on what is said 
and yet, 
(2) They are not dependent on features of discourse either. 
(3) They do not arise from an interplay of what is said with the CP 
and maxims. 
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(4) No other independent procedure is available to determine them. 
(5) They are generated by the conventional meaning of particular 
words. 
Conventional implicatures form a class that has been rather neglected 
in the literature; hence, not many proposals have been made about how 
they might be treated, either within semantics proper as truth-functional 
meaning aspects, or within an alternative framework. Katz and Langendoen, 
1976, for example, favour the former approach, since they regard them as 
semantic entailments. But, then, they do not consider 'but' at all; their 
view, therefore, reflects their consideration of 'therefore' only. Harnish, 
1977, is equally reluctant to concede the existence of a class of conventional 
implicature. Parret, 1977, on the other hand, claims that, though convent- 
ional implicatures can be represented in a pragmatic construction, yet they can 
be explained truth-functionally. However, it is not very clear how the 
various systems of regularities work within his pragmatic representation. In 
contrast, Moravcsik, 1976, draws a sharp distinction between natural languages 
and formal languages, partly because of the inadequacy of the latter to handle 
linguistic phenomena such as 'lexical implications'. 
However, the only formal treatment that exists to our knowledge is that 
by Karttunen and Peters, 1975,1979. Their treatment is based on Montague's 
framework. The concept of meaning is extended by allowing conventional 
implicata to be represented in it, as well as a heritage function that assigns 
implicatures of argument phrases to the complex phrases that are constructed 
from them. The meaning of an expression, in their treatment then, consists of 
an extension expression ae, an implicature expression ai and a heritage 
expression ah. Their notion of conventional implicature is, however, wider 
than Grice's, since sources of implicatures can be, not only lexical items, but 
certain grammatical constructions as well. More specifically, they hope 
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that certain phenomena that have been called pragmatic presuppositions can be 
profitably handled as conventional implicata in their framework. 
As regards 'but', it has been suggested that in an interactional represent- 
ation of language, it could be viewed as 'signalling' and 'labelling' our next 
move in relation to the local purpose of our utterance, or to the overall direction 
of the conversation. This is a very general and tentative proposal, and its 
tenability largely depends on the viability of an interactional model of language 
representation, which at the present stage of research, does not seem to be 
available. 
In the second part of the thesis our primary concern was with the concept 
of conversational implicatures. Our aim was to reconsider the notion, and 
see whether it has been used to describe a homogeneous class of phenomena. 
To this end we looked closely at some of Grice's examples of conversational 
implicatures, and it was found that a wide range of linguistic facts have been 
handled in terms of conversational implicature. The class of conversational 
implicatures, therefore, was found to be heterogeneous. It was concluded 
that the term 'conversational implicature' was a misnomer for a variety of 
linguistic facts, which however were, not only misleadingly but also inade- 
quately, accounted for in terms of conversational implicature. 
Grice never gave a specific definition of conversational implicature, 
nor did he propose any sufficient or necessary conditions for its identification. 
The advantages such a loose characterization of conversational implicature 
accrues are obvious, and, in many quarters, welcome. A variety of intract- 
able linguistic facts that resist an explanation within the framework of semantics 
can be claimed to be conversationally implicated. 
What are the demerits then of such a view? The question to be asked 
is how much is thus explained. True, Grice offered a theory of Conversation, 
267 
and specified certain rules of discourse therein, which shed some light on what 
goes on when we engage in conversation. However, neither the structure 
of conversation nor the notion of implicature are fully clarified to warrant an 
adequate explication of linguistic phenomena in terms of conversational 
implicature. The view taken here is that it is unrevealing, and hence 
unappealing, to account for a variety of intriguing phenomena in terms of a 
poorly described and insufficiently defined notion. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that a more rigorous definition of the concept 
of implicature will have as a result the exclusion from the class of the vast 
majority of the phenomena therein housed, leaving behind however a homo- 
geneous class of linguistic facts that could be profitably accounted for in terms 
of conversational implicature. In chapter 6, therefore, we suggested some 
criteria towards a more stringent redefinition of conversational implicature. 
It should be admitted that this definition is bound to come up against a lot of 
problems, but then this is only to be expected when more stringent conditions 
are set out. 
We did not look at cases of purported conversational implicatures in which 
the notion is used to explain phenomena that relate closely to the linguistic 
form of utterances (cf. for example, Kempson, 1975, Wilson, 1975, Gazdar, 
1976,1979). It goes without saying that, in our view, the notion is 
misused, though conveniently so, in these cases. It is also clear that an 
approach to the study of language that anticipates sharp dichotomies between 
semantics, on the one hand, and pragmatics - that most often than not 
serves as a 'waste-basket' - on the other, is rather not favoured in this 
study. In any event, the sort of stiff orthodoxy, characteristic of the 
interpretive approach, to the analysis of language, epitomised in Katz' work, 
is obviously not countenanced in this thesis. This approach fails to capture 
the most intriguing linguistic facts by insisting on the doctrine of pure 
grammaticality. 
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Our examination of the examples of conversational implicature was 
motivated by our view that it is uninformative and misleading to view bodies 
of knowledge, against the background of which all linguistic activity takes 
place, as being conversationally implicated. As Dretske, 1972, would 
put it, 
To elevate an assumption or presupposition made in the 
premises to the conclusion of one's argument is, if you 
will, to commit a pragmatic fallacy. 
(p. 434) 
And since a conversational implicatum in an utterance is what the speaker 
intends to ultimately convey to his audience, it can very well be likened to 
the conclusion of an argument. 
It has been argued that (87), 
(87) Jones didn't pay the bill, 
which according to Grice gives rise to conversational implicatures in certain 
contexts, can be more profitably and systematically handled in terms of 
intonational meanings. It can be noted though, that originally what goes 
wrong in this example is the fact that Grice considers it in abstraction from 
any context, and then tries to associate it with some form of context via 
implicatures due to intonational features. 
Intonational aspects of meaning are very complicated and difficult to 
handle since they intertwine with linguistic facts that are not well understood 
or described in linguistic theory such as presupposed knowledge (presuppositions), 
focus and topic, theme and rheme, etc. However, the significance of 
these aspects of meaning (intonational) has often been stressed, and it has been 
claimed that they must be treated in the grammar of the language (cf. for 
example, O'Connor and Arnold, 1961). For instance, Halliday, 1970, 
writes: 
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The different meanings carried by various possible intonation 
patterns are part of English grammar ... The distinctions 
expressed by the choice of different tones are also distinctions 
in meaning, and they are of the same general kind; so they 
too belong in the realm of grammar (and, within grammar, the 
realm of syntax). Intonation is one of the many kinds of 
resources that are , avb i lable in the language for making 
meaningful distinctions. 
ýP. 21) 
Searle, 1968, notes that "deep syntactic structure, stress and intonation contour" 
are "bearers of meaning", as well as the uttered sentence and its surface 
structure. He adds that stress and intonation contour are also "crucial deter- 
minants of illocutionary force". 
In chapter 8 we tried to view communication as a meaningful process that 
takes place against the background of shared assumptions and beliefs which have 
been thought to be segmented into more or less distinct chunks. These chunks 
of knowledge have been called 'scripts', when they are episodic, or 'frames' 
when they are static. The speech-act performed by an interactant would call 
up a specific chunk of knowledge which would help to place it in a certain 
frame or script. However, physical contextual features interact with our 
linguistic acts to place the latter in a specific frame or activity type (cf. 
Levinson, 1978). Thus an interpretation of the utterance spoken would be 
made available. This process, aided by some form of the CP or coupled with 
sequencing rules would predict and delimit a class of next utterances, or next 
activities more generally, out of which 'a next' would be selected. 
As has been shown in chapter 8, this is not always a viable proposition, 
however neat such a procedure seems to be. Besides, the members of a thus 
delimited class can be infinite, a point that is worrying if no specific constraints 
can be placed on membership 
in it. Moreover, a script or an activity type, 
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for that matter, is not always identifiable. As a last resort we had to re ly on 
the invocation of largely unspecified classes of knowledge and assumptions 
which we called respectively SBKBs and CMCAs in order to enable ourselves 
to account for linguistic events. It maybe the case, then, that such 
notions as scripts and frames (Artificial Intelligence), 'schemata' (Hudson, 1980) 
activity types (Levinson), Frames (Goffman, 1975), and speech events (Hymes, 
1972) can be of some utility in conventionalized, and thus more or less predictable, 
uses of language (see Strawson, 1971) or in "formal settings" (see Atkinson, 1979) 
such as rituals, ceremonies, courts, games, dramas, etc. 
A promising approach to linguistic problems is offered in Levinson, 1978x, 
1978b. He sketches an interactional model of conversation1 which, in con- 
junction with Grice's maxims claims to mimic the way in which language functions. 
This model is the product of the union of a theory of language and a theory of 
interaction. Key notions in his model are the goal-driven and dual-control led 
nature of conversation, the interlocking of actors' goals, the recipient-design 
and rationality-based structure of dialogue, amongst others. 
This model is set up to explicate, inter alia, 'multiple-duty' utterances, 
which are not accountable within the framework of speech-act theory. There- 
fore, to a question such as (1)A, 
(1) A: Is John there? 
B: You can reach him at extension thirty four sixty two, 
one can answer as in (1)B, which is not a direct answer to A's question and yet 
is a cooperative response. This fact is explained by Levinson, 1978, in terms 
of his notion of the goal-driven nature of conversation. In answering A's 
question, B responds to a higher-order intention (goal) of A's question (cf. also, 
Cicourel, 1972). 
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Levinson's proposal, indeed, seems to be a very promising and commend- 
able approach to a description of how language works. However, it is 
immediately noticed that all the examples considered by Levinson are cases 
of responses aiming at prior speaker's higher-level goals of their utterances 
as in (1). This is all well, but the question that arises is whether the 
interactional model in question is capable of accounting for a majority of 
speech events. For instance, can examples such as the ones extensively 
considered here, i. e. (86) and (2)2 - in which the responses do not seem 
to address a (higher-level) goal in A's utterance - be satisfactorily accounted 
for within Levinson's framework? In both (86) and (2) B's utterance seems to 
be an appropriate and cooperative response to A's utterance and yet it does not 
constitute an explicit rejection of the preceding proposal in (2) nor a direct 
suggestion of where petrol is to be found in (86). So much so, that Grice 
had to devise the notion of conversational implicature to account for the fact 
that utterances such as (86)B are in fact cooperative responses to the utterances 
preceding them. 
Clearly, Levinson's notion of the goal-directed nature of conversation, 
so prominently figuring in his account, is not the key issue in what is going on 
in these examples, i. e. in (86) and in (2). In both examples, B does not 
address A's (higher-level) goals in producing his utterance. After all there 
are no - or at least there need not be any - higher level goals in a 
proposal like (2)A in an ordinary context. Instead the problem lies in (2)B's 
multi-purpose utterance ('I have work to do'), in the 'how' it constitutes a co- 
operative response. There is no 'interlocking of goals' in evidence in such 
cases. What then? 
In a previous section we argued that (86)B is a cooperative and appro- 
priate response to its preceding utterance (86)A on the grounds of assumed mutual 
knowledge - which we labelled SBKBs. Items of this class are triggered by 
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current assumptions - dubbed CMCAs in this study - which place constraints 
on the selection and interpretation of the next utterance. These conditions 
in conjunction with the cooperative principle, or some form of it in the guise of 
sequencing rules of conversation, have been said to enable us to interpret the 
next utterance as cooperative, i. e. as cohering to the preceding one. Whether 
they can also provide constraints for defining and delimiting a class whose 
members could constitute an appropriate 'next' is very much a moot point. The 
some method was followed in trying to explicate in what ways (2)B constitutes 
not only an appropriate next, but also performs the act of rejecting the proposal 
made in the previous speech act. 
However, in considering which conditions make (2)B a cooperative 
response to (2)A, we tried to view such bodies of knowledge as SBKBs and 
CMCAs as more or less structured chunks of knowledge. This enterprise has 
failed in a large measure - at least in cases of interaction which do not take 
place within the frame of specifiable, conventionalized activities, as seems to 
be the case with (86) and (2) - leaving us with two vague and unstructured 
bodies of knowledge. Admittedly, CMCAs are a motley of unspecified ass- 
umptions pertaining to each speech event and constraining it to a certain 
extent. The members of this latter class could be likened to the items that 
fill in the dummy symbols at the end nodes of a tree which would represent our 
conventionalized static or episodic knowledge of the world, thought of as 
being part of the class called SBKBs. 
Is then Levinson's notion of activity type a viable proposition for tent- 
atively structuring items which in our account would fall within the purview 
of our two classes? Let us see how he defines activity types: An activity 
type is taken to refer to "a fuzzy category whose focal members are goal- 
defined, socially constituted, bounded events with constraints on participants, 
setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions" 
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(Levinson, 1978a, p. 5). Paradigm examples that are cited are teaching 
(also cf. Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975), a jural interrogation, a dinner party, 
a football game, and so on. Activities are structured into subparts or 
episodes, and their structural constraints may define the personnel, as well as 
the allocation of roles in an activity. Further constraints are placed on the 
time and place of the activity. More structural constraints are mentioned 
in Levinson, 1978, which can be more abstract "having to do with topical 
cohesion and the functional adequacy of contributions to the activity". 
Levinson's notion of activity type -a close approximation or the 
linguistics equivalent of, the concept of script used by workers in artificial 
intelligence - is appealed to in order to account for utterances constituting 
specific acts. For example, the utterance of a customer spoken at a green- 
grocer's shop, 
A: That's a nice one.. 
accompanied by a gesture of pointing at a lettuce constitutes - and is taken 
as constituting - the act of selecting that particular lettuce. Not only 
does utterance A count as selecting a lettuce but it also counts as a request 
that it be wrapped, and an undertaking that the utterer will'pay for it. 
Levinson explains the force of A's utterance in terms of the expectations 
governing the activity of shopping. 
As an interlude, it could be noted that, indeed, many jokes depend on 
the interaction between utterances and scripts, or activity types, as, for 
example, when an utterance that would fit in a different activity type is made 
in the context of another. An example of this instance would be the 
following talk-exchange, taking place in a pet shop where A is the shop- 
keeper and B is a customer interested in buying a pet. 
4 
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(3) A: How about rabbits? 
B: Nice in a stew, aren't they? 
3 
However, (3) would not be funny uttered in the context of a butcher's shop. 
Searle, 1975, considering indirect speech acts, writes: 
The question, 'How do I know he has made a request when 
he only asked me a question about my abilities? ' may be 
like the question, 'How do I know it was a car when all I 
perceived was a flash going past me on the highway? ' 
Implicit in this quotation is our appeal to stereotypes of knowledge, For 
example, we do not expect to see a star flashing along a motorway, though 
if we perceived the same flash in the sky we would be inclined to say that 
we had seen a UFO, rather than a car. The incidents of the flash on the 
motorway and of the flash in the sky channel into stereotypes which have been 
well learned and are embedded in our conceptual world. Such stereotypes 
help us to perceive such utterances as, 
(4) Can you pass me the salt? 
as indirect speech acts, when these are made in the context of a script or 
activity type that would predict that (4) is something to be expected in it. 
But if (4) is thrown at me while I am waiting for my bus at the bus-stop, I 
would be completely confused. I 
So much so for cases in which an activity type is identifiable. But 
what about cases in which the identification of an activity type within which 
the speech event occurs is not feasible? Moreover, to be in a position to 
predict the expectations governing a speech activity, we must, in the first 
place, be in a position to identify the activity type within which it takes 
place and, hence, specify the rules governing it. The specification of 
speech activity rules can often be adequate for specifying these expectancies. 
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However, how do we know which 'next' is a cooperative response to the 
proposal in (2)A? We saw that a response like 'Margaret Thatcher 
addressed the conference yesterday' or 'I have to tie my shoelaces' will not 
satisfy our expectations. 
We therefore have to rely on more principles that might help delimit 
a class of responses - though its members may be infinite - that would, 
in theory, satisfy the conversational demands set by the preceding utterance. 
Indeed, Levinson did not suppose that all problems would be settled within a 
framework of activity types without the aid of other factors. He assumes 
that Grice's cooperative principle is an indispensable apparatus, although it 
seems that some expectations governing activities are but another name for 
some of Grice's maxims. 
4 
It is widely accepted in the linguistics literature that a cooperative 
principle and its maxims, as described by Grice, 1975, or some form of it, 
are at play in conversation. This principle, albeit fundamental and power- 
ful in conversation, is very general. Failing to place (86) and (2) within 
a specifiable activity we would have to rely very heavily on knowledge 
derived from Grice's cooperative maxims. The maxim that concerns us in 
this case is that of Relation, which specifies that the next speaker's utterance 
should be relevant to the previous one. However, it does not specify the 
terms in which this relation is to be realised and defined, as has been seen. 
We would therefore come across the same problem: What constitutes 
relevance? In what terms is it to be described? How does it function 
to interpret the next utterance? 
If activity types or scripts are further studied and their structure is 
rigorously analysed, it is conceivable that parts of Grice's maxims can be 
collapsed into rules or expectancies therein described. 
One, of course, 
can argue that were something 
like this to happen, it would result in a 
276 
deplorable state of affairs, since general principles applying to all linguistic 
activities might be lost into idiosyncratically defined particularized 
activities. This need not be so though. Since such rationality 
principles, as the CP offered by Grice, describe, or prescribe, man's 
linguistic conduct, and since activities or scripts are related to man's 
linguistic conduct, these principles cannot lose their general import. Be- 
sides, the content of these conversational rules is too general and totally 
unrelated to other parameters, at the present stage of research, to effectively 
constrain linguistic behaviour. The view taken here, therefore, is that 
future research must start "cutting through the jungle" of language interaction 
with bodies of knowledge. 
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NOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Some pragmatic rules foreshadowing Grice's maxims are to be found in 
Nowell-Smith, 1957. For example, a close approximation to Grice's 
maxim of Quality would be Nowell-Smith's rule 1 and rule 2, which 
run as follows: 
Rule 1: When a speaker uses a sentence to make a statement, it is 
contextually implied that he believes it to be true. 
Rule 2: A speaker contextually implies that he has what he himself 
belie es to be good reasons for his statement. 
A third rule in Nowell-Smith, op. cit., concerns relevance and is phrased 
as follows: 
Rule 3: What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the 
interests of his audience. (pp. 72-73) 
Rules of discourse are also implicit in Urmson, 1963. Cf. also Strawson, 
1964, his 'Principle of Relevance' (p. 97) and his two principles of the 
Presumption of Ignorance and Knowledge (pp. 86-87) which relate to 
Grice's 'M. Quant'. 
2. Grice also distinguishes between two types of implicatures in general: 
conventional and non-conventional implicatures. Conversational 
implicatures, he claims, have a species-to-genus relationship to non- 
conventional implicatures. However, he does not define or talk about 
any other subclass of non-conventional implicatures, neither does he 
specify any set of characteristics of the more general category of non- 
conventional implicatures. 
3. Also cf. William James Lectures, III, 1978, and Urbana Lectures, IV. 
4. However, Grice cites the following example as a case of explicit can- 
cellation of the generalized conversational implicature attaching to 'if 
p then q': 
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If you put that bit of sugar in water it will dissolve, 
though so for as I know there could be no way of knowing 
in advance that this is what will happen. 
(1967b-William James Lectures, IV fn. ) 
The oddity of this statement is acknowledged by Grice. 
5. The second lecture of the William James Lectures at Harvard University, 
1967, where the Cooperative Principle and the concept of implicature 
are discussed and the third lecture of the same series are the only ones 
published (Grice, 1975,1978). The other lectures remain unpublished. 
6. The interested reader is referred to Cohen, 1971, and Walker, 1975, for 
a discussion of the implicatures attaching to conjunctive, conditional and 
disjunctive statements. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 1 
1. It should be noted that 'therefore' may be represented by the turnstile, 
'F- ', in metalogic. 
2. Cf. Strawson, 1952, chapter 3, part JT for such a view. 
3. It must be noted that Grice does not explicitly say that to assert (3) is 
tantamount to asserting (5). However, to assume that to assert (3) 
is to assert two different propositions cannot be right, in case the two 
sentences are inferentially linked (see below). Besides, we have to 
account for conjunctions of the form 'pt, and, therefore, g' (cf. Grice, 
1971, p. 56), and, also, for negated forms of (3), such as (i) 
(i) It is not the case that he is an Englishman, and 
therefore brave. 
In any event, this issue will not be pursued here, as it does not have any 
decisive relevance on the following argument. 
. 4. 'therefore' is the standard conclusion-indicator; its presence, however, does not always signal the presence of an argument since requests, 
commands or even questions can follow it (cf. Copi, 1968, p. 16). 
5. Cf. Quine, 1952, p. 170: "... the tacit premises ... invoked must 
always be statements which can be presumed to be believed true by all 
parties at the outset" (emphasis added . 
Stalnaker, 1978, notes 
that the propositions that are presented as common ground or mutual 
knowledge need not really be common or mutual knowledge: "The 
speaker need not even believe them. He may presuppose any 
proposition that he finds it convenient to assume for the purpose of the 
conversation, provided he is prepared to assume that his audience will 
assume it along with him" (p. 321). 
6. Cf. Gazdar, 1976: 3.1, though we would not agree that it is more, or 
equally, probable that (6) had been asserted prior to (3). 
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7. Also see Hempel, 1968, on enthymematically formulated explanations. 
8. Cf. Strawson, 1952, p. 195: "To generalise is to 'speak generally'. " 
9. Hempel, 1968 
10. Grice is not alone in claiming that 'therefore' plays no role in truth- 
valuation. Isard, 1975, for example, contends that 'therefore', 
together with some other expressions, "play the same sort of role as 
these extra trappings in natural deductive systems. That is, they do 
not affect the truth, with respect to any model, of the assertion with 
which they are associated. Instead, they say something about the 
sequence of changes of belief that the speaker is trying to induce" (p. 295). 
11. The type of causality is not thought to be relevant here. 
12. Ryle, 1971, would claim that (3) cannot be a statement, but only an 
argument. One of the criteria posited by Ryle for distinguishing between 
arguments and statements is that no recognisable question can result from 
the former by shifting its verb and replacing its ful (stop by a question-mark 
as the case may be with statements. Moreover, (3) cannot do the 
'premissory job' (ibid. ). It cannot be either the premises or the con- 
clusions in arguments. And as Ryle says: "it is patent that arguments 
themselves are not statements. The conclusion of one argument may be 
the premiss of another argument, but an argument itself cannot be the 
premiss or conclusion of an argument" (ibid. , p. 304). 
13. See Dijk, 1977, on 'indirect derivability' "... B is derivable from A 
together with a set of propositions: 
¬r UA'3 B. " 
14. Cf. Brown, 1955, on inferring: "I do not merely presentpas a good 
enough reason for thinking that g, I also indicate that it is ecause it is 
the case that p that I think that g ... " (p. 353). 
15. At this point it could be pointed out that when Katz, 1972, argues that 
he cannot find any difference between cases like (3), on the one hand, 
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and sentence (i) 'The reason he is brave is that he is an Englishman', on 
the other, what he has in mind is the explanatory interpretation of (3), 
and not the inferential one. 
16. Ryle, 1971, says that 'because' sentences are explanations;, and therefore 
statements and not arguments, but he also notes that "there is a didactic. 
use of 'because' sentences, in which they function much more like arguments 
than like statements" (p. 309). In such cases 'because' is preposed. 
17. But note that even so, p and q would have to be connected by some form of 
'truth-dependency' stating that the truth or falsity of g is entailed respect- 
ively by the truth or falsity of p. 
18. Cf. Ryle, 1971 , who argues that inferences of the form 'p, therefore g' can 
never be true or false. 
19. Cf. Quine and Ullian, 1970: "Often the search for an explanation is the 
search for a cause. " Also note Ryle's, 1949, distinction between active 
and dispositional senses of predicates. 
20. Ryle, 1949, Chapters ] and V. 
21. Even on the assumption that the general statement assumed includes the 
universal quantifier, note that it can only take the form of the statement 
'All Englishmen hitherto observed are brave. ' Also, it is well known that 
general statements (proportional generalizations) are not necessarily 
falsified by a few counterexamples or exceptions. 
22. This point need not concern us here as it need not be countenanced. For 
a criticism see R. Brown, 1957. However, our point is amply illustrated 
in this quotation. 
23. Cf. Alexander, 1967, Chapter XIIT. 
rs 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 2 
1. Cf. 'The President of the United States of America is a religious man, 
and, therefore, the grass needs mowing. ' 
2. Cf. Grice, 1978, p. 117, who says that 'It is not the case that A but B' 
is uncomfortable. 
3. Cf. Moravscik, 1965,1976, McCawley, 1978, Givon, 1978, Brown and 
Levinson, 1978. 
4. Notice that (15) becomes acceptable if 'too' is appended to it. 
5. Of course one might answer as in (i): 
(i) That's not true. He's--not an Englishman. 
But by uttering (i) one is a fortiori negating the relation of consequentiality 
or, more aptly, by negating tl e grounds on which this relation is based, he 
invalidates any claims for such a relation. 
6. Incidentally, it can be noted that Harnish, 1977, touches on the inferential 
use of 'He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave' when he defines the case 
of the conventional implicature of 'therefore' as follows: a therefore g: 
q follows from p (perhaps: p provides good reasons for believing g (our 
emphasis). 
7. This example is given in Grice, 1960. 
8. On the grounds that your reasons for regarding him as brave are different, 
though you accept the truth of both conjuncts. 
9. By means of a conjunction that has a standard (invariant, constant) meaning. 
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10. Cf. Wilks, 1975, who says that 'humans do not reject utterances but they 
try to understand them'. Also see Leech, 1974, pp. 106-7. 
11. But note that not every contradiction is unintelligible and thus unemploy- 
able in conversational situations. For example, 'I am and I am not' as 
a response to 'Are you well now? ' is intelligible (see Strawson, 1952, 
ch. I, part I, Hungerland, 1960, pp. 214,232, Lyons, 1977, V. 2, pp. 
417-418) as in 'He is neither rich nor poor. ' But such examples show, 
as Leech, op. cit., notes: 'that a polarity can accommodate a middle 
ground belonging neither to one pole nor to the other' (p. 108). This 
is not true, though, of binary taxonomies. In our example, however, 
there is no case for any such scale of polarity, and what (28) involves is 
a contradiction, or inconsistency, in any kind of context. 
12. That is, independent criteria the employment of which will differentiate 
conventional implicatures from what can be characterized as meaning 
proper. 
13. But see Sadock, 1978, who argues that there is no principled reason why 
two words do not differ in meaning in that one includes in its meaning the 
very implicature that is detached from the other. 
14. In the sense of what is asserted. 
15. Note that (i) cannot be a report of (24): 
(i) She said that he was an Englishman and therefore she said 
that he was brave. 
16. See Halliday and Hasan, 1977, p. 203, on structural ellipsis. In trans- 
formational terms it is repeated material that is deleted. See Gleitmau, 
1965, on ellipsis in conjunctions; see p. 274 for rules for deletion of 
identical strings in conjunction. Also see Green, 1973, for conjunction 
reduction. 
17. Cf. Z. Harris, 1964 (1957), p. 170: 
Members of the class C ('and', 'but', 'more than', etc. ) 
have in general the property that they occur between two 
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instances of the same construction. Given an utterance 
containing C, it is in general possible to find a construction 
X immediately before C and a construction Y immediately 
after C, such that X and Y have the same status within the 
next larger construction. 
However, this widely accepted observation (cf. Chomsky, 1957) holds 
for cases in which the contrastive meaning of 'but' is operative within 
the conjunction and does not extend beyond it. 
18. See, for example, sentences like 'Fand therefore a' or negative sentences 
in which the second conjunct has to be conjoined by 'and' as in -(sand 
therefore g). This is indicative of the absence of any conjunctive 
aspects of meaning in the case of 'therefore'. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 3 
1. Clearly truth-values are assigned only to what is said in its fuller 
identification. 
2. Cf. Katz, 1972, p. 445. 
3. If it is argued that there can be a point of contrast between the two 
conjuncts in (45) then it is easy to construct a similar example, for 
example, 'I went to see him but his mother was there', for which the 
claim that there is a contrast between the two conjuncts would not hold. 
In any case, it is beyond dispute that a very widespread use of 'but' 
follows this pattern. Cf. an oft-quoted (Pittenger et al, 1960, 
Wootton, 1975, Turner, 1976, Heritage, 1978, Owen, 19978) example 
though for different purposes: 
'What do you do? ' 
'I'm a nurse, but my husband won't let me work. ' 
In this example it is even more evident that 'but' does not contrast the 
two conjuncts as it is an answer to the question 'What do you do? ' 
'4. Cf. R. Lakoff's, 1971, p. 133, definition of 'semantic-opposition-but'. 
5. From G. Lakoff, 1971b. 
6. R. Lakoff's view of expectations involved in this case are different (cf. 
p. 133), but they are rejected here on the grounds that they are not 
considered to be general enough to constitute general presuppositions 
occasioned by our knowledge of the world. Besides the presuppositions 
as rendered here seem to us to be more natural, especially in the absence 
of any context. 
7. Our suspicion is that (49) becomes more problematic in cases of 'but' in 
which the subjects of the two conjuncts are not identical. This jibes 
with our supposition that cases of 'but' which involve general statements 
tend to have identical subjects in both conjuncts. But see below. 
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8. Sacks et al, 1974 
9. Cf. Wilson's example, 1975, p. 119. It is primarily this kind of 'but' 
that Dascal and Katriel, 1977, have in mind in their study of Hebrew 
equivalents of 'but'. 
10. It can be remarked that the statement of the form A -) B in this case, 
viz. 'If it's January, it's cold', is generic and general; whilst the one 
of the form A 8c N B, viz. 'It's January and not cold', is specific about 
this January. It is suspected that Dijk's definition is adequate to 
handle those cases of 'but' that belong to group `3 , fig. 9, section 3.3.3. These cases contain 'near-antonyms', on the one hand, as defined by 
R. Lakoff, 1971 (see below), and 'a flavour' of expectations, on the other. 
This combination determining the use of 'but' seems to be captured in (49). 
11. But see Yorick Wilks, 1975, for a criticism of Lakoff's deductive procedures. 
12. See R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 137, for some similar examples, (75) - (79) which, 
she says, are not accountable for, within her analysis. 
13. Without relying on the meanings of the two conjuncts. 
14. See R. Lakoff, 1971, p. 233. Put differently, and as some analysts would 
like to claim, while (58) functions as an explicit cancellation of conversational 
implicatures generated by the first conjunct - and (45) as an implicit can- 
cellation of the implicatures of its first conjunct - this cannot be the case 
in (27) and (57). 
15. Consider the following recorded talk-exchange in Vennemann, 1975: 
Policeman at the front door: 'Does Mrs. Miller, the widow, live here? ' 
Lady: 'I am Mrs. Miller, but I am not a widow. ' 
16. We here have in mind those language analysts that do not extend the notion 
of conventional implicatures to instances of what have been called pre- 
suppositions of the sentence or pragmatic presuppositions (Karttunen and 
Peters, 1975, Parret, 1977, Sadock, 1978, Lyons, 1981 , etc. ) but those 
who see conventional implicatures as described by Grice, i. e. attached to 
lexical items and not to larger linguistic units. 
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17. 'Analysis' or 'citation' refers to the main component of a lexicon entry. 
18. 'Directive' refers to an extra component or implication of some dictionary 
entries, like the indication enclosed in angled parantheses below: 
'Snub: (ad jective)Zf a nose7, concave'. 
19. But see Kempson, 1975, who attributes to R. Lakoff the claim that 'but' 
has two senses (p. 55). 
20. This idea of 'opposition' or 'contrast' between the two conjuncts-conjoined 
by 'but' is not new. Gleitman, 1965, in her pioneering study of con- 
junction on transformational lines notes the unacceptability of conjunctions 
with identical conjuncts ('internal similarity' of the conjuncts). She also 
notes "the kind of 'opposition' necessary for the natural use of 'but' ", but 
her analysis is in syntactic and not semantic terms, so she notes that "this 
opposition is apparently not always syntactically marked" (p. 266). She 
also notes that the purpose of conjunction is to indicate contrast or reduce 
repetition (p. 268). 
Also cf. Campbell, 1969, p. 415: ".., the omission of copulatives always 
succeeds best, when the connexion of the thoughts is either very close or 
very distant. It's mostly in the intermediate cases that the conjunction 
is deemed necessary. When the connexion in thought is very distant, 
the copulative appears absurd, and when very close, superfluous ... ". 
21. R. Lakoff is not the first to associate the use of 'but' with expectations. 
Green, 1968, defines 'but' as follows: 
When 'but' conjoins clauses, its use involves a denial that the 
contrary of the following clause is true, although the contrary 
of the following clause is to be expected in the light of 
preceding content. 'But' may thus be considered equivalent 
to 'and' contrary to (your) expectation. 
(pp. 29-30) 
22. R. Lakoff may have in mind not individual presuppositions - indeed, this 
cannot be the case - 
but, rather, the presence of some degree of indeter- 
minacy of criterial conditions in defining the meanings of 
lexical items. 
But see Binnick, 1970, who claims that "the criteria involved in definitions 
exist on different levels and relate directly to one's presuppositions" (p. 150). 
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23. For a definition of 'antonymy' in terms of semantic markers, see 
Katz, 1972. See Kempson, 1977, pp. 84-86, for overview. 
24. Ziff, 1960, argues against the thesis that the word 'good' is an 
'evaluative term'; he writes that "the word 'good' is sometimes said 
to be an 'evaluative term' or a 'term of evaluation'. It isn't. " 
(p. 242). 
25. It must be made clear that by criticizing Lakoff's extended notion of 
antonymy we do not raise any objections against the necessity for the 
assumption of some degree of fuzziness of the distinction made between 
pairs of antonyms (for example, in cases of binary taxonomies). 
Neither do we raise any objections in a definition of antonymy against 
the necessity for envisaging a scalar hierarchy running between polar 
extremes of antonymic pairs (gradable polarity). (See Lakoff's 
comment on pairs like 'hot' and 'warm' on p. 134n. ) What is 
objected to is the recourse to 'speaker-related norms' or 'role-related 
norms' (Leech, 1974) in defining semantic notions. (The concept of 
norm with respect to polarity in adjectives was introduced by Bierwisch, 
1967. ) 
26. See Fries, 1967, ch. for a description of classes of words. 
27. Kempson, 1975, points out that such examples as (64) are counter- 
examples to an account in terms of a semantic component of the con- 
trastive meaning of 'but' because she claims: 
This account of 'but' should in addition predict that 
examples such as 'John is rich but John is poor' are non- 
contradictory because they meet the requisite condition 
of contrastiveness. There is no obvious way to prevent 
such a prediction (p. 57). 
However, this criticism is based on the assumption that indeed Lakoff 
attributes two senses to 'but'. But it must be noted that she talks 
about distinct underlying structures (p. 134) and about the inclusion of 
presuppositions and deductions in our semantic representations (p. 121n). 
Also see Harder and Kock, 1976, p. 21, for a criticism of R. Lakoff's 
claim regarding the two senses of conjunctions. 
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28. This is one of the many terms that are left unexplicated in Lakoff's 
analysis but we will come to that later. 
29. Also see Halliday and Hasan, 1976, p. 252, on the correlation between 
although and but structures. 
30. On this point it is apt to quote Leech, 1974, p. 109: 
Some polar oppositions are basically evaluative, and for 
them there is not only an object-related norm, but a 
subjective, speaker-related norm as well. They include 
good/bad, beautiful/ugly and kind/unkind. These 
evaluative meanings are logically distinct from other polarities, 
because we cannot discuss their implications of truth value 
without distinguishing 'true for Mr. X', 'true for Miss Y', etc. 
Hence they involve a relaxation of the rules of incompatibility: 
I cannot maintain that (a), 'London is beautiful' and (b), 
'London is ugly' are necessarily inconsistent statements, 
because (a) could be true for one person, and (b) for another ... 
Yet a third type of norm, a role-related norm, applies to some 
evaluative polarities, such as good ad and clever stu id: 
thus a 'good boss' may mean not only 'a boss who is goo as 
bosses go' and 'a boss who is good according to Mr. X', but 
also 'a boss who is good at being a boss'. It is largely 
because of this three-fold variability of the norm that words 
such as 'good' and 'bad' are thought to be vague and shifting 
in their meanings. 
Also see Bierwisch, 1967, who distinguishes between those adjectives for 
which a scale of polarity can be set up with a point indicating the expected 
average, 'the norm', between the two polar ends (for example, lang(long)/ 
kurz(short)) and between those for which there can be no such norm between 
two polar ends (for example, gut(good)/schlecht(bad)). 
Not only are these polarities evaluative and unfixed (for example, these 
adjectives are not treated in Bierwisch, 1967, and for obvious reasons) but 
Lakoff wants to employ them as criteria for determining other polarities. 
Also see Ljung, 1974, who notes that there exists no objective scale for 
evaluative adjectives and "it is no doubt true that the presence of such a 
scale facilitates the formation of antonymous adjective pairs" (p. 76). 
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31. See Kempson, 1977, p. 54, for a critical appraisal of this approach. 
32. Incidentally, this is conducive to the supposition that but in (73) refers 
back to (72). 
33. However notice what interpretation is given to it in the above described 
context: John is a Republican (and this is considered an argument in 
favour of the desired goal (conclusion) in our discussion) but (on the other 
hand) he is honest (and this is considered an argument against it). 
According to Davey and Longuet-Higgins, 1976, what you have here is 
two moves, or rather two aspects of a move, of comparable significance 
(that is the reason for having them coordinated rather than subordinated; 
for example: 'Although John is a Republican, he is honest', or vice 
versa, or 'Since John is a Republican, he is honest. ') So actually the 
speaker signals with but that the next part of his move is negative in 
nature as against his first part, and such an evaluation is relative to an 
ongoing desired end, i. e. is pegged on to either preceding discourse, or 
to contextual features. So what gets contrasted here is not one state 
of affairs to another state of affairs, but rather the speaker's evaluation 
of one state of affairs with another. 
34. 'General', in the sense that the resources utilised in such cases are part 
of the stock of our general knowledge of the world. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 4 
1. Of course, we are not here referring to linguistic negation. 
2. These terms are borrowed from Ethnomethodology. 
3. If 'and' is substituted here for 'but' it is still heard as a 'but'. 
4. It must be made clear that by "the 'but' introduced clause" we do not 
mean whatever follows 'but' but rather whatever 'but' introduces in the 
context of syntax. Therefore, subordinate clauses immediately following 
'but' are not necessarily introduced by it as shown below: 
... 
but, before she put him on the table, she thought she 
might as well dust him a little, ... 
Also note that 'but' introduced clauses can carry old information when 
this is made clear by appending phrases to this effect, such as 'as you 
know', 'of course', etc. Intonation may be another point worth 
mentioning here. 
5. Also note the unacceptability of sentences like (i) (G. Lakoff, 1970, 
p. 147): 
(i) *I didn't believe it, although Sid asserted that Max left, 
in which the anaphoric pronoun is in the main clause, while the noun 
phrase is in the following 'although'-clause. If the 'although'-clause 
is preposed, however, the sentence becomes acceptable: 
(ii) Although Sid asserted that Max left, I didn't believe it. 
Loetscher, 1973, pointed out cases like non-restrictive relative clauses, 
which bearing a low information rank, do not belong to the intended 
message level. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 5 
1. Grite is not concerned with cases of fixed stress on particular syllables 
of words, as for example in the pair 'content', 'content'. 
2. See Heritage, 1978, for an introductory gloss of some sequential 
features in conversation. He notes: 
the provision of a first pair part makes the provision of a 
second pair part 'conditionally relevant'. That is, it 
makes relevant the provision of an utterance drawn from 
a delimited sub-class of all produceable utterances. 
(p. 15) 
3. By 'flexibility of coherence' we should understand that the link of the 
next utterance with the preceding one does not have to be explicit 
(uttered) if this link is more than obvious to both participants, and the 
speaker knows, or thinks, that it is obvious to the hearer. In short, 
this link may consist in the mutual assumption of their shared knowledge 
of certain facts about their surrounding world; in such a case stating 
such facts, without an introductory remark to establish them as obvious 
premises of the speaker's following argument, may offend against the 
hearer's assumed claim of his knowledge of such facts. 
4. By 'permissible variation' we should understand a wide range of utterances 
that would potentially belong to this domain of discourse; they can be 
varied, but they should all be well fitted to the first utterance which 
generates the sequence. What constitutes 'well-fittedness' is a 
difficult matter to determine, though intuitively we know which utterance 
is well fitted to which. 
5. The appropriate gloss along Grice's lines can be easily supplied by the 
reader. 
293 
6. It is not here ignored that the notion of 'relevance' is as intractable 
as important and pivotal it seems to be in a theory of language. See 
Dascal, 1977, Levinson, 1978b, Wilson and Sperber, 1979, and 
Holdcroft, 1980, for relevant discussions. 
7. He would be puzzled because he would think that B was acting as if 
he was refusing to meet - at least minimally - the social 
expectations thrust upon him by A's utterance; that is, A would think 
that B was acting as if he was refusing to accept the social role imposed 
upon him by A's utterance. 
8. E. Tripp as early as 1964 notes that the overt behaviour of the hearer is 
manipulated by utterances which express a request. 
9. Indeed, Grice would not be "forced" to accept the presence of such 
implicata. He endorses them; in his Urbana lectures IV, p. 53, 
for example, he notes, 
:., when somebody asks me where he can get some petrol 
and I say that there is a garage round the corner, I might 
be said to imply, not only that there is a garage around the 
corner, but that it is open, and that it has stocks of petrol, 
etc. (emphasis added) 
10. There may be cases in which the need for a prior receipt of linguistic 
messages is overridden by the degree of the emergency of the case. 
Moreover, as Goffman, 1971, p. 92, notes "when circumstances make 
it clear what an individual's need is, help may be volunteered by a 
stranger, providing the need can be satisfied at little cost to the 
satisfier". 
11. Cf. R. Lakoff, 1977, p. 87, who refers to something like a "principle 
of mutual sanity". Indeed, what seems to be at stake here is the 
assumption of the other party's rationality. See Kosher, 1976, who 
substitutes Grice's CP for a rationalization principle: "There is no 
reason to assumed that the speaker is not a rational agent; his ends 
and his beliefs regarding his state, in the context of utterance supply 
the justification of his behaviour" (p. 210). 
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12. It must be pointed out that we do not know whether A's utterance 
initiated the conversation formulating thereby the topical focus. 
Indeed, prior conversation may have preceded this talk-exchange; 
for example, A and B may have been talking about Smith (focus) for 
some time, and A may have now shifted the topic to the question of 
Smith's girl-friend (cf. Schenke in, 1972, on 'topic-focus'). We 
prefer Schenkein's use of these two terms, not only because it is 
conveniently loose, but also because as used here, these terms seem 
to span across discourse pieces rather than structure isolated utterances 
(cf. Halliday, 1967, Chomsky, 1971, Hajicova, 1972,1973, Sgall, 
1972,1975) or question-answer sequences (cf. Venneman, 1975). 
In any case, there is a great deal of confusion in the application of 
these terms and, worse, no agreed terminology. For instance, 
Venneman uses the term topic where Schenkein would use focus and 
the other way round. 
13. The importance of the direction of gaze is obvious in (b). Cf. Goodwin, 
1979, on the significance of non-vocal phenomena such as gaze in the 
construction of sentences. 
14. Cf. Venneman, 1975, who introduces a referential constant in the pre- 
suppositional representation of a topic thus formalizing the minimalization 
of verbalization, in cases in which topic repetition is necessitated by the 
syntax of the sentence. 
15. Cf. the 'professor' example, discussed in 5.1 and, also, (i) given as a 
reply to an enquiry about a friend's settling down to his new job: (i) 
'Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been 
to prison yet. ' (trice, 1975, p. 43) 
16. We here have in mind stereotypic tautologies in which a nounphrase is 
predicated of itself. But see Brown and Levinson, 1978, p. 225, for 
other examples of tautologies. 
17. It is not suggested that these writers are unaware of the complexity of 
the phenomenon of irony. For example Searle, 1979a, p. 113, writes, 
I am not suggesting that this is by any means the whole 
story about irony'nterpreting utterances as meaning the 
opposite. Cultures and subcultures vary enormously 
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in the extent and degree of the linguistic and extralinguistic 
cues provided for ironical utterances. In English, in fact, 
there are certain characteristic intonational contours that go 
with ironical utterances. 
However, Searle cannot have fully appreciated the intricacies involved 
in irony or he would not have defined ironical utterances as follows: 
Ironical utterance - Speaker means the opposite of what he 
says. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through 
sentence meaning and then doubling back to the opposite of 
sentence meaning. (ibid., p. 115) 
This definition must be founded on the view that the majority of ironical 
utterances involve propositional inversion. He also writes, 1979b, 
p. 118: 
41t e speake] may even mean the opposite of what the sentence 
means, as in the case of irony. 
18. Cf. Gordon and Lakoff, 1971, Ziff, 1972b, R. Lakoff, 1973a, b, 
G. Lakoff, 1975, Green, 1975, Mittwoch, 1977, Parret, 1977, Cogen 
and Herrmann, 1975, Kempson, 1975, Wilson, 1975, Gazdar, 1976,1979. 
19. This criticism carries over to Gazdar, 1976, who gives an initial form- 
ulation of "quality implicatures" as follows: 
Utterance of ý by a speaker s implicates ký (where 
for kßf read s knows that p). 
(p. 58) 
20. This claim, of course, reflects the view of conversational implicature 
taken here, which, however, stems from Grice's specification of the 
main characteristics of implicatures. But, see also Cole, 1975, for 
support of this view. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 6 
1. The underlined words are conducive to our supposition that, although 
the speaker has divested himself of the responsibility of having 
implicated that q, the hearer is still left with the impression that the 
professor thinks that Jones is no good at Philosophy. 
2. Cf. Cole, 1975, p. 271: One of the criteria he proposes for the 
presence of conversational implicature is as follows: 
What the sentence to which the rule applies is understood 
to mean is different from the literal meaning conveyed by 
the words making up the sentence. 
3. Some of these issues have been taken up by workers in Ethnomethodology. 
4. We cannot fail to notice that these examples support the claim (cf. 
Levinson, 1978a) that utterances exhibiting various levels of intentions 
do not always stand to a one-to-one relationship with illocutionary 
forces. In this respect, then, Searle's theory of speech acts does 
not provide an adequate account for them. (Cf. Weiser, 1974,1975 
for examples. ) 
5. Would we say that these examples exhibit lack of attention to the factor 
'recipient design'? 
6. Another characteristic of court-room language is a strict turn-taking 
pre-allocation system. (Cf. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974, 
on turn-taking systems, and Atkinson, 1979, on noticeable features of 
language use in court. ) 
7. The demand for linguistic precision is often characteristic of young 
children who have not yet built up an adequate body of factual knowledge 
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to back up language use and understanding. An example is given 
below: 
6-year-old child who has just watched 'Snowwhite' on TV. 
ReaI Child: Mummy, was it naughty that Snowwhite ate the 
data dwarfs' food? 
Mummy: Well, she had been wandering in the woods all day, 
and she was tired and ... 
Child: LTnterruptin97 Look, mummy, was it or was it not naughty? 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 7 
1. For a discussion of this feature see Bach and Harnish, 1979 (Appendix). 
The status of participants, according to Bach and Harnish, is determined 
by the mutual beliefs regarding their respective 'role standards' or even 
their 'normative roles' "if it is mutually believed that they meet their 
standard and they do". They note: 
It is important to make the distinctions embodied in these 
definitions, as the expectations (mutual beliefs activated 
in particular situations) that are directed at people of a 
given type or position can be anticipatory, normative, or 
both. Which they are depends on the type of position, 
and on people's associated mutual beliefs. 
(Appendix) 
Also see Cicourel, 1972. 
2. As pointed out to me by David Holdcroft, if proximity has to be defined 
relative to a tree, then the NP 'the square of 19' must be the most 
proximate to the pronoun as it dominates the noun '19'. This is 
illustrated in the tree-diagram below: 
S 
and 
SS 
V NP V 
DN 
I 
take the squre cube it 
of`19 
The 'rule' would then be that the antecedent is the nearest NP subject to 
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the condition that if NP, dominates NP2, NP1 is nearer. Such a 
rule would make 'the square of 19' the unambiguous antecedent. 
However, consider the pair: 
(a) Take the car from the garage and wax it. 
(b) Take the car from the garage and sweep it out. 
If there was such a rule 'the car from the garage' would have to be 
the antecedent. Yet, in (a) it is clearly 'the car', and in (b) 'the 
garage'. 
3. However in a small study, the paragraph was altered, so that 'the bar 
of chocolate' appeared first, and the lexical item 'soap' was, therefore, 
most proximate to the pronoun. None of the subjects selected 'soap' 
as the antecedent for it. 
q, But see p. 217 below. 
5. For a criticism of extending current conceptions of sentence processing 
see Weiner and Goodenough, 1977. 
6. The original example quoted in Charniak, 1972, is as follows: 
Janet and Penny went to the store to get presents for Jack. 
Janet said 'I will get Jack a top. ' 'Don't get Jack a top' 
said Penny. 'He has a top. He will make you take it 
back. ' 
Charniak goes on to say, 
The trouble here is the it in the last sentence. If we were 
naively to decide that it referred to the last inanimate object 
mentioned, we would conclude that the reference was the top 
Jack currently has. ... 
it is our knowledge of 'presents' 
and returning presents, which is coming into play. 
7. Also see Venneman, 1975, and Stalnaker, 1977, p. 138: "The pre- 
suppositions coincide with the shared beliefs, or the presumed common 
knowledge. " 
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8. CMCAs will roughly correspond to the abstract characterization of a 
setting, C, as in Katz and Fodor, 1964. 
9. Though this remark can be taken to indicate the significance of context, 
it need not be endorsed. 
10. Cf. Bransford and Johnson, 1973, p. 425, who argue that, 
... the relation 
between linguistic inputs and referential 
knowledge structures can be much more dynamic than is 
implied by the general notion of linguistic disambiguation. 
11. This argument seems to hinge on the definite reference of the nounphrase 
"the mop", but the issue is more complicated than it appears if you 
consider examples Iike, 
Last summer we went on a cruise. The captain was such 
a lovely man. 
12. The balloon passage reads as follows: 
If the balloons popped the sound wouldn't be able to carry 
since everything would be too far away from the correct floor. 
A closed window would also prevent the sound from carrying, 
since most buildings tend to be well insulated. Since the 
whole operation depends on a steady flow of electricity, a 
break in the middle of the wire would also cause problems. 
Of course, the fellow could shout, but the human voice is 
not loud enough to carry that far. An additional problem 
is that a string could break on the instrument. Then there 
could be no accompaniment to the message. It is clear that 
the best situation would involve less distance. Then there 
would be fewer potential problems. With face to face 
contact, the least number of things could go wrong. 
13. This background knowledge is brought to bearnot only on the interpretation 
of language, but, first and foremost, on the interpretation of human 
behaviour, and in general of everday activities, as noted by Garfinkel. 
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14. It is worthy of note that such concepts as frames or scenes are finding 
their way into theories of semantics. Cf., for example, Fillmore's, 
1977, 'scenes-and-frames' view of meaning as against checklist 
theories of meaning. Also cf. Margalit's, 1979, adoption of the 
notion of 'hard core beliefs' in his attempt to find a natural solution 
to the problem of "open texture" (Waismann, 1968a). His concept 
of hard core beliefs seems to correspond to that of prototypical chunks 
included in the set of SBKBs, or of prototypic scenes (Fillmore, 1977). 
Also cf. Freede (ed) VII. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 8 
1. The term 'tiedness', however, is used by Sacks, 1967, to identify a 
chaining relation between adjacent pairs. 
2. Labov, 1972a, gives a rule of discourse of the following form: 
If A utters a question of the form Q-SI, and B responds 
with an existential E (including ems, no, Probably, maybe, 
etc. ), then B is heard as answering A with týtement 
E-S, '. 
(p. 300) 
But if we had to give such specific rules for each 'next' utterance type, 
we could rest assured of the necessity for a multiplicity of such discourse 
rules, which, however, would all derive from the interpreter's realization 
of the next speaker's (see Merritt, 1976, for the relevance of this point to 
monologic discourse, where one speaker or author is involved) orientation 
towards a coherent and, hence, relevant next utterance. Also see 
Sacks, 1967, for his notion of 'tiedness'. Searle, 1968, on the other 
hand, gives a different explanation based on his Principle of Expressibility; 
he writes: 
Often we mean more than we actually sue. You ask me, 'Are 
you going to the party? ' I say, 'Yes'. But what I mean is 
'Yes, I am going to the party', not 'Yes, it is a fine day. ' 
(p. 415) 
3. Adjacency pairs represent sequences of activities. 
4. Cf. Schegloff, 1976, "... an adjacency pair is initiated making a second 
pair part relevant, and the second pair part seems to satisfy whatever 
formulation of the notion 'answer' one uses. " 
5. Note that to an invitation or offer, characterized by the notion of query, 
a mere comment of appreciation is usually taken as an acceptance, if it is 
not followed by a rejection. 
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6. The speaker may not even "pass the conversational turn to the next 
speaker". 
7. It must be noted that the utterance 'I have to take out the garbage' can 
be heard as an affirmative answer to the invitation, or, at least, as 
some sort of an answer, if its speaker, for example, makes for the bin. 
The speaker of the first pair part, then, interprets it as meaning 'I have 
to take out the bin first, though. Hang on a minute. ' But even in 
this case, it must be assumed that it had been agreed beforehand between 
the two co-participants, that they would play tennis, or that they 
habitually played tennis. But even under such circumstances, why 
should it be taken as constituting the act of acceptance, or, rather, 
reaffirming acceptance, and not of rejection? 
8. Although, this is the rule, there are exceptions to it, as when a question 
is met by querying the speaker's right to ask a question at all, for instance, 
or by an exclamation at its stupidity, or by pointing out that one is not 
the appropriate person to reply. 
9. The fact that Labov considers 'requests for information' and not invitations 
or proposals, need not concern us here, since the notion of 'query', as 
described earlier, characterizes both types of sequences. That is, in a 
way, (1A) is a request for information, since an answer (though it would 
have to be an acceptance or rejection) is conditionally relevant upon the 
utterance of the first pair part. Moreover, the 'basic organization' of 
adjacency pairs is analysed in terms of the utterance sequence 'question- 
answer' (Schegioff, 1972). 
10. But see Levinson, 1978a, for a criticism of this model of conversation. 
11. Schank and Abelson introduce the term 'track', which refers to a specific 
subclass of script situations, as is, for example, the self-service restaurant 
track in relation to the Restaurant script. Also cf. Bower et al, who 
note that "Different instances of an activity seem to bear a 'family 
resemblance' to one another, but they may possess no common features. " 
12. That, however, does not mean that scripts called up are comparable only 
along the time dimension, but that, in this case, their temporal structures 
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seem to provide the only relational ground between the two scripts, as 
activated by the corresponding utterances. 
13. The accomplishment of goals presupposes the construction of places. 
14. J. Heritage, 1980, notes that "dispreferred responses to requests, 
invitations and the like are regularly expanded by the provision of an 
account which deals with why the preferred option (e. g. accepting, 
granting, etc. ) is not the one selected. " Also see Goffman's, 
1976, 'ritual constraints'. As Owen, 1978, puts it, "a bold 
answer 'yes' or 'no' would have satisfied system constraints, but would 
have left ritual ones unsatisfied; in short, it would have been offhand 
or rude. 11 Also see Green, 1975, p. 10. 
15. Cf. Heritage, 1980, p. 5: "... a primary 'context' to be investigated 
is the immediate sequential environment of an utterance - the turn that 
preceded 'this utterance' ". 
16. Cf. Fillmore, 1977, who, in a 'scene-frame' approach to the description 
of meaning, argues that "a set of procedures or cognitive operations such 
as comparing, matching, filling in, and so on", should implement an 
account of the process of communication. 
17. Also cf. Dascal, 1981, for a critical discussion of Ziff's analysis of under- 
standing in terms of deciphering. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER 9 
1. In cases in which there are more than two rival referring expressions 
denoting persons as in (5), Grice has not provided us with any heuristic 
method whereby the implicature of 'an x' expression is to be understood 
in relation to one of them, rather than the other. 
2. By the way, Hawkins' account would settle Kroch's, 1972, problem 
concerning the use of the in sentences like (i), 
(i) John ate the apple; 
the question Kroch raises is that according to Grice's'M. Quant', the 
speaker should have said (ii), 
(ii) John ate all of the apple, 
if he wanted to convey thereby that all of the apple was eaten. By 
conversational implicature, therefore, (i) should be taken as meaning 
'John ate at least some of the apple', if it is to be assumed that 'M. Quant' 
is observed. He concludes that Grice's maxims are too general and 
vague. Cf. Kempson, 1975, p. 155, who tries to counter Kroch's 
argument but rather unsuccessfully. Also cf. Wilson, 1975, p. 104 ff, 
who raises interesting issues in considering the in relation to Kroch's 
problem. 
3. Cf. Habermas, 1970, I. He notes that "the choice between definite 
and indefinite articles ... does not express a characteristic of the nouns but, rather, certain pragmatic relationships". 
4. It could be noted that inalienable possession receives special treatment 
in the linguistics literature, as it is considered to raise special problems 
(cf. Fillmore, 1968, Chomsky, 1970). 
5. Grice's analysis of existential presupposition of definite expressions in 
terms of conversational implicatures (cf. Urbana lectures) in which the 
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expression in question is taken as 'common ground', does not furnish us 
with any method for determining how to relate one definite description 
to another, if they are relatable, as indeed is the case in (12). 
6. Due to lack of space, familiarity is here assumed with the protracted 
dispute over the question of definite descriptions and their significance 
for logical theory. Russell, 1905, analysed denoting expressions in a 
tripartite conjunction, which, he claimed to represent their true logical 
structure which was distinct from their misleading surface grammatical 
form. For example, the familiar example, 
(1) The King of France is bald, 
is represented as in (2): 
(2) (i) There is at least one King of France. 
(ii) There is at most one King of France. 
(iii) This entity is bald. 
If any of these three clauses is false, so is (1). The significance of 
this analysis for a two-valued logical system is obvious. However, 
this analysis was severely criticised by Strawson, 1950, who developed 
the notion of presupposition, first introduced by Frege, 1892. Strawson 
claimed that if either (2)(i) or (2)(ii) are false, we cannot assign a truth- 
value to (1). As he put it, "the question simply does not arise". 
Quine, 1960, coined the term 'truth-value gap' for such cases, Austin 
invented the term 'infelicities' (1961,1962) while Searle, 1969, called 
such utterances 'defective'. But see Strawson, 1964, where his 
position is significantly modified. Grice's motivation for trading on 
conversational implicature in the case of definite descriptions is obvious. 
By claiming that (2)(i) and (2)(ii) are implicated rather than asserted or 
presupposed, the two-valued logical system is left intact, while our 
linguistic intuitions are explained away in a purportedly acceptable way. 
Thus Grice manages to steer clear of both the presuppositional reef and 
the assertional reef. 
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NOTES 
CONCLUSION 
1. Of late quite a few analysts seem to favour an interactional approach 
to language analysis. Cf. Dascal, 1977, Widdowson, 1979, Motsch, 
1980. 
2. (86) A: I'm out of petrol. 
B There's a garage round the corner. 
(2) A: Let's play tennis. 
BI have work to do. 
3. Cl. Loetscher, 1973, and Sadock, 1972, for examples containing clashes 
of scripts. 
4. Cf. R. H. Turner, 1970, p. 474: ".., norms are at least partially equatable 
with expectations". 
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